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Abstract English 
 
In 2008, following the electoral triumph of the center-right coalition in Italy, the newly 
appointed Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, announced that a “national security 
emergency” had deprived the Italian population of the right to be free from fear. Even 
though the Premier refrained from identifying the roots of this state of affairs, the 
subsequently launched “security package” clarified that, alongside terrorism and 
organized crime, immigration was deemed to be one of the security threats to the 
Mediterranean country. It was based on this assessment that, in the years of 2008 and 
2009, immigration policy took a repressive turn in Italy: as a result of this understanding 
of the phenomenon, a number measures said to criminalize movers, and of provisions 
accused of violating these individuals' freedoms and basic human rights were adopted. 
This securitized policy evolution was, however, at odds with the basic values upon 
which the Italian Republic is founded. As a liberal democracy, Italy should abide by 
human rights laws and standards, regardless of the pressures and difficulties brought 
about by the international context. In light of this observation, how have security 
concerns managed to circumvent and suppress the necessary presence of human rights 
considerations in the country's immigration policy? The present study aims at 
addressing this question. Since contemporary political battles over the definition and 
handling of societal matters mostly occur in and over language, this study is based on a 
critical discourse analysis of the parliamentary debates that led to the approval of the 
centerpiece of the Italian “security package”, the Security Law no.94, concerning 
“Provisions in the Field of Public Security”. 
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Abstract German 
 
In 2008, nach dem triumphalen Wahlsieg der Mitte-rechts Koalition in Italien, 
verkündete der neu angelobte Premierminister, Silvio Berlusconi, dass eine „nationale 
Sicherheitsnotlage“ die italienische Bevölkerung um ihr Recht frei von jeder Furcht zu 
sein gebracht habe. Obwohl der Premier die Ursachen dieser Sicherheitslage nicht näher 
identifizierte, machten die anschließend verabschiedeten „Sicherheitspakete“ klar, dass 
neben Terrorismus und Organisierter Kriminalität, Immigration als eine Gefahr für den 
Mittelmeerstaat angesehen wurde. Basierend auf dieser Einschätzung  nahm 
Immigrationspolitik einen repressiven Schwenk in den Jahren 2008 und 2009 in Italien: 
daraus folgte das Phänomen der Kriminalisierung von Immigranten. Diese Evolution 
der Sicherheitspolitik steht aber im Widerspruch zu den grundlegenden Werten, auf 
Basis deren die italienische Republik gegründet wurde. Als eine liberale Demokratie 
sollte Italien Menschenrechtsgesetze und Menschenrechtsstandards berücksichtigen, 
unabhängig von durch den im internationalen Kontext erzeugten Druck und 
Schwierigkeiten. Angesichts dieser Beobachtungen stellt sich die Frage wie 
Sicherheitsbedenken es geschafft haben, die Bedenken in der Immigrationspolitik 
bezüglich der Menschenrechte zu umgehen und zu unterdrücken. Die vorliegende 
Studie setzt sich mit dieser Frage auseinander. Nachdem aktuelle politische Kämpfe 
über Definition und Behandlung von gesellschaftlichen Belange mehrheitlich durch 
Sprache ausgefochten werden, basiert diese Studie auf einer kritischen Diskursanalyse 
der parlamentarischen Debatten, welche zur Annahme des Herzstücks des italienischen 
„Sicherheitspaketes“, das Sicherheitsgesetzt Nr. 94, bezüglich „Zusätze im Bereich der 
Öffentlichen Sicherheit“, relevant waren.
Acronyms 
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1 Introduction 
 
The news coverage of the public security problems afflicting Italy during the late 2007 
and the beginning of 2008 heralded what would become one of the central themes of the 
general elections of March 2008, namely: the “national security emergency”. 
Aggressions, murders, rapes, robberies, assaults, growing signs of urban degradation, 
garbage disposal troubles, problems with Rom camps, among others, filled the pages of 
the main newspapers of the country, and prefigured the (in)security polemic that would 
take over that year's political campaign.
1
 As expected, the widespread sense of unease 
related to the concern about crime and victimization and to the perception of increasing 
urban disorder and decay was instrumentally mobilized by political actors for electoral 
purposes. The center-right coalition in particular – which had hitherto been in the 
opposition, and had observed the successive failures of the center-left government to 
address Italy's pressing security problems – , built a political platform that strongly 
relied on the call for legality. It was based precisely on this law and order political 
program that Silvio Berlusconi became for the fourth time the President of the Italian 
Council of Ministers.
2
 
 In consonance with the bloc's electoral promises, the months that followed the 
political dispute were marked by an intense endeavor to approve a “package” of security 
measures that would, according to the rhetoric used by the newly formed majority, 
restore one of the primary rights of the citizenry: the right to live a life free from fear.
3
 
To this end, the so-called “security package”4 included a large number of legislative 
measures, which covered a highly heterogeneous set of topics, ranging from terrorism 
and mafia to violence on sports stadiums and immigration policy. In respect to the latter 
topic, it is noteworthy that new regulations on immigration gained a disproportionate 
amount of space in nearly all the laws that compose the “security package”: not only did 
                                                 
1
Laura Sartori. Lavavetri, Punkabbestia e Rom, Spritz, Furti e Graffiti: Cos'è l'insicurezza in Italia?. In: M. 
Donovan and P. Onofri (Eds.). Politica in Italia. I fatti dell'anno e le interpretazioni. Edizione 2008. 
Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008, p. 281-300. Available at: 
<<http://www.darwinbooks.it/doi/10.978.8815/144072/_13__3>>. 
2
Evelyn Shea. Elections and the Fear of the Crime: The Case of France and Italy. European Journal of 
Criminal Policy and Research, n.15, 2009, p.83-102. Available at: 
<<http://www.springerlink.com/content/qgq7h877k8877925/>>. 
3
The right of the Italian citizenry to live a life free from fear was declared by the Italian Premier Silvio 
Berlusconi on the occasion of the Third Council of Ministers of the current  government (Naples, 21
st
 
of May of 2008). The audiovisual archive of this conference may be found on: Governo Italiano, 
Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. Audiovideo della Conferenza Stampa a Termine del Consiglio 
dei Ministri n.3, Naples, May 21
st
 2008. Available at: 
<<http://www.governo.it/GovernoInforma/Multimedia/dettaglio.asp?d=39096>>. 
4For a list of the measures included in the “security package”, see: Annex 1: The Italian “Security 
Package”. 
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the first governmental decree (no.92) deal extensively with cross-border movements of 
people, but so did most of the decrees announced thereafter, and the main draft law 
proposed (Bill S 733 and AC 2180) by the government to regulate security-related 
matters. Together, these pieces of legislation contained a bundle of provisions that 
significantly modified the country's policy framework on immigration, as well as the 
legal condition of foreigners residing in Italy.
5
 
 The inclusion of immigration regulation on public security acts is neither new, 
nor surprising. Illustrative of this is the fact that since the Fascist regime, the Italian 
state has approached foreigners with some degree of suspicion, after all, in times of 
international turbulence migrants potentially represent a danger to the national security 
and to the public order of a country.
6
 But that is not all: over the past fifty years, 
international movements of people, particularly from the developing areas of the world 
to high-income regions, have received progressively more attention, becoming by the 
dawn of the twentieth first century one of the main global concerns not only of Italian, 
but of all Western politicians and electorates.
7
 In fact, migration has been consistently 
approached by European political classes as an ever-increasing problem to national 
cultural identities, to economic prosperity, and to the maintenance of the public order.
8
 
  
 More specifically, the treatment of the migratory phenomenon as a problem in 
the old continent dates back to the mid-1970s, when faced by a period of economic 
strain, traditional recipients of foreign workers and of post-colonial subjects decided to 
halt the entry of migrants to their territories – a decision that failed to achieve its 
objectives due to the right to family reunification, which maintained the incoming flows 
of people alive.
9
 However, back then, the increasing public awareness of migration 
merely turned the issue into a public concern, and it was only in the 1980s that the 
                                                 
5
Massimo Merlino. The Italian (In)Security Package: Security vs. Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights 
in the EU. Research Paper n.14, CHALLENGE Project, 2009, p.1-33. Available at: 
<<http://aei.pitt.edu/10764/1/1809.pdf>>. 
6
Giovanna Zincone. Immigration and Immigrant Policy-making in Europe, 2009. In: Giovanna Zincone, 
Rinus Penninx and Maren Borkert. Migratory Policymaking in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors and 
Contexts in Past and Present, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011. 
7
Martin O. Heisler and Zig Layton-Henry, Migration and the Links between Social and Societal Security, 
p.148-166. In: Waever, O. et al. (eds.) Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. 
London: Pinter, 1993, 221 p. 
 And: Héctor Gorski, C. Fernández, and A. Manavella. A Right-based Approach to Migration Policies 
in a Context of Emergencies: “Expelling states ” and Semi-persons in the European Union. Work 
package 9: University of Barcelona. CHALLENGE project, 2009, p.1-12. Available at: 
<<http://www.libertysecurity.org/article2499.html>>. 
8
Jef Huysmans,The European Union and the Securitization of Migration. Journal of Common Market 
Studies, v.38, n.5, 2000, p.751-777. Available at: << http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-
5965.00263/pdf >>. 
9
Jef Huysmans,The European Union and the Securitization of Migration, 2000. 
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phenomenon came to be framed as a troublesome matter related to more serious societal 
problems, including inter alia economic and political instability, raising criminality and 
terrorism.
10
 Needless to say, this perception was aggravated after the 2001 terrorist 
attacks.
11
 Italy was no exception to these patterns. In spite of the fact that immigration is 
somewhat more recent in this Mediterranean state, the portrayal of foreigners as security 
threats is neither a new nor an isolated event: even though a fully fledged security 
emergency had not been announced before, popular hostility and repressive immigration 
policies have been quite common in the country. Alessandro Dal Lago
12
, for one, argues 
that third-country nationals have been approached as public enemies in the country at 
least since the mid-1990s. 
 Notwithstanding the growing anxiety surrounding immigration in the European 
continent, statistical data does not seem to justify these fears: even though the 
movement of people towards industrial countries has increased since 1945
13
, the share 
of international migrants in the world's population has remained surprisingly stable over 
the past half century, and unlike developed countries' restrictive immigration policies 
suggest, most of these cross-border movements occurred either between developing 
regions or between high-income countries themselves.
14
 Moreover, as it is expressly 
recognized by the European Union (EU)
15
, barriers to international movements of 
people are being erected at a time when the economic and demographic input of 
immigrants is considered ever more important to the mature economies of the Northern 
hemisphere, as they face aging populations and labor market shortages in low and high-
skill sectors.
16
 In spite of this need, the general objective of European immigration 
                                                 
10
Jef Huysmans,The European Union and the Securitization of Migration, 2000. 
11
Didier Bigo et al. The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security: Mid-term Report on the 
Results of the Challenge Project. CHALLENGE Project, 2007, p.1-45. Available at: 
<<http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf_ChallengeMidReport.pdf>>. 
12
Alessandro Dal Lago. Non-persons: The Exclusion of Migrants in a Global Society. Milan: IPOC di 
Pietro Condemi, 2009. 288p. 
13
James F. Hollifield. The Emerging Migration State. International Migration Review, v.38, n.3, 2004, 
p.885-912. Available at: <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/27645420>>. 
14
United Nations Development Programme. Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development. 
Human Development Report, 2009, 229p. Available at: 
<<http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_Complete.pdf>>. 
15
The European Commission recognizes the importance of immigration to the continent's economy in a 
number of Communications, notably the one on immigration, integration and employment, issued in 
2003. What's more, the Council has also acknowledged the economic significance of immigration in a 
number of occasions, such as in the European Councils of Tampere and The Hague. See more in:  
European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 
Immigration, Integration and Employment, COM/2003/0336, 2003. Available at: <<http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0336:FIN:ES:PDF>>. 
16
James F. Hollifield. The Emerging Migration State, 2004. 
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policies continues to be the limitation of the scale of migration.
17
 Restricted entry is 
justified on various grounds, but the argument that immigration poses dangers to the 
internal security of states has been popular among politicians, bureaucratic bodies and 
the media.
18
 Indeed, in Italy, the approval of a “security package” that spends as much 
time trying to restrict immigration as it does fighting terrorism and criminal 
organizations can only be reasonably justified  if the migratory phenomenon is 
considered a serious security threat per se. 
 To be sure, migration, similarly to other social phenomena, may in fact become a 
cause of turbulence to receiving and sending societies. For starters, the incoming and 
outgoing flows of individuals may create conflicts within and between states.
19
 
Historically, for example, the displacement of populations has triggered clashes between 
political units in the international system.
20
 International and internal migrants may also 
cause distress within polities, either because governments are unable to manage cultural 
and political changes related to their presence, or because communities of outsiders are  
perceived as cultural and economic threats to the native population.
21
 When it comes to 
countries of origin, the increasing magnitude of human capital flight from developing to 
developed countries is certainly one of the worrisome aspects of emigration, in 
particular because the loss of bright minds and ultimately of the resources spent to 
educate and train them are enduring deprivations to countries undergoing development 
processes – even more so if they possess scarce financial and scientific resources.22 
 These problems indicate that, in itself, the political attention devoted to the 
migratory phenomenon is not misplaced: incoming and outgoing flows of individuals 
have unpredictable, yet crucial consequences for both sending and receiving states. 
Thus, they are likely to significantly affect the future of most societies around the globe. 
In this sense, the attempt to understand and manage the phenomenon seems to be a step 
in the right direction. However, this endeavor should be an enlightened one, that is to 
say, it should be founded upon well-informed assessments of the multiple causes and 
                                                 
17
Despite the restrictive character of these policies, developed countries often adopt positive measures to 
attract the better educated. See more in: United Nations Development Programme. Overcoming 
barriers, 2009. 
18Jef Huysmans, Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of ‘Securitizing’ Societal Issues, p.53-72. In: R. 
Miles and D. Thränhardt (eds), Migration and European Integration: the Dynamics of Inclusion and 
Exclusion. London: Pinter, 1995, 209 p. 
19
Myron Weiner, Security, Stability and International Migration. International Security, v.17, n. 3, 1992, 
p.91-123. Available in: << http://www.jstor.org/pss/2539131 >>. 
20
There are several instances of cases in which immigrants and refugees represented political risks to their 
host countries, most notably in the Middle East. See more in: Myron Weiner, Security, 1992. 
21
 Myron Weiner, Security, 1992. 
22
Soumana Sako. Brain Drain and Africa's Development: A Reflection. African Issues, v.30, n.1, 2002, p. 
25-30. The African "Brain Drain" to the North: Pitfalls and Possibilities. Available at: 
<<http://econ399.atwiki.com/file/open/21/Brain+Drain+and+Africa%27s+Development.pdf>>. 
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consequences of migration
23
, and not based on a negatively biased view that conceals 
the potential and actual positive impacts of human mobility. This is exactly the problem 
with much of the policy-making in the West, as well as with the new Italian legislation: 
politicians, electorates and the media often disregard the positive contributions 
immigrants bring to their societies, such as their help in boosting economic growth.
24
 
 Despite this and many other beneficial effects, the disproportionate focus on the 
disruptive consequences of international flows of people suggests that migration is still 
chiefly associated to notions of destabilization and insecurity.
25
 Indeed, over the last two 
decades, the presence of immigrants in Europe was not only politicized, but effectively 
securitized, that is to say, migration was turned into a security concern, into a matter of 
life or death.
26
  Collectively held understandings about the impacts of migration upon 
European societies frequently include the portrayal of  immigrants as carriers of 
multifarious threats to the continent's way of life; foreigners are considered menacing 
not only because they are said to displace native workers from their jobs, thereby 
augmenting unemployment, but also because their presence in Europe allegedly 
endangers the cultural, social and political foundations of Western societies.
27
 The 
questionable character of such considerations suggests that immigration is not 
inherently a security concern, but that it came to be framed as such through a process of 
social construction.
28
 The establishment of tougher visa requirements, the reinforcement 
of border controls, the usage of new technologies to augment the level of surveillance 
over populations, the weakening of asylum-seekers' status and the formation of 
transnational collaboration schemes between polices and intelligence services are some 
of the concrete results of the formation of this migration-security nexus.
29
 From this 
viewpoint, it is clear that the Italian “security package” is not alone: it follows a 
European-wide trend. 
 Although contestable, the securitarian approach to migration usually goes largely 
unchallenged. In part, this is because this perspective is but one component of a wider 
                                                 
23
In fact, this is precisely what the Human Development Report of 2009 attempts to achieve: by studying 
the multiple causes and consequences of human mobility, the contribution shows how well-informed 
migration policies could help to enhance human development. See more in: United Nations 
Development Programme. Overcoming barriers, 2009. 
24
United Nations Development Programme. Overcoming barriers, 2009. 
25
Martin O. Heisler and Zig Layton-Henry, Migration and the Links, 1993. 
26
Jef Huysmans, Migrants as a Security Problem, 1995. 
27
Jef Huysmans,The European Union and the Securitization of Migration, 2000. 
28
Roxanne Lynn Doty. Immigration and the Politics of Security. Security Studies, v.8, n.2, 1998, p.71-93. 
29
Anastassia Tsoukala. Looking at Migrants as Enemies, p.161-92. In: D. Bigo and E. Guild (Eds), 
Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and within Europe.  Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005. 283p. 
10 
global development, namely: the emergence of a “risk society”, to use Ulrich Beck's30 
terms. According to this view, since the end of the Cold War, the world is undergoing 
deep social, political, cultural, environmental and technological transformations, which 
in addition to creating new risks to humankind, question the capacity of modern 
rationality to dictate the best means to achieve desirable social outcomes. As a result of 
the desperate attempt to make sense of, and to manage these changes, novel insecurities 
and risks are identified, or rather anticipated.
31
 However, differently from conventional 
states threats, new dangers are potentially global in character and may emanate from a 
diverse and unpredictable number of sources, such as from technological advancements, 
and environmental changes. The heterogeneous character of the Italian security package 
illustrates well this point. It is precisely because these dangers' objective “capabilities” 
and ideological strength cannot be gauged that they are seen as particularly alarming to 
the Western world.
32
 Therefore, in spite of not representing tangible and certain threats, 
these alleged dangers – including the ones related to cross-border movements of people 
–, generate a logic of emergency and suspicion, which leads, by its turn, to the adoption 
of concrete measures and policies of prevention and risk management, oftentimes at the 
expense of people's rights and liberties.
33
 
 A paradoxical picture results from this process: in order to safeguard their 
populations from the imprisonment that is living in fear, contemporary liberal 
democracies increasingly chose to counteract sources of insecurity with illiberal 
practices, and justify their actions by resorting to the maxim that “security is the first 
freedom”.34 The Italian case is paradigmatic in this respect: whereas, on the one hand, 
the Premier Berlusconi contended that the package of security measures launched by his 
government would allow the resident population to live a life “free from fear”, on the 
other hand, the critics of the novel set of security laws (analysts, NGOs, Catholic groups, 
amongst others) argued that the provisions breached the rule of law, and the 
fundamental rights of nationals, and of foreign-born individuals living in Italy.
35
 Despite 
critiques to illiberal practices, political manoeuvres that breach the liberal and 
democratic principles of Western societies are generally deemed acceptable due to the 
                                                 
30
Ulrich Beck. Living in the World Risk Society. Economy and Society, v.35, n.3, 2006, p.329-345. 
Available at: <<http://www.skidmore.edu/~rscarce/Soc-Th-Env/Env%20Theory%20PDFs/Beck--
WorldRisk.pdf>>. 
31
Ulrich Beck. Living in the World Risk Society, 2006. 
32
Ulrich Beck. Living in the World Risk Society, 2006. 
33
Didier Bigo et al. The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security, 2007. 
34
Didier Bigo et al. The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security, 2007, p.1. 
35
Massimo Merlino. The Italian (In)Security Package, 2009. 
11 
urgency attributed to security-related problems.
36
 Paradoxically, however, the 
predominance of security over freedom and individual rights tends to reinforce the 
climate of fear and unease that first motivates the adoption of illiberal practices. This 
happens because the acceptance of the latter as a legitimate means to safeguard the 
population institutionalizes the securitization of an issue, as well as the sense of urgency 
related to it.
37
 In other words, ironically, measures devised to re-establish a secure 
international or national environment often function as a feedback device that maintains 
the “politics of unease” alive.38 
 A parallel mechanism seems to be operative in the handling of immigration both 
in Italy and in Europe as a whole: several restrictive policies initially established to 
counter threats allegedly related to, or stemming from the migratory phenomenon have 
brought about negative consequences to immigrants' rights, as well as to European 
populations' freedoms. The rising supremacy of the security logic over immigration-
related matters has led European states to adopt several controversial measures that 
breach not only liberal and democratic principles, but also basic human rights, as the 
criminalization of irregular migrants in Italy exemplifies.
39
 Besides, the restrictive and 
exceptional character of this type of legislation has helped to reinvigorate the senses of 
insecurity and unease that were already predominant in the continent.
40
 Therefore, the 
reduction of the migratory phenomenon to a security problem has served to exacerbate 
rather than to diminish the insecurities and vulnerabilities of European societies. As a 
result of these developments, over the past two decades, a hegemonic discourse about 
immigration emerged in European governmental spheres: according to this discourse, 
immigration is a threat to individual nation states and to the continent as a whole.
41
 In 
                                                 
36
Didier Bigo et al. The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security, 2007. 
37
Didier Bigo. Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. 
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, v.27, 2002. Available at: 
<<http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5002461855>>. 
38
Didier Bigo. Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease, 2002. 
39
This may happen either directly – by progressively diminishing the rights associated to different 
immigrant statuses – or indirectly – for instance, by creating detention centers for migrants, or by 
using technologies of surveillance and control over persons, who are profiled as dangerous without 
having committed any crime. See more in: Ryszard Cholewinski. The EU acquis on irregular 
migration: reinforcing security at the expense of rights. European Journal of Migration and Law, v.2, 
2000, p. 341-405. Available at: 
<<http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/ejml2&div=28
&id=&page=>>. And: Héctor Gorski, C. Fernández, and A. Manavella. A Right-based Approach to 
Migration Policies, 2009. And: Didier Bigo et al. The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and 
Security, 2007. 
40
Didier Bigo et al. The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security, 2007. And: Didier Bigo. 
Security and Immigration, 2002. 
41
Alessandra Buonfino. Politics, Discourse and Immigration as a security concern in the EU: a tale of two 
nations, Italy and Britain. Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Uppsala. 
Workshop: ‘Who Makes Immigration Policy? Comparative Perspectives in a post 9/11 world, 2004, 
12 
Italy, the identification of the migratory phenomenon as one of the main threats to the 
security of the country, coupled with the approval of the novel set of security laws – 
notably of the Law no.94, the main legislative piece of the package –, made it clear that 
the understanding of migration in the largest Southern European country, too, has been 
dominated by a security logic. On the consequences of this view, we have that other 
concerns related to the migratory phenomenon, such as “rights-based” considerations, 
were relegated to a second plane.
42
 
 The dominance of a securitized discourse on immigration did not preclude the 
emergence of antagonistic alternatives to it; on the contrary, there are scholars, NGOs, 
political actors, parts of the media and even segments of the lay population which 
criticize this framing of migration, and chose to approach the issue from different 
perspectives, that is, as a social, economic, political and human phenomenon. However, 
the understanding of migration as a phenomenon somehow related to security has not 
only become dominant, but, as the usage of the term “hegemonic” suggests43, it has 
been, to a large extent, naturalized; in other words, the equation immigration, thus 
risk/danger became largely commonsensical both in the public and academic spheres.
44
 
Yet, this is no reason to assume that the linkage between migration and security is 
absolute and undisputed
45
; those who question this perspective point out a number of 
reasons for which its dissemination is problematic and worrisome: firstly, the alleged 
negative impacts of migration over security do not bear resemblance with the 
phenomenon's empirically observable consequences; secondly, the migration-security 
nexus reduces the complexity of the migratory phenomenon to a question of risk 
management and threat annihilation in detriment to the multifarious aspects of this 
social, economic, and above all, human process; thirdly, such a negative understanding 
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of international mobility masks several issues and interests influencing the treatment of 
immigrants in European states
46
; and, fourthly, this perception justifies the adoption of 
policies that affect negatively the rights and freedoms of native citizens, as well as those 
of foreign residents.
47
 
 Needless to say, these problems are interconnected in that they stem from the 
consideration that migration is a complex phenomenon that goes far beyond the security 
logic; it is a process that involves economic, demographic, humanitarian, historical and 
political considerations – to name a few. Therefore, whereas the current predominance 
of an overly negative, simplified and debatable view of immigration flattens the issue to 
a question of establishing a condition of “freedom from fear” through the elimination of 
alleged risks and threats
48
 – regardless of what it takes to reach such objectives –, the 
multitude of understandings mentioned above elucidates that there is no reason to 
presume that the security-migration nexus is the only discourse type informing policy-
making processes and debates on migration in Europe. Moreover, as Huysmans and 
Squire
49
 note, migration is not the sole complex variable here: securitizing processes, 
too, as social and political processes, are embedded “in social and societal negotiations 
of central political questions, which are rarely engaged exclusively in security terms”.50 
 Notwithstanding the plurality of discourses on the international movement of 
people, it should be stressed that the dominance recently acquired by the securitarian 
narrative generates concrete problems for foreigners, in particular because its 
hegemonic position means that security policy is the main – albeit not the only – type of 
policy mediating belonging in Europe (again, the recent policy evolution in Italy 
exemplifies this point).
51
 Accordingly, the criteria of membership to European political 
communities, as well as their measures of integration are directly influenced by the 
identification or anticipation of threats and risks, and such influence may lead (and has 
led) to cuts in immigrants' rights and freedoms. In this respect, however, it is also 
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interesting to highlight that there are other, additional principles which necessarily 
inform these countries' politics of belonging, notably the notion of liberalism, 
fundamental/human rights, and democratic values (these are referred to throughout the 
rest of this study as the “rights-based” discourse).52 These principles lie at the heart of 
European polities, and therefore can hardly be ignored by politicians and policy-makers. 
This means that the influence of security policy over immigration regulation is not 
unrestricted: foreigners cannot be reduced to dangerous subjects whose presence in 
Europe is unwanted; they must be treated as human beings invested with fundamental 
rights. Hence, the capacity of states to exclude aliens is not absolute, even in a context 
dominated by the securitization of foreigners. The proliferation of immigrant statuses 
over the past half century is symptomatic of this process, as Joppke
53
 observes: 
“empirically, immigration has multiplied membership categories in Western societies, 
defying the citizen-alien dualism of either full or no membership at all”.54 
 Despite the theoretical imperative to take immigrants' rights as human beings 
into account, a puzzling picture still emerges if one compares these considerations to the 
recent, repressive development of immigration policies in Europe, and more specifically 
in Italy. In light of this contradiction, the following inquires emanate: if a liberal, 
“rights-based” discourse must be given a voice in liberal democracies55, how can one 
explain the fact that several policies devised to regulate immigration in European states 
impact negatively on foreigners' rights and freedoms? Why and how have security 
concerns progressively managed to circumvent the necessary presence of human rights 
considerations in European regulatory frameworks? In other words, what explains the 
ground gained by security concerns in immigrant-related matters, and how are other 
liberal and humanitarian discourses silenced? The present study aims at addressing 
these questions, using the Italian “security package” as a case study. As mentioned 
previously, the measures that compose this “package” are accused of violating the 
freedoms and fundamental rights of both the native and foreign individuals residing in 
the country. It is precisely due to this repressive and clearly securitized policy evolution 
that Italy is considered a valuable case to examine here. Taking into consideration that 
the securitarian understanding of immigration is a socially and politically constructed 
                                                 
52
Christian Joppke. Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 368p. 
53
Christian Joppke. Immigration and the Nation-State, 2003. 
54
Christian Joppke. Immigration and the Nation-State, 2003, p.6. 
55Even more so with the legal development of wider a “rights-based liberalism” both nationally and 
internationally, as stressed  by Hollifield. See more in: James F. Hollifield. The Emerging Migration 
State, 2004. 
15 
view, and that contemporary political battles mostly occur in and over language
5657
, a 
focus on how the dominant security narrative on immigration suppresses the “rights-
based” discourse in institutionalized sites of political and ideological struggle – as the 
government, the Parliament or security institutions – seems to be appropriate to 
investigate the inquire. Therefore, in order to canvass the matter, the present study looks 
at the parliamentary debates that culminated in the adoption of the main legislative 
piece of the “security package”, the Security Law no.94 (Bill S 733 and AC 2180), 
concerning “Provisions in the Field of Public Security”. What's more, since language is 
simultaneously one of the main sites in which, and means through which political 
contentions take place, these debates are analyzed using the interpretative 
methodological framework of critical discourse analysis provided by the discourse 
analyst Norman Fairclough.
58
 
 As it was mentioned above, immigration has both positive and negative 
consequences for receiving and sending states, and due to this uncertainty as well as to 
other factors, contemporary states adopt an ambivalent position in relation to the 
phenomenon.
59
 Most of the so-called developed states, including Italy, are reluctant to 
open their borders, even though many of them need the extra manpower provided by 
foreigners. This ambivalence generates a contradictory state of affairs: whereas most 
people are free to leave their home countries, the majority of states have in place 
restrictive immigration policies, which not only regulate who is allowed into the 
territory, but also  for how long, under what conditions, for which purposes and so on. 
In fact, as said, the propagation of legal migration statuses reflects precisely the 
conflicting interests of state actors in immigration.
60
 Since states' norms and rules of 
membership and belonging originate a spectrum of inclusion and exclusion of outsiders, 
which respects receiving societies' needs, duties, international agreements, etc, the 
present paper advances the hypothesis that in order to discursively conciliate an 
exclusionary security discourse with an inclusive “rights-based” discourse, 
parliamentarians of the center-right coalition instrumentally use the Italian state's 
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official categorization of migrants. In more detail, the hypotheses put forth here are the 
following: 
 
– The “rights-based” discourse on immigration is instrumentally appropriated by 
the actors advancing a security logic; 
– The antagonistic aspects of these discourses are brought together in the rules and 
procedures of membership and belonging of the country. In other words, the articulation 
of a legal and institutional framework that transcends the notion of foreigners as a “non-
I”, as an“Other”, allows politicians to formulate a spectrum of inclusion and exclusion 
against which the worthiness and dangerousness of each immigrant may be gauged. 
– This framework provides the government with the power of discretion to: 
– translate security concerns into policies that target specific, “dangerous” groups; 
– maintain a “rights-based” facade to migration regulation; and 
– advance national economic interests related to the inflow of particular categories 
of foreign-born individuals (e.g. high-skilled and seasonal migrants). 
 
 In order to investigate whether these hypotheses are correct or if they should be 
qualified, altered or even discarded, this study is divided in five parts. In addition to this 
brief introduction, it contains three main chapters and a final, conclusive section. The 
main objective of the subsequent chapter is to introduce the conceptual framework that 
supports the foregoing discussion, as well as the analysis delivered thereafter. To this 
end, the securitization theory, the migration-security nexus, as well as the social theory 
of discourse that underlies the approach to critical discourse analysis used here are 
further explored. The third chapter, in turn, introduces the case study under investigation 
in this work, that is, it presents the brief history of immigration in Italy and the 
evolution of the country's immigration policy from the mid-1980s until the security 
provisions adopted by the fourth Berlusconi government (2008-today). However, it 
should be added that this chapter aims at more than simply rebuilding the history of 
migration in the Mediterranean state; it endeavors to disclose, based on scholarly 
literature, the main frames used by the Italian population to approach immigrants, as 
well as to demonstrate that a securitized perception of the phenomenon became 
dominant in the country over time. Thereafter, the fourth chapter presents the critical 
discourse analysis of the parliamentary debates that led to the approval of the Security 
Law no.94, concerning “Provisions in the Field of Public Security”, in addition to 
introducing in further details the methods used in the analysis. At last, the fifth part 
17 
concludes the study by summarizing the main inquire as well as the main findings of the 
analysis. What's more, some qualifications are made to the conclusions of the study 
based mostly on methodological difficulties. 
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2 Securitizing Immigration: a theoretical overview 
 
The main objective of the present chapter is to introduce the theoretical and conceptual 
framework that backs up the discussion presented previously, and the inquiries to be 
investigated in this study. Therefore, the “securitization” theory, the nexus between 
migration and security, as well as the social theory of discourse that underlies Norman 
Fairclough's
61
 approach to critical discourse analysis are explained in some detail. In 
addition, the chapter starts up with a brief introduction on a wider, yet important 
phenomenon to understand the securitization of migration in the Western hemisphere, 
namely: the emergence of societies obsessed with managing and controlling risks, 
insecurities and threats. In order to present this large array of topics orderly, the 
remaining of this chapter is organized as follows: succeeding the first section on the rise 
of uncertainty and insecurity in Europe after the Cold War, the securitization theory is 
introduced, both in its early version – which provides the basic conceptual framework to 
analyze security phenomena as social constructions –, and in its upgraded state, which 
includes a number of criticisms and reformulations that enriched the theory and helped 
to expand its applicability. Thereafter, the migration-security nexus is explored, and 
problematized. At last, Fairclough's
62
 social theory of discourse is introduced, with a 
focus on his discussion about language, power and ideology. 
 
2.1 The invisible enemy: the rise of insecurity in Europe 
 
The end of superpower rivalry in the middle of the 1980s does not seem to have made 
the Western  hemisphere a safer place: the prominence of security issues in national and 
regional political agendas, the apparently multiple and unforeseen global risks to 
mankind, the novel character of known threats, and the politics of fear instigated by the 
mass media and political classes are strong indicators that, despite the end of the Cold 
War and the unprecedented level of prosperity of Western populations, security matters 
and their management still occupy much space in the minds of both policy-makers and 
lay people. The emergence of societies haunted by known and unknown dangers – 
ranging from the very concrete threat posed by the degradation of the natural 
environment to the virtual risks wrought by technological changes – is said to be 
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associated to the fast pace and radical character of widespread transformations that 
affect various spheres of life, notably globalization, regional integration, and continued 
modernization.
63
 The resulting scenario is one of a society in the midst of an 
overwhelming 'swathe of change' which, for its complexity, cannot be properly managed, 
and much less grasped. Thus, the opening of this epoch of uncertainty also brings the 
utility of modern rationality, based on simple means-end calculations, into question as 
multiple futures become possible.
64 65
 The current difficulty, or rather incapacity to 
comprehend the causes and to envision the consequences of these transformations 
generates doubts and fear of what is to come. Yet, these developments must be 
confronted somehow in that their good and bad products affect the present, and shapes 
the future of mankind.
66
 
 Therefore, despite the incalculable character of risks, human societies are still 
attempting to manage insecurities and to mitigate potential dangers. The irony of this 
approach is that, due to their uncertain and ultimately unpredictable character, risks are 
possibly infinite, and thus, in trying to anticipate them, security experts and others end 
up proliferating the amount of situations, processes and actors that may eventually 
represent threats to humanity.
67
 One of the most important consequences of this 
paradoxical state of affairs is the emergence of a “risk society”. This expression, 
originally formulated by Ulrich Beck
68
, is meant to describe late-modernity's obsession 
with the identification and management of potential dangers. In this sense, the author 
states that: “being at risk is the way of being and ruling in the world of modernity; being 
at global risk is the human condition at the beginning of the twenty-first century”.69 In 
spite of the prevalence of this (in)security logic, risks are not real; that is to say, unlike 
traditional security threats, such as the concrete nuclear and military power of the Soviet 
Union, risks are devoid of substance, they are anticipations of possible scenarios, they 
are social constructions.
70
 This consideration puts an interrogation mark over the very 
definition of security: if uncertainty about the future is enough to disseminate a 
widespread politics of fear, this means that security is also a socially constructed 
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condition, i.e. it is the representation of a condition as being devoid of dangers, rather 
than a condition in itself.
71
 In this sense, societies may feel secure or insecure regardless 
of the empirically observable conditions of safety or danger of a given situation. 
 The constructed character of security is well illustrated by the situation in which 
Western European countries found themselves after the end of the Cold War: at first 
glance, given the establishment of a peaceful international order, in which no real state 
threat existed, analysts would most probably describe the continent as a safe place. 
However, as mentioned in the beginning of the present section, this was not how 
European politicians and electorates chose to approach the recently gained freedom 
from a hostile nuclear neighborhood. According to Buzan
72
, the demise of the 
Communist bloc did not eliminate instability and insecurity in the old continent; on the 
contrary, the early 1990s were marked by the unfolding of a sociopolitical revolution, 
which resulted from the intensification of the globalization process, as well as from the 
deepening of regional integration. Together, these processes are said to have exposed 
national societies – hitherto shielded from the external world by territorial borders – to a 
number of strong international pressures, such as the competitiveness requirements of 
the global, neoliberal economic order. As a result, insecurity and uncertainty continued 
to take part of the region's everyday life.
73
 
 The transformations spurred by globalization and regionalization demonstrated 
that, although sources of fear and insecurity were no longer to be found in state actors, 
this by no means meant their disappearance
74
; rather, as both Beck
75
 and Buzan
76
 argue, 
instability and insecurity were found elsewhere, in a diffuse set of entities, processes 
and transformations, whose potential risk is however, incalculable. This understanding 
was reinvigorated and aggravated in the early 2000s as a result of terrorist attacks in the 
United States and Europe.
77
 Additionally, it became  clear that the state as such was not 
the sole entity whose existence could be put into question by the products of this 
ongoing revolution. In fact, currently, risks are de-localized, meaning that they are no 
longer confined to one territory, but are omnipresent, threatening the globe, specific 
regions, states, as well as small localities.
78
 In this regard, it is interesting to note that 
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the direct exposure of domestic contexts to new pressures coming from abroad also 
paved the way for the emergence of a new focus for insecurity in Europe, namely the 
society.
79
  As a result of these developments, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the 
concept of “societal security” was coined by scholars of the Copenhagen School of 
security studies. According to Weaver , societal insecurity refers to: 
 
[...] the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing 
conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the 
sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns 
of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and 
custom.
80
 
 
 In light of this novel understanding, the European security agenda, traditionally 
concerned with military threats, was no longer suitable to address the rising sources of 
instability and insecurity in the continent. In this context, the task of safeguarding 
populations against alleged dangers coming from abroad became particularly difficult 
for national states in that the objects to be protected were unclear, defined by the loose 
and subjective ideas of identity and society. Moreover, as aforesaid, detecting potential 
menaces to “national” security became an arduous job since these are neither confined 
to the territories and institutions of states' counterparts nor necessarily material and 
immediately obvious.
81
 Immigration illustrates well this point, and it was in fact one of 
the issues captured by the logic of this new and more multifaceted understanding of 
insecurity, as it is going to be further discussed later on. Therefore, this uncertain 
environment required the traditional security vocabulary to be revisited and broadened 
in order to, first, subsume the apparently ever-increasing number of actors and events 
under the label of “threats”, and second, to define what and/or who was being 
threatened.
82
 
 In spite of the urge to reform the security vocabulary and tools, the reappraisal of 
the field did not lead to a decrease in the importance of the traditional Westphalian state 
as a basic point of reference to those occupied with security concerns.
83
 In this respect, a 
point to note is the aforementioned rise of the concept of “societal security”, which 
clearly reflects the persistence of the framework of nationality – a crucial component of 
the modern nation-state – in identifying dangers and in defining measures to mitigate 
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their effects.
84
 The continued strength of this and other conceptual and institutional 
statehood components in dealing with security concerns may be considered surprising in 
that new risks and threats are global in extent, multifarious in character, and may 
originate within, as well as outside territorial borders. In light of these developments, it 
seems slightly paradoxical that the state and its central elements –  territoriality, 
sovereignty, citizenship and nationality – prevail as the lenses through which the 
challenges of the contemporary world are viewed. In addition, the fact that the classical 
sovereign state has been weakened in this transformed global environment indicates that, 
although still serving to structure Western societies' thought, the Westphalian political 
model is no longer capable of providing efficient means to appropriately manage the 
world in the twenty-first century.
85
 So, why hold on to these concepts? 
 According to both Beck
86
 and Bigo
87
, the persistence of this somewhat 
anachronistic frame is partly explained by the idea of politics of denial: governments, 
having to cope directly with the uncertainty of an ever-changing world, chose to rely on 
conventional responses and measures in order to safeguard themselves, that is to say, to 
keep their positions of authority and power untouched. If instead they recognized that 
national modes of governance are ill-equipped to face the challenges of a global risk 
society and that humankind must look for new, more cosmopolitan solutions for current 
difficulties, they would be voluntarily giving up some degree of power and authority, 
although they would probably be more successful in managing this age of global crisis 
and risk.  However, politicians, in addition to being unwilling to lose their authority, 
know that declarations of intent and legislation often suffice to quiet down unsatisfied 
electorates and to reinforce their legitimacy.
88
 Meanwhile, national and transnational 
security agencies, albeit motivated by a similar self-interested reasoning, take a more 
globally oriented view as the identification of unconventional threats and risks to 
nation-states and regions allows them to widen their field of competence and to 
preserve their functions and budgets.
89
 
 The problem with the maintenance of an outdated
90
 conceptual and institutional 
                                                 
84
Although Weaver's idea was differentiating state security from societal security, more often than not the 
former serves as a container of the latter. Therefore, both notions are still embedded into a statehood 
vocabulary, even though they are meant to denote different referent objects. 
85
Ulrich Beck. Living in the World Risk Society, 2006. 
86
Ulrich Beck. Living in the World Risk Society, 2006. 
87
Didier Bigo. Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease, 2002. 
88
Anastassia Tsoukala. Looking at Migrants as Enemies, 2005. 
89
Didier Bigo. Security and Immigration, 2002. 
90Here, the term “outdated” is not used as a reference to the technological basis of security apparatuses, 
but rather in reference to modern, means-end rationality, which cannot grasp current events, regardless 
of how much technology is put into such efforts. 
23 
security framework is that it not only fails to diminish the feeling of unease; the attempt 
to use modern knowledge to foresee, prevent, manage and control potential threats 
actually enhances insecurity, for it proliferates risks, as it was explained above. What's 
more, the focus on the state reifies national boundaries, the mythical idea of nationality, 
as well as the sovereign power of national governments.
91
 This consideration clarifies 
that inadvertently relying, for example, on the above mentioned claim that national 
societies are now the new focus of insecurity is to accept that the debatable notion of 
national identity possesses concrete existence, and that it can be endangered by external 
processes, including immigration.
92
 Interestingly, it is precisely because this notion of 
societal security provides a fixed point of reference to populations facing insecurity that 
it seems to have conquered the hearts of political classes, of the media, and of normal 
citizens.
93
 Hence, despite of being a shallow understanding, the idea of an endangered 
society gained stage in the political sphere due to the predominant climate of fear and 
unease within Europe. In this sense, the concept of societal security, first created by the 
scholars of the Copenhagen School to function as an analytical tool, may not be useful 
as such
94
; however, its artificial content demonstrates that concepts such as security, 
risks, dangers and threats are, regardless of their materiality, results of the political 
mobilization of politicians, security agencies, the media, amongst other relevant actors. 
 To be sure, the reflection presented so far does not have the objective of 
questioning and/or evaluating the truth behind security claims, but rather to show how, 
independently of their concreteness, risks and dangers are politically and socially 
constructed, especially – but not only – by powerful actors, who often possess particular 
interests in the maintenance of a politics of fear and unease. Yet, the global 
transformations mentioned before do affect the present and future possibilities of 
humans all around the globe. Moreover, due to their unpredictable and overwhelming 
character, they help to disseminate the feeling of insecurity and suspicion in societies. 
Politicians and security agents, amongst other actors, in responding to potential dangers, 
are the main actors responsible for determining what is a threat or not, and unfortunately, 
these decisions are not always motivated by public concerns, but rather by other 
interests – consciously or not. In this context, the current focus on the notion of societal 
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security is not surprising: the rise of fears and anxieties in Europe, the deterioration of 
standards of living, and the recurrence of international financial and environmental 
crises help to explain why populations feel and believe that their identities and ways of 
life are somehow endangered. The image of a threat not only conveys the idea that 
appropriate action is being taken to counteract risk, but also provides citizens with a 
framework in which they can reassure themselves. Therefore, to sum up, in the world 
risk society, security can no longer be understood as a value to which human beings 
aspire, nor can dangers and risks be immediately connected to concrete threats; these 
realities are social and political constructions, as it is going to be further explained in 
the subsequent section. 
 
2.2 Securitization Theory: Copenhagen School and Beyond 
 
The main objective of this section is to introduce the theoretical mechanisms through 
which a narrative of (in)security is socially and politically established. In light of this 
goal, the theory of securitization is presented for it represents the first attempt in the 
field of security studies to recognize the socially constructed character of security 
threats. Since the theory received inputs from various sources, the beginning of the 
section is devoted to presenting the early work of the first proponents of the idea of 
securitization, the Copenhagen School
95
, and thereafter, the main criticisms and 
reformulations of the theory are exposed. 
2.2.1 The Copenhagen School: the concept of securitization and the 
importance of language 
 
In the academic world, the definitional challenges imposed by the post-Cold War 
international environment led to a re-conceptualization of the security field, firstly 
proposed by the Copenhagen School of security studies. This intellectual refreshment 
was based on a distancing from the previously dominant idea of state security, and on 
the definition of a new center of analysis: the notion of survival. In other words, even 
though national sovereignty was still considered important, the emergence of a new 
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security agenda in Europe had clarified that security was not intrinsically about the state 
and its apparatus, and that this narrow focus was no longer appropriate to tackle 
challenges imposed by the new world order.
96
 In order to overcome these limitations, 
the proponents of the Copenhagen school recalled those working in the field that 
security concerned primarily survival, that is to say, it is fundamentally about the pursuit 
of freedom from threats.
97
 Insofar as survival underlies the quest for security, it is 
possible to identify many potential existential threats, certainly more numerous than the 
predominance of military and political concerns had led analysts to believe. Also, based 
on this view, different types of referent objects
98
, in the domestic and international 
spheres, may be view as existentially threatened, including states, societies, political 
systems, and even the environment, as it was briefly mentioned in the previous section. 
Hence, this re-conceptualization of the field indicated that the security vocabulary could 
be – and was – legitimately used to discuss matters that went far beyond the limiting 
idea of safeguarding state sovereignty. It was during these early stages of theoretical 
development that securitization scholars came up with the aforesaid notion of societal 
security. According to them, the society, too, could be approached as a referent object 
from a security viewpoint: whenever the maintenance of collective identities – that is, 
the ability to live as a 'we' – is seen as existentially threatened, the idea of societal 
security could be legitimately used to refer to and to describe the problem.
99100
 
 Despite the multiplication of sources of dangers, the proponents of the 
Copenhagen School observed that oftentimes the rhetoric of security was employed 
without the actual existence of a menace. Immigrants, for one, have been frequently 
associated to a number of social troubles in Western Europe, such as criminality, 
terrorism, and economic stringency, especially after 9/11.
101
  It is, however, hard to 
prove empirically that the presence of foreigners is factually related to these problems. 
Even so, regardless of the veracity of these security claims, under the right 
circumstances, the mere utterance of a connection between migrants and criminality, for 
instance, may prove to be sufficient for governments to enact the adoption of emergency 
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measures to counteract the putative threats.
102
 Based on this detachment between 
objective reality and (inter)subjective constructions about the world, Buzan, Weaver and 
de Wilde
103
 argued that the meaning of security could not be directly derived from what 
would be analytically, philosophically, or even consciously defined as such; rather, 
security is a self-referential practice. Put differently, a security practice exists not 
because there is an underlying concrete reality justifying security claims, but because 
the practice of these claims turns a certain element or aspect of the reality into a threat 
that must be neutralized through extraordinary means. Whenever a rhetoric of survival, 
urgency, and existential threat is used to approach a matter, and thereby justifies the 
adoption of urgent measures that go beyond what is defined as normal politics in a 
country, this event constitutes a securitizing move. In case this move is supported by a 
relevant audience, the securitization of an issue is achieved. In sum, securitization is 
defined as: 
 
[a speech act] through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed 
within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a 
valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures 
to deal with the threat.
104
 
 
 The difference between a securitizing move and securitization emphasizes the 
importance of the construction of an intersubjective understanding in the establishment 
of a security drama – although the acceptance of the discursive move by the audience 
may be tacit. As stressed previously, in order to be supported by a political community, 
the content of the speech act advocating the existence of a threat does not need to find 
correspondence in reality. However, an unreasonable claim is unlikely to be accepted as 
legitimate. This fact indicates that there must be a set of facilitating conditions for a 
successful security speech act. In fact, Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde
105
 define a few 
circumstances under which the success rate of security utterances is augmented. More 
specifically, they identify two categories of facilitating conditions: a linguistic-
grammatical one, and an external, contextual and social condition. Whereas the latter 
category refers to the position held by the enunciator of a securitizing move – and thus, 
to the social capital and authority he/she possesses –, and to the historical conditions 
associated with the threat, the former indicates that certain linguistic rules must be 
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respected for the act to be efficient, in particular the adoption of a grammar of security 
for the establishment of the drama. 
 In this respect, Huysmans
106
 contends that language has an integrative capacity 
that allows several isolated discourses – such as migration, religious fundamentalism, 
drugs and terrorism – to be related and combined into a whole, unique security narrative. 
The adequate formulation of this narrative requires a specific organization of the 
securitizing actor's enunciations, so that they are understood as security utterances.
107
 
The reliance on the use of language for the creation of a security drama indicates that 
this linguistic instrument not only represents the world and supports communication 
between individuals, but also assumes a performative role through which meaning is 
constructed. In this sense, the vocalization of security concerns is not only a speech, it is 
a speech act that possesses constructive qualities.
108
 Even though the utterance itself is 
the act, once a speech act successfully generates the collective understanding of a topic 
as a security concern, this move is then expected to influence or to significantly shape 
concrete actions. In other words, the securitization of an issue is a political act, and as 
such, has real world consequences that will lead actors to operate in new, different ways. 
Therefore, the discursive articulation of a security concern is said to structure social 
practices that follow, particularly policies.
109
 
2.2.2 Theoretical amendments and (some) reformulations: the role of 
practices and other concerns 
 
Although the concept of securitization represented a much needed and praised 
innovation in the field of security studies, it has also proven to be highly controversial: 
it raises dilemmas ranging from the normative implications of the theory to the 
appropriateness of its terminology.
110
 In fact, a number of scholars have disclosed gaps 
in its early theoretical formulation, and in trying to solve these issues, have contributed 
to improve the explanatory power of its framework.
111
 It should be noticed, however, 
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that the objective of this subsection is not to present an exhaustive account of the 
contributions that criticize and amend the Copenhagen School's early version of 
securitization. Rather, the goal here is to review exclusively the developments that are 
considered important for the analysis presented in the following chapters of this work. 
 Several elements of the original framework of the securitization theory are 
deemed problematic by critics in the field of security studies, even though there seems 
to be a widespread agreement over the theory's main contention, that is: security and 
threats are social constructions, not factual realities. While the answer to what is 
securitization seems to be well accepted, the responses to how and by whom such 
processes come to be established have received much less support. As a result of these 
controversies, a lot of work was invested in revising both the means through which a 
process of securitization sets in, and the actors responsible for such an articulation. 
According to McDonald
112
, these problems stem from the fact that the process of 
securitization, as defined by the Copenhagen School, is too narrowly conceived: while 
in its original formulation, political leaders and speech acts are always privileged in 
explaining how a security concern comes into being, in the real world other actors and 
means are capable of establishing and maintaining a security narrative.
113
 
 The ways to construct a security threat have probably been the theory's main site 
of contention, with many scholars criticizing the Copenhagen School's excessive focus 
on discourse in detriment to other types of practices which may also lead to security 
formations. Didier Bigo
114
 is one of these critics: relying on Bourdieu's and Foucault's 
works, this author claims that by concentrating exclusively on speech acts, the 
Copenhagen School ended up overlooking a number of heterogeneous practices that 
might contribute to incite processes of securitization. Although acknowledging the 
importance of politicians' populist rhetoric, the author stresses that new technologies of 
surveillance and control, as well as institutional practices of security professionals are 
themselves independently responsible for creating and advancing nexuses between 
security and other “risky” phenomena, such as immigration – Bigo's case study.115 If 
bureaucratic practices and technological artifacts may indeed become means to 
articulate and advance a security construction, this means that the 'empirical referents of 
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policies'
116
 – i.e. policy tools and instruments – also have the potential of conveying the 
idea that certain processes or entities are dangerous, regardless of whether the 
vocalization of such claims took place or not. In this sense, securitization is a much 
wider process than it was first imagined by its Danish proponents; a securitizing move 
may take place “above and beneath the discursive ‘level’” 117 , and therefore, the 
audience's acceptance of such moves is not always required. Balzacq's
118
 study, for 
example, demonstrates how some of the European Union's technical devices – e.g. the 
Schengen Information System (SIS), the Eurodac and the Visa Information System – are 
more than objective technological responses to specific public needs; all of them 
became, to a larger or lesser extent, concrete embodiments of securitized representations 
of particular entities. Hence, they too are capable of conveying the idea that certain 
people/processes/objects threaten European societies. 
 In a similar line of argumentation, Williams
119
 contends that the theoretical body 
developed by the Copenhagen School remains underdeveloped in that securitization 
cannot be reduced to a linguistic rhetoric, especially in a world marked by the 
preponderance of alternative forms of political communication, such as televisual ones. 
Although his work focuses exclusively on the role of images, Williams
120
  suggests that 
securitization, as a performative act, may rely on a number of contextual, institutional 
and symbolic resources, not only on language. Interestingly, this multimodal view of 
social constructions is supported by some critical discourse analysts, who believe that 
language is but one aspect responsible for structuring and representing social reality.
121
 
 The debate on whether discourses should be or not understood as the sole source 
of securitizing moves denotes the existence of two “centres of gravity of securitization 
theory”: an internalist centre and an externalist one.122 The former bears more direct 
correspondence with the early conceptualizations of securitization proposed by the 
Copenhagen School, which tend towards a postmodern/post-structural position. 
According to this perspective, analytical priority should be given to the speech act event 
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itself in that utterances are considered powerful performative actions capable of 
constituting new social meanings, as well as of changing patterns of social relations. In 
light of the inherent power of speech acts to bring about change, the social context in 
which actions take place is deemed unimportant.
123
 Conversely, the externalist position, 
drawing on social constructivist insights, attributes central role to the social setting in 
which a successful security narrative is established. Speech acts are embedded in 
specific socio-political contexts, and even though these contexts are certainly influenced 
by linguistic actions, utterances cannot be understood separately from the larger context 
in which they emerge.
124
 In other words, discursive practices are socially embedded 
practices; that is, they are influenced by dimensions of power, by social structures, by 
organizational practices, among others. As it is shown ahead, this is the perspective 
privileged in the present contribution. 
 The discussion presented thus far impinges directly upon the debate over which 
actors should be considered securitizing actors in that the clarification that securitization 
is not limited to discourse practices implies that other agents may become messengers 
of security constructions. In fact, Bigo
125
, by focusing on bureaucratic practices, looks 
for those responsible for the formulation of security problems within and beyond the 
political sphere. According to him, a number of actors working in different power 
positions possess the symbolic power to determine what is and what is not a threat or a 
risk to society. Hence, in addition to politicians, he highlights the role of security 
professionals in the process of securitization. Since these actors are thought to be 
endowed with privileged institutional knowledge about the management of dangers, 
they can legitimately make security claims without having to prove their contentions.
126
 
Another powerful actor in this regard is the media
127
, as Williams'
128
 preoccupation with 
the role of televisual communication in securitization processes demonstrates. 
 However significant the contributions of powerful actors may be, it is also 
important to notice that at least in principle any actor could be responsible for turning an 
issue into a security threat for securitization is a social process. In this respect, Doty
129
 
remarks that, notwithstanding the centrality of powerful political participants in 
formulating security claims, the productive capacity of language cannot be completely 
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controlled by such actors; thus, theorists must be opened to the possibility that less 
powerful, subaltern groups may actively take part of the construction of security 
concerns or alternatively – and more likely –, they may take positions against the 
securitization of certain topics, as observed in the case of immigration.
130
 The reason 
why these voices should be heard in the academic sphere is two-folded: first, a 
normative problem emerges if scholars decide to neglect these articulations, since they 
would be effectively contributing to the marginalization of the less powerful; secondly, 
these groups often attempt to contest dominant security constructions, and  the 
continued preponderance of mainstream representations means that in an unspecified 
manner, securitizing actors manage to silence these voices.
131
 Therefore, it seems that it 
is not possible to fully understand how a security narrative is formed, unless this process 
of negotiation and/or subjugation  is clarified.
132
 Taking into consideration the multitude 
of actors potentially involved in the construction of a security narrative, one may assert 
that securitization, besides being a social process, is also a political construction: 
security professionals, politicians, the media, politically and socially engaged sections 
of the population, amongst other actors, struggle to establish what Bigo
133
 calls a 
“hierarchy of dangers”. Even though amateurs, such as associations, NGOs and 
churches can intervene in the security game, professionals and politicians have the 
advantage of exercising authority and are thus, more likely to be heard.
134
 
 As a political game, securitization reflects the interest of securitizing actors in 
advancing their own agenda – as it was explained in the previous section. That is to say, 
politicians identify threats to their states and constantly feed a politics of fear and 
unease not because this approach is more likely to mitigate the multifarious risks to 
which societies are certainly exposed, but because these moves reaffirm the sovereign 
character of the state and, more importantly,  politicians' own positions of authority. 
Likewise, bureaucracies and other actors often base their securitizing moves on their 
self-interests, as illustrated by security professionals preoccupation in maintaining their 
budgets. Hence, power, in addition to determining those who are more likely to be heard 
when talking about security, is reified through securitization. To be fair, Buzan, Weaver 
and de Wilde
135
 are not completely blind to the importance of this category: the 
acknowledgment of a set of facilitating conditions for the establishment of a successful 
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speech act clearly expresses their awareness of the importance of power, as well as of 
additional contextual factors, such as historical and institutional factors. However, due 
to their excessive focus on discourse, these important elements of the theory remained 
under-theorized.
136
   
 The importance of power in explaining the articulation of security narratives 
further emphasizes that “contextual” factors should assume a bigger role in the 
theoretical framework of securitization.
137
 In fact, without this amendment, the theory is 
ill-equipped to fully address complex processes taking place within a polity. Boswell
138
 
demonstrates empirically this theoretical inadequacy by showing that a straightforward 
relation between securitizing discourses and policy practices cannot be observed in 
Europe: where governments remained unwilling to discursively construct a security 
narrative, security professionals did not hesitate to prompt processes of securiticization 
through practices and policies
139
; similarly, where security rhetorics were unequivocally 
included in official political discourses, the resulting  policies were often not congruent 
with the views conveyed.
140
 According to the author, such notorious differences 
between praxis and discourses may be attributed to the different operational dynamics 
that underlie the political and administrative levels of a polity, as well as to the various 
sets of interests that inform politics and policy-making.
141
 These crucial factors are, 
however, excluded from the Copenhagen School's formulation. 
 These critiques and revisions concerning the form and context of securitization 
have yet another theoretical implication: if security threats may be embedded in 
everyday bureaucratic and institutional practices, as well as in technical devices, and if 
there is a continuous political struggle over the definition of dangers, this means that 
(in)security is not always an exceptional condition verbally expressed at a given space 
and time, as first formulated by the Copenhagen School.
142
 Rather, security articulations 
of the type described along this section must be understood as social constructions that 
became institutionalized: they are reiterated in political speeches and in the media, they 
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are ingrained in routine bureaucratic practices and in policy instruments, and their 
exceptional character has given way to normal politics.
143
 To be sure, this normalization 
does not mean that institutionalized threats are not considered dangerous; what it does 
mean is that the representation of certain entities or events as menaces is incorporated 
into quotidian practices, and are more likely to be perceived as managerial problems, 
whose risks must be calculated and controlled.
144
 In this regard, the components of the 
Copenhagen School themselves differentiate between ad hoc and institutionalized 
securitization, the former consisting of the initial stages of the process, and the latter 
referring to a point when the portrayal of an issue as threatening becomes a natural, 
commonsensical political discourse.
145
 Nevertheless, this division replicates problems 
already mentioned in this section: the relevance given to discursive practices neglects 
other forms of securitization and downplays the importance of the social, political and 
institutional context in which a securitization move occurs. 
 
2.3 Migration and security: a “dangerous” connection 
 
For the proponents of the theory of securitization, “security is what agents make of 
it”.146  Apparently, over the last two decades, European agents have been keen to make 
of security a condition contradictory to immigration flows. As mentioned previously, 
foreign groups in Europe are associated to a number of social and economic problems, 
and this connection contributes to enhance the climate of insecurity already 
predominant in the continent. In times of economic crisis and political disturbance, this 
negative image of the immigrant is said to become peculiarly pronounced.
147
 Yet, it 
should be noticed that, presently the linkage between insecurity and immigrants is all 
but exceptional: it can be easily observed in newspapers and magazines, in official 
political discourses, in the everyday contentions of extremist political parties, in the 
actions of xenophobic groups, among other manifestations.
148
 As a result of the success 
obtained by this securitized picture of foreigners, migration has been legitimately 
included in the European security agenda, both domestically and regionally. This 
section aims at introducing how and why the nexus between migration and security was 
formed, how it became institutionalized, and how it affects the lives of immigrants and 
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of European citizens. Based on scholarly literature, and in accordance to the view of 
securitization presented above, the discussion demonstrates that this nexus is a social 
and political construction that serves specific interests of actors working within 
European polities. 
 The previous sections of this chapter argued that since the last decade of the 
twentieth century, human societies, in particular Western ones, have been experiencing a 
novel type of insecurity, one that is neither directly related to political and economic 
troubles nor to military threats, but rather to profound transformations that affect several 
spheres of social life, such as globalization and continued modernization. The migratory 
phenomenon, albeit dating back to the very beginning of human history on Earth, is 
certainly influenced by these changes.
149
 In fact, advances in transportation and 
communications technologies and the open character of what is now a truly global 
economy are some of the factors that help to explain the accelerated pace of 
international migration.
150
 As a result of these new possibilities, European states are 
now hosting a seemingly ever-increasing amount of foreigners.
151
 However, more than 
being influenced by these contemporary transformations, cross-border movements of 
people are seen as a part of the changes responsible for destabilizing the self-assurance 
of modern societies.
152153
 Current migration flows, as expressions of transnationalism, 
are said to challenge the very foundations of nation-states, notably the principles of 
bounded territoriality and absolute sovereignty. 
 Paradoxically, it is the very existence of sovereign territorial polities that creates 
the conditions for the existence of international migration – for without states there 
would be no borders to be crossed. Hence, the state is implicated in the definitional 
creation of migration.
154
 More than that, states have also enabled movements of people 
in direct ways throughout history: first, the creation of the principle of territoriality 
freed individuals from ties of personal bondage, thereby allowing them to become 
mobile; second, the formation and the sustainability of the interstate system has always 
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required communication and boundary exchanges between its components; third, states 
have actively instigated trans-border movements according to their needs, as illustrated 
by colonizing states and, more recently, by guest worker schemes; and, fourth, most 
states grant individuals the right to exit their territories. Therefore, as Joppke
155
 argues, 
the relationship between migration and states is not exclusively negative; instead, it is 
ambivalent: “it is one of mutual conditioning and exclusion at the same time”.156 
 This ambivalence may, in fact, be observed in the contradictory way states deal 
with international migration: on the one hand, individuals are given the right to exit the 
territory of their countries of origin; on the other, most states put in place severe 
restrictions to the entrance of foreign citizens.
157
 What's even more surprising in this 
respect is that, while maintaining strong border controls, most advanced industrial states 
value the ingress of certain categories of aliens, feel obliged to accept others, and often 
chose to overlook the presence of unwanted ones. Together, this mixture of freedom, 
constraint, and necessity generate a paradoxical situation for states, one in which they 
must try to reconcile the imperatives of closure and openness.
158
 But why hold on to 
borders so strictly? As mentioned, one of the justifications for this restrictive approach 
is that, from the perspective of a national state, the movement of people across borders 
represents not only a violation of sovereignty and authority, but also a challenge to the 
alleged unity of the national community. However, this somewhat theoretical 
explanation is enduring, and therefore, it does not account for the increasingly 
restrictive character of immigration policies in Europe. Instead, the fact that migration 
slowly developed into a security concern seems to be more important here. 
 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the aforesaid contradiction between entry and 
exit became even more pronounced in that most European countries increased their 
entry barriers at a time when the freedom to move was being enhanced by technological 
and political transformations. The pervading changes spurred by the acceleration of 
globalization combined with the emergence of societies unsettled by fear, uncertainty 
and anxiety help to explain this paradoxical development in that, together, they made it 
easier for immigrants to become scapegoats for any type of societal problem.
159
 With 
the number of newcomers moving upward, and due to their different cultural baggage 
and lower socioeconomic status, it was not too difficult to associate distressful 
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occurrences to the apparent rise of migration. In such a critical context, the inescapable 
and burdensome task of managing the social, economic and political presence of 
outsiders in a country is easily subverted into popular, yet convincingly misleading 
connections, such as: the notions that immigrants heighten economic insecurities; that 
European borders are too porous, and thereby, allow waves of foreigners to invade the 
continent; that immigrants are prejudicial to social cohesion and to the public order, 
etc.
160
 Thus, the widespread feeling of unease and the transformations wrought by the 
process of globalization have functioned as a fertile soil to the construction of the image 
of the immigrant as a threat to the continent's security. 
 However, the population's susceptibility to the securitized image of migration, 
alone, does not explain its rise, much less its contemporary preeminence. As it should be 
clear by now, the relationship between migration and security is not natural, and it 
certainly does not stem from concrete societal problems; on the contrary, it is socially 
and politically established, firstly by securitizing actors. According to Bigo
161
, national-
level politicians and security professionals at both the domestic and supranational 
spheres are the main actors responsible for articulating and disseminating the migration-
security nexus in Europe. The political rhetoric used by the first group to formulate a 
security narrative is widely recognized by those studying the issue, since the 
Copenhagen School's early version of the theory privileged the discursive power of 
politicians in securitization processes. Indeed, the vision of Buzan, Weaver and de 
Wilde
162
 does not seem to be at all inaccurate when the case under consideration is the 
political presentation of immigration in Europe: many professional politicians have 
been engaged in discursively advancing the view of foreigners as either a source, or an 
aggravating factor of socioeconomic troubles.
163
 The immediate motivation underlying 
such formulations is electoral since the topic is very useful in mobilizing voters in times 
of political disputes. As Tsoukala
164
 indicates, the issue's profitability in these situations 
is derived from the fact that it occupies the political agenda in a more or less perennial 
basis, and from the fact that, potentially, migration can be connected to many other 
topics – in this way, it becomes easier to divert the attention of the people from more 
serious concerns. Moreover, the objective to curtail immigration is more or less a 
straightforward goal, one which does not require the politician to propose particularly 
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innovative policies to please voters; in fact, in this regard, Tsoukala
165
 argues that 
citizens who are concerned about immigration are usually quieted down by the mere 
adoption of symbolic measures. 
 Notwithstanding the importance of the electoral game in explaining politicians 
willingness to portray migrants as menaces, another dynamic is also significant in 
accounting for this move: with the rise of globalization and with states' partial loss of 
control over certain policy fields, immigration remains as one of the few realms in 
which states are still able to dictate their preferred courses of action.
166
 Although few 
states are willing – or capable, for that matter – to seal their borders to inward migration, 
the management of cross-border movements and of residence statuses allows 
governments and bureaucratic apparatuses to consolidate the nation-state as a frame of 
mind.
167
 In other words, even though these governing entities are no longer in a position 
to cope with the risks and threats of an unpredictable world, the attempt to master the 
“migratory threat” helps states to reify their borders, authority, sovereignty, as well as 
the homogeneity of their people. This process, by its turn, allows the modern polity to 
reaffirm itself as the only political order possible in the world. Clearly, politicians are 
beneficiaries of this move for their power is also restated. 
 The second group of actors responsible for the securitization of migration in 
Europe is formed by the public security agencies working domestically and 
transnationally.
168
 In spite of being  in competition with one another, these agencies 
share the interest in preserving their functions and budget lines in a world that is now 
devoid of conventional military threats. This common concern is paramount in 
understanding why they are engaged in taking the politicization of immigration to the 
security realm. However, in this case, the process of social construction of the 
“migratory threat” is propelled through other means; that is to say, although these 
agents' position as professionals invested with specialized know-how permits the direct 
evocation of migration as a threat, the discursive aspects of securitization give way to 
the effects of institutional practices and technologies, themselves carriers of securitized 
understandings of the phenomenon –  as explained previously. 169  Thus, more than 
managing risks, these professionals are in charge of defining what entities/phenomena 
are and what are not threats to national and regional security. 
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 The merging of internal and external security promoted by the emergence of 
security threats that are not confined to territorial borders – such as terrorism – gives 
these professionals reasonable justifications to adopt extreme forms of “hyper-security” 
or “hyper-surveillance”, which help to perpetuate the climate of insecurity, and allow 
these agencies to profile certain groups and individuals – in particular immigrants – as 
suspects of criminal activities a priori.
170
 Thus, security agencies assist the process of 
securitization of the immigrant population through a variety of means, which not only 
convey the negative image of the foreigner, but also help to disseminate suspicion.
171
 In 
doing so, these agencies reinforce their own roles as managers of the unease. In addition 
to these agencies and politicians, the media and the scientific community also play a 
role in establishing a connection between migration and security.
172
 In fact, just by the 
mere identification of the topic, analysts are engaged in the normative dilemma of 
inadvertently disseminating this problematic view of immigration – unless, of course, 
they set out to criticize and deconstruct it.
173
 
 On the effects of the securitizing strategies of these actors, we have that 
migration is legitimately constructed as a security threat, and consequently, suffers a 
fundamental semantic change, which is, by its turn, expressed in the inclusion of the 
issue in the European security agenda, as well as concretely mirrored in the adoption of 
restrictive policies aimed at counteracting the “migratory threat” and at managing the 
risks related to it.
174
 To begin with, the meaning of the phenomenon suffers fundamental 
semantic changes in that its multifarious dimensions are suppressed and flattened to a 
question of security
175
; thereby, migration becomes part of a security drama, and 
accordingly, starts to be approached as a danger from which societies wish to be freed. 
Furthermore, in this process, the migratory phenomenon is connected to other security 
threats and, as a result, it is effectively incorporated into what Huysmans
176
 calls a 
“security continuum”: once political and security agents successfully frame migration as 
a concern related to societal problems, and to traditional security matters, such as 
terrorism, drug-trafficking and money-laundering, a logical discursive and institutional 
nexus between migration and security is created. Consequently, the security 
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connotations of threats like terrorism and transnational criminal networks are transferred 
to the international movement of people, with the obvious consequence that national 
and regional immigration regulatory frameworks reflect and help to propagate the 
understanding of the topic as a legitimate area of concern of security professionals.
177
 
 This connection with a large array of problems and menaces means that the 
threatening quality of immigrant communities may be attributed to a large number of 
factors. Yet, features shared by these groups, such as cultural differences, religiousness 
and even physical peculiarities, are prominently publicized for they materialize the 
division between immigrants and locals, which is then exacerbated, and made 
problematic by securitization.
178
 What is being stressed here is that, in general, the 
referent object of the migratory menace is the domestic society, or rather its identity and 
integrity. For instance, when it comes to the European Union (EU), Huysmans
179
 
identifies three essential elements of Member States that are allegedly threatened by 
migration flows, namely the public order, cultural identity, and labor market stability – 
all of which make reference to the society as such. In this context, the above mentioned 
notion of “societal security” seems to be an appropriate conception to explain why 
immigration is so feared in Europe: the inflows of people challenge the receiving 
society's ability to live as a 'we' by decreasing social cohesion, by diminishing economic 
prosperity of locals, by bringing new cultures and religions, etc. 
 However, if critically inspected, this notion of European societal security does 
not hold: the idea that the EU as a whole shares a set of common, defining 
characteristics which are endangered by third-country nationals generates a puzzling 
understanding of the EU as some sort of culturally founded community, whilst most 
would agree that this is, to say the least, a disputed notion. The same contention is valid 
for domestic societies, although in this case the questionable character of a unified 
society is made less obvious by the idea of national community. It is interesting to 
highlight these controversies here because they shed light into a problematic element of 
the concept of societal security, namely the usage of a fixed conception of society.
180
 
According to McSweeny
181
, Weaver's concept of societal security reifies and objectifies 
the notions of society and of identity in that it assumes these elements' unproblematic 
and given existence, and thereby excludes their intrinsically dynamic character. In his 
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words, “identity is not a fact of society; it is a process of negotiation among people and 
interest groups”. 182  In addition, as Weaver 183  himself recognizes, people possess 
multiple identities, and these may be located at different levels. Therefore, “the sources 
of societal identity are in theory almost infinitely open”.184 
 Despite the plausibility of McSweeny's critique, Williams
185
 presents not only a 
convincing counterargument in favour of Weaver's definition, but also a good 
description of the developments set in motion by the process of securitization. 
According to him, the indisputable limits of a society and of its identity are fixed as a 
consequence of the securitization process itself. The establishment of an issue as a threat 
to a given identity implies that the audience's identity must be given precise limits – i.e. 
its negotiability must be suppressed –, otherwise it is neither possible to grasp the 
relationship between 'us' and 'them' nor to oppose dangers effectively.
186
 In this sense, 
there is a mutually constitutive relationship between securitization and the production of 
identities. 
187
 Therefore, when a speaker (or other securitizing means) claims that an 
identity is existentially threatened, the boundaries of a society are immediately fixed, 
and this move defines not only who is part of the society, but also those who are to be 
left outside. In other words, the creation of spheres of internal harmony implies the 
existence of a disharmonious outside.
188
 Or, as Williams
189
 puts it, a security utterance 
invokes a Schmittian logic or friends and enemies, which sets in motion a politics of 
exclusion between the self and the other. From this viewpoint, the securitizing move 
against foreigners in Europe locates trust either in national or European societies, and by 
implication, situate fear in immigrants' communities. This separation leads to the 
creation of internal and external relational spheres, which are respectively composed by 
'us' and 'them'. 'They' are identified as the carriers of death.
190
 
 In the face of challenges to their survival, societies take extraordinary measures 
to minimize vulnerabilities and to control the threatening entity or process. Along time, 
the exceptional character of these measures may give way to normality, that is, in case 
the securitized image of the entity becomes institutionalized. In any way, the result of 
both processes is an instrumentalization of the struggle for survival, characterized by the 
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referent object's will of controlling and simultaneously distancing itself from the 
threat.
191
 In practice, these actions are materialized in stronger border controls, tougher 
visa requirements, the creation of separate immigrant neighbourhoods, among others. 
Huysmans
192
 argues that the dialectic of trust and fear created by the securitization of 
immigrants is equivalent to a dialectic of inclusion and exclusion. The exclusion of the 
other is said to annihilate the migrant in two ways: first, by defining him/her as a non-
native, a “non-I”; and secondly, by making him/her worthless for he/she is unable to 
share the host society's identity. Doty
193
 adds to this view by arguing that when 
securitization takes the form of identity politics – i.e. one that involves the reassertion of 
the host society's identity –, as in the case of immigration, policies designed to 
assimilate the “other” represent an alternative attempt to control the threat, albeit 
incorporating a logic that is different from the exclusionary one highlighted by 
Huysmans
194
. The reasoning behind a politics of assimilation is both inclusionary and 
exclusionary, as the migrant is seen as an imperfect version of the native that must 
become harmless and worthy before being accepted in the society.
195
 What's more, in 
principle, in a secutirized context, the migrant ceases to be a particular individual, and 
becomes part of one single category, the “migrant”, which subsumes all foreigners, and 
thus, erases differences of all sorts between them. According to Huysmans
196
, this 
unification is much like a Pandorean box. This metaphor is chosen to elucidate the fact 
that, if critically inspected, the limiting category reveals its highly fragmented 
composition. As a result of these processes, these individuals are set apart from the 
members of receiving society. 
197
 
 Although the plasticity of the term “immigrant” allows for it to be used as a 
general sign of danger that lumps together all foreigners, as Huysmans
198
 and Bigo
199
 
argue, immigration and immigrant policies do not simply reflect the generalizing effect 
of this category, as the existence of different legal categories of immigrants 
demonstrates. In light of this qualification, it should be clarified what exactly the 
symbolic power of the term “immigrant” is said to cause: first, it turns immigration into 
a legitimate topic of concern of security professionals; and second, it disseminates the 
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understanding that a security reasoning should be included in the fashioning of policies 
concerning migration, and that, due to the urgent character of security matters, this logic 
should take precedence over other interests and considerations concerning the migratory 
phenomenon. Thereby, a security narrative does more than creating a logical connection 
between migration and terrorism; it imposes itself as the main mediator of belonging, 
membership, integration and other immigrant-related matters in host states.
200
 Hence, 
even though security is only one factor that impacts on, and shapes movements of 
people across borders, it has become the dominant frame to approach and to govern the 
migratory phenomenon in Europe. 
 The migration-security nexus works by flattening human mobility to a question 
of security; however, the phenomenon is multidimensional for it includes considerations, 
concerns and interests  from diversified fields, as demonstrated by states ambivalent 
treatment of migration. Joppke's
201
 observation that there is a gap between the 
restrictionist rhetoric of politicians and the expansionist reality of immigration is a good 
illustration of the multifarious interests and concerns that inform migration policy. In 
fact, the author contends that migration policies are the result of a political game. Yet, as 
aforesaid, the securitization of migration changes the understanding of the migratory 
phenomenon and imposes on it a logic of urgency, suspicion, control, and exclusion that 
seems to be taking precedence over other concerns.
202
 The fact that the management and 
control of immigration  in Europe are increasingly resorting to measures that breach 
immigrants' rights, as well as the liberal and democratic character of these societies is a 
symptom of the dominance assumed by the security discourse. This tendency to 
privilege security over freedom and rights is observed not only throughout the continent, 
but also at the supranational level. Cholewinski
203
, for one, demonstrates that that, 
although the European Commission adopted an approach that combined the control of 
irregular immigration and the protection of human rights in the early 1990s, the latter 
component of the strategy slowly faded away as a security oriented agenda emerged. 
 Gorski, Fernández and Manavella
204
 also demonstrate how the rule of law and 
immigrant's rights have been diminished by the focus on risks and dangers. According 
to them, the transformation of European states into what they call “migrants' expulsion 
machines” paved the way for the emergence of administrative punishing structures, 
which allow irregular migration to be treated as a crime punishable with detention and 
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expulsion. In this respect, the creation of internment centers within European states and 
in third countries is a case to note, as the deprivation of liberty based on an 
administrative offense such as clandestine immigration breaches Article 5(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
205
 More than that, they go on to contend that 
immigrants are turned into semi-persons in these facilities, as these centers serve not 
only as  internal borders to states, as well as places where foreigners are immobilized, 
disciplined, and intimidated before being sent back to their countries of origin. 
 Claudia Aradau
206
 also highlights the power of the security logic to transform 
human beings endowed with fundamental rights into threats to the security of a society. 
More specifically, she demonstrates how the feeling of pity elicited by the trajectories of 
victims of human-trafficking is subverted into a securitarian discourse that locates 
threatening qualities within trafficked women themselves. Since individuals who 
suffered psychological traumas are profiled by contemporary “risk societies” as groups 
“at risk” of becoming dangerous actors, these women, too, are approached as dangerous, 
and are treated accordingly. That is to say, they receive therapies aimed at helping them 
to overcome the trauma, as well as at limiting the possibilities that they engage in risky 
behaviors in the future.
207
 Interestingly enough, one of these dangerous behaviors is 
irregular immigration. Thus, by focusing on a topic that inevitably involves security as 
well as humanitarian considerations, this study shows how the securitizing discourse is 
capable not only of dominating, but also of appropriating other discourses, in this case 
the humanitarian one. 
 Together, these articles illustrate that over the past two decades the securitized 
understanding of human mobility became the hegemonic political discourse on 
migration in the European continent
208
, and that this image reproduces itself through 
discursive and institutional practices of politicians, security agencies, the media, and 
even of the public opinion, as well as through policy instruments. As Buonfino
209
 argues, 
these studies also indicate that there are countless, antagonistic discourse types on 
immigration, all of which are somehow silenced by the security frame. Cross-border 
movements are composed of, and informed by many other dimensions, problems, and 
interests. Indeed, immigrants are commonly approached by different political actors as 
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factors of production, as human beings, as right holders, as family members, as asylum-
seekers, as victims, amongst other categories. So when it comes to handling 
immigration, states must deal with a paradoxical situation that may be summarized as 
follows: the logic of economic openness, the imperative of protecting human rights, the 
importance of upholding democratic values, and the obligation of guaranteeing liberty 
collide with the principles that traditionally define nation-states, namely sovereignty, 
authority, citizenship, territory, and borders.
210211
 
 According to Buonfino
212
, these different narratives on migration reflect the 
existence of  other political forces engaged in continuous struggles for power, such as 
employer's associations, leftist political parties, NGOs, international organizations, 
churches, parts of the Judiciary, among others. In fact, Fairclough
213
 notes that 
hegemonies are based on a contradictory and unstable equilibrium, and thus, the fact 
that a conception of the world is at a certain moment predominant does not imply that 
ideological struggles over a given representation are not taking place, nor that 
dominating discourses cannot respond creatively to these challenges. In this particular 
struggle, however, the dominance of a security perspective over the discourses on 
freedom and rights is particularly surprising because human rights and liberal principles 
help to define the very essence of European polities. Thus, in theory, even if migration 
is captured by a security logic, these basic values should not be ignored or disrespected. 
Withal, as demonstrated above, although the dominance of a securitized view of 
immigration is not unrestricted, it has negative implications for the rights and civil 
liberties of third country nationals, and thereby it generates a puzzling situation in 
which liberal countries resort to illiberal measures to assure the security of their 
populations.
214
 This indicates that, in securitizing migration, politicians, security 
agencies, among others, do more than simply advance a particular view on the matter; 
their discourses and practices also manage to silence other voices informing the debate 
on immigration. Alternative understandings, be them economic, humanitarian, or 
political, must become secondary if the security reasoning is to take over. But if 
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liberalism and human rights are constitutive parts of European states, what explains the 
increasing dominance of the security discourse type in immigration regulatory 
frameworks? More specifically, how are liberal values and human rights relegated to the 
background in this debate? Since language is a social process that simultaneously 
conditions and is conditioned by the non-linguistic parts of a society, and consequently, 
a place where relations of power are produced, exercised, enacted and changed
215
, it is a 
privileged site to investigate such inquire – even though a security articulation may also 
express itself through other means. In light of these considerations, the next section 
explores in more details this view of language as a social practice and its relations to 
power struggles in different social settings. 
 
2.4 Language as a social practice: ideology and power 
 
The last section of the present chapter has the objective of briefly introducing the 
concepts of  language, discourse, power, ideology and hegemony, according to the 
social theory of language developed by the discourse analyst Norman Fairclough
216
. 
Whereas most modern perspectives to language studies set out to devise techniques to 
describe languages outside of their contexts, Fairclough
217
 develops an approach to 
critically study actual language practice and its relationships to the social and historical 
context in which it is imbricated. The usage of the word “critically” here is not casual; 
the term is chosen by the author to describe his approach for it conveys the idea of an 
analytical engagement that goes beyond the mere description of social reality. It implies 
that the researcher should seek to depict the existing sociolinguistic order as a historical 
configuration, one that conceals its transitory and politically established character by 
presenting itself as natural. This is important because, for Fairclough
218
, language plays 
a crucial role in the production, sustenance and modification of social relations of power. 
In other words, language is invested with power, as well as with ideological 
representations. In as much as linguistic elements bear traces of political contests, 
language cannot be considered simply a neutral system used by human beings to 
describe the outside world and to interact with each other. More than that, language 
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must be seen as actively involved in the workings of society and, in this sense, it should 
be considered a social practice determined by societal structures. This relationship is not 
unidirectional, but dialectic: when using language, people also impact upon the world – 
and they may even do so creatively. Therefore, language does not merely reflect social 
reality, it is a constitutive part of it. As a matter of fact, most contemporary social 
phenomena are at least partly linguistic in that they involve some interaction of this sort. 
Politics, for one, always consists of disputes taking place in and over language. 
 While language is considered a part of social reality, texts (written or spoken) are 
understood as the final products of language use. Discourses, in turn, refer to the whole 
social interaction in which language is deployed. Discourses, as the practical use of 
language, involve processes of production and of interpretation of texts. Such processes 
leave traces and cues in texts in various forms, such as features of the vocabulary, 
metaphors, grammatical structures, among many others. Processes of production and 
interpretation of meaning involve the interplay of these formal traits with the cognitive 
resources of producers, readers or listeners. These “members' resources” (MR) consist, 
for example, in people's background knowledge, values, and representations of the 
world. Although being kept in the mind of participants, these resources are socially 
generated, and consequently, it is reasonable to contend that texts necessarily reflect the 
prevalent social conditions of the moment in which they are produced and interpreted. 
Here, the expression “social conditions” refers to more than the immediate context in 
which discourses take place; rather, discourses are said to be related to three different 
levels of society, namely: the more tangible situational level, the level of the social 
institution – the family, an educational facility, a hospital, etc. –  in which the discourse 
is happening, and at last, the level of the society as a whole. Hence, when making an 
analysis, it is not enough to limit one's observations to the content and formal 
characteristics of the text; if language is a social process, this means that the more 
remote levels of social interaction should also be taken into consideration. 
 The theory developed by Fairclough
219
 is in tune with Buonfino's
220
 contention 
that different discourse types reflect the political forces of a society. According to the 
former author, no matter how localized certain texts are, they will always be, to some 
extent, products of a wider social context, as well as of the struggles for power 
happening in it. Mainstream language and established orders of discourse
221
 – each with 
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its own structures, expressions, vocabulary, etc. – are involved in the maintenance of 
social relations of power. Existing conventions over meanings and discourse practices – 
such as turn-talking or the usage of appropriate language in given contexts – are the 
results of power relations and struggles. Therefore, such discourses are sites where 
power is exercised, as well as (hidden) effects of the dominant power relations in a 
society. This means that, although human beings take for granted the assumptions, 
meanings and conventions of language, the linguistic realm is actually pervaded with 
ideological contents. The word ideology, in this context, is used to refer to “particular 
representations and constructions of the world [that] are instrumental (partly in 
discourse) and important in reproducing domination […]. In tying ideology to social 
relations of power, I am alluding to asymmetrical relations of power, to domination”.222 
Thus, when people use implicit frames to make sense of a discourse – for example, 
when individuals use traditional representations of women in order to understand a 
nineteenth century novel –, they are resorting to a given conception of the world, to an 
underlying philosophy that, albeit commonsensical, is also of a certain ideological order. 
The problem with ideological commonsense is that, as a result of power struggles, it 
often contributes to sustain unequal relations of power in society (to variable degrees, 
obviously). In general, it does so by preventing alternative ideas to gain stage, in 
particular those that could lead individuals to question the established social reality. It 
should be highlighted that language is a privileged means to convey ideological 
representations for two reasons: first, no other communication means requires such a 
high level of reliance on commonsensical premisses as language does; secondly, modern 
society is living an epoch in which power can no longer be exercised through coercive 
means, but only through the fabrication of consent and acquiescence; in this context, the 
ideological workings of language are the best means to disseminate apparently neutral 
ideas and conventions that are actually capable of perpetuating and legitimizing the 
existing juncture. 
 The concept of ideology is closely related to the one of hegemony: “Hegemony 
is leadership as well as domination across the economic, political, cultural and 
ideological domains of a society. Hegemony is the power over society as a whole […], 
but it is never achieved more than partially and temporarily, as an 'unstable 
equilibrium'”.223 This definition is interesting not only for clarifying the meaning of the 
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term, but also for indicating that, regardless of how hegemonic the ideological content 
of language appears to be, this macro-level dominance is never absolute. Therefore, it 
does not preclude the emergence of alternative conceptions of the world, of discourses 
invested with different ideological contents. Ideological diversity is an unavoidable 
component of societies in that individuals occupy innumerable social positions, and 
thereby, have different experiences, interests, points of view, etc. Such diversity is 
specially pronounced nowadays as many states take the shape of capitalist democracies. 
The proliferation of political ideologies is symptomatic of this development. In this 
context, the powerful and dominant groupings endeavor to maintain their position, and 
for this reason, are constantly engaged in social struggles. Ideological struggle is a form 
of social struggle, one that takes place chiefly in language (i.e. in discourse as a site of 
contention). However, this conflict is also about dominance over language (i.e. over 
meanings, linguistic norms, interaction rules etc). Fairclough
224
 adds to this notion of 
struggle by arguing that hegemonic forces do not simply seek to dominate the 
subordinate ones; instead, the perpetuation of power oftentimes depends on the 
construction of alliances with, or on the integration of these other groupings to the main 
bloc – here, the idea of power as consent is very clear. 
 One last important remark about the struggle over language is that such 
contentions may manifest themselves as a conflict between discourse types invested 
with different ideologies. Discourse types are effects of power in a particular domain, 
which are materialized in discursive conventions, codes of practice, assumptions, 
meanings, among other features. Since they are effects of power, discourse types are 
ideologically particular and variable. Examples may be found in a number of realms: 
there are predominant discourse types in medical examinations, job interviews, and 
university lectures. Each of these possesses underlying premisses about who ought to 
control the interaction, about what sort of vocabulary should be used, about what are the 
meanings of expressions and words. When a struggle between diverse discourse types 
emerges, as it is common to see in politics, social forces fight for the dominance of a 
given discourse type in a domain, and therefore they endeavor to maintain or establish a 
particular set of ideological assumptions as commonsense. In the political world – 
which is of interest for the present paper –, the stake of this struggle “is more than 'mere 
words'; it is controlling the contours of the political world, it is legitimizing policy, and 
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it is sustaining power relations.”225 
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3 Immigration to Italy: still in search of the “Bel paese” 
 
The present chapter aims at introducing the main aspects of immigration in Italy with an 
eye to the dominant perception of the phenomenon, as well as to the legislative 
innovations devised by the Italian government to manage the movements of people 
across its borders – particularly the novel security provisions adopted by the fourth 
Berlusconi government (2008-today). Unlike most European countries, the immigration 
history of this Mediterranean state is relatively recent: it was only in the mid-1970s that 
the amount of foreigners living in the country surpassed the number of nationals 
established abroad.
226
 Despite the briefness of this past, as it was mentioned in the 
Introduction, the Italian case provides a paradigmatic example of a society in which 
immigration rapidly became a security concern. Presently, politicians at both sides of 
the political spectrum, the media, and a large part of the population conventionally 
establish connections between the growing presence of foreign-born residents and the 
aggravation of societal problems, including unemployment, criminality, drug trafficking, 
and international criminal activities.
227
 
 Although the migration-security linkage is certainly disputable, it continues to 
serve as a justification for the adoption of ever more restrictive immigration policies in 
Italy, a trend clearly exemplified by the recent formulation of an anti-immigration 
“security package”, whose declared aim is to fight insecurities that prevent Italian 
citizens from enjoying a life “free from fear”228. The set of laws and decrees contained 
in this “package” criminalizes certain categories of immigrants, and helps to consolidate 
the already stigmatized image of foreigners in the country.
229
 In addition, several 
provisions introduced by the new security legislation breach immigrants' fundamental 
rights, as well as EU directives.
230
 As a result of this package – and of previous policy 
reforms, such as the Bossi-Fini Law –, Italy counts with few legal channels for potential 
movers to access its territory, and the legal security of those already established in the 
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country has experienced a certain degree of deterioration.
231
 These developments 
indicate that a securitized view of migration is dominant and institutionalized in the 
Southern state. Hence, the treatment of immigration in Italy seems to provide a valuable 
case study for the research proposed in the present paper. 
 In light of these circumstances, this chapter aims at more than simply presenting 
the history of migration in Italy; it endeavors to disclose, based on scholarly literature, 
the main frames used by the Italian population to approach immigrants, as well as to 
demonstrate that a securitized perception of the phenomenon became dominant in the 
country over time. In order to expose this large array of topics orderly, the remaining of 
this chapter is organized as follows: the first section provides an overview of Italy's 
early experience with migration flows, that is, its historical experience as a country of 
emigration. As it is clarified below, it is important to look at this record because it 
affects the self-definition of the Italian state, the way current immigrants are approached, 
and also policy-making in the fields of nationality, citizenship and immigration.
232
 
Thereafter, the focus is shifted back to the central concern of the chapter, namely 
immigration. In order to introduce the main aspects of migration in Italy without 
disregarding the perceptions and reactions of the host society, the second section is 
divided in two parts: the first presents the main characteristics of incoming flows of 
people to Italy, such as data on the amount of outsiders, on the main communities of 
foreigners, and on their geographical distribution – in other words, it demonstrates the 
multiple aspects of the migratory phenomenon in the country; the second part, in turn, 
provides a general introduction to the evolving social, political and economic context in 
which immigration became more than an ordinary concern for political classes and 
electorates. Moreover, this second part tries to relate these contextual changes to the the 
progressive articulation of a security narrative that includes immigration as a security 
threat. Thereafter, the third section describes the evolution of immigration policy in Italy 
from the mid-1980s to 2002. The regulatory framework is presented at last because it is 
important to understand how Italy became a country of immigration and the main 
reactions of the host society to this transition in order to make complete sense of the 
policy evolution. The fourth and final section introduces the most recent changes to 
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immigration policy, the ones resulting from the so-called “security package”. 
 
3.1 The “Greater Italy”: from emigration to immigration 
 
The present section aims at introducing Italy's early experience with migration flows, 
that is, the country's past as a source of foreign labor to transatlantic and neighboring 
nations. The importance of looking back on Italian emigration flows lies in the fact that 
this historical image still informs the self-representation of the state, as well as the 
formulation of policies in the fields of immigration and nationality.
233
 Hence, the lives 
of foreigners in Italy are somehow affected by this early history. 
 Even though the contemporary intensification of cross-border movements of 
people tends to be attributed to the deepening of globalization, human mobility has been 
a prevalent phenomenon during different epochs. In fact, it was at the turn of the 
twentieth century, in a much less interconnected and technologically advanced world, 
that the movement of individuals across national borders reached its peak. In this earlier 
era of modern migration, those adventuring themselves in long transatlantic journeys 
came from the poorest parts of a number of European states, such as Italy, Poland and 
Russia.
234
 By 1900, nearly one million individuals were leaving the old continent every 
year in search of a better life elsewhere, notably in the New World. Italians, in particular, 
should be well aware of their past as emigrants for they were “the source of the largest 
international migration in recorded world history”.235 Based on this account, it seems 
appropriate to state that the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries share a 
commonality with present times, that is: both may be described as “immigrant eras”236. 
Despite this similarity, there is also a crucial discrepancy between these periods: 
whereas the first was marked by a liberal stance towards human mobility, in present 
times most receiving states adopt restrictive immigration policies in order to avoid the 
entrance of unwanted aliens – as mentioned in the previous chapter. Interestingly, they 
do so even when their economies are dependent on the additional manpower immigrants 
supply.
237
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 This ambivalent treatment of foreigners is consonant with the current situation in 
Italy: as it was briefly cited above, over the past two decades, the country's policy 
evolution in the field of immigration has been marked by an attempt to put a stop to the 
inflow of people, more than by an endeavor to properly manage the entrance of these 
individuals.
238
 This restrictionist bias might come as a surprise for two main reasons. 
First, the regulatory framework has been developed in spite of Italy's pressing economic 
and demographic situations, which demand the contribution of newcomers – as it is 
going to be further explained in the subsequent section. Second, the state has a long 
emigration history, having supplied the labor markets of both distant locations and 
neighboring countries for more than a century.
239
 As remarked before, it was only in 
mid-1970s that Italy's balance between emigration and immigration turned positive.
240
 
This record indicates that the country's history as a sending state should still be a fresh 
memory in the minds of Italian citizens and government. From this standpoint, it is 
reasonable to suppose that the so-called “Great Emigration” serves to sensibilize Italians 
to the stories and difficulties of newcomers, as well as to inform the formulation of a 
fair set of policies to regulate inflows of nationals from other states.
241
 This argument 
was indeed used by the President of the Italian Republic between 1999 and 2006, Carlo 
Azeglio Ciampi: in 2002, when the country was dealing with yet another arrival of 
hundreds of clandestini to its water borders, the then head of the state called on Italians 
to take a more sympathetic stand towards the foreigners in light of their own history as 
migrants to foreign countries and to the industrialized Italian Northwest.
242243
 
 Although the length of the country's past as an emigration state could in 
principle serve as an argument favoring immigration and the acceptance of newcomers, 
this understanding does not accurately reflect how the historical record is interpreted by 
the majority. Instead of using the past to highlight similarities between the two aforesaid 
immigration eras, Italians choose to focus on the alleged differences between old and 
new flows, particularly on the misconceived idea that whereas “pull factors” explain the 
classical migrations of the nineteenth/twentieth centuries, “push factors” are responsible 
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for the current flows.
244
 According to this view, back in the beginning of the last century, 
Italians moved abroad not because certain regions of Italy were extremely 
underdeveloped, but to supply labor to societies that factually demanded their input. As 
a result of this interpretation, the past mobility of emigrants is understood in a positive 
light: Italian expatriates were helping newly formed states to construct themselves.
245
 
Adding to this positive view is the idea that the integration of Italian movers into the 
host societies has been an unproblematic process. Conversely, current immigrants are 
seen as the lower social strata of poor and unstable societies, as miserable individuals 
who are pushed out of their countries by war, famine, poverty, among other distressful 
factors. Hence, the entry of foreigners in Italy is seen as a phenomenon relatively 
independent from pull factors in the host country. According to this “vision of 
pauperism”246, this character of contemporary immigration flows helps to explain the 
alleged propensity of outsiders to fall into criminality and the difficulties they face in 
becoming socially integrated to the Italian society. 
 Even though these differences between “the Great Emigration” and 
contemporary immigrations to Italy are widely accepted, they convey a mistaken image 
of both episodes; that is to say, neither the traditional emigration of Italians was so 
unproblematic as depicted, nor are current influxes so unstable and complicated as 
described. Since the main characteristics of immigration flows to Italy are presented in 
the subsequent section, it is enough to mention here that the Southern European state is 
a part of several migration systems that are complex and quite different among each 
other; thus, no unique picture is capable of providing a proper description of them.
247
 
Despite this, it is noteworthy that the diverse communities of foreigners in the country 
show signs of economic and social success, an observation that contradicts the aforesaid 
view that new migrations are related to marginality, criminality and disorder.
248
 In short, 
the perception of current immigrants presented previously is simplistic and inaccurate. 
As for the image of the old Italian emigration, given that the present section focuses on 
the early history of migration flows from and to Italy, it is appropriate to do more than 
simply clarify why this understanding should be discredited. Therefore, the remaining 
of this section provides a general description of Italy as a country of emigration, of the 
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strategies devised by the government to cope with this phenomenon, and of the ways in 
which this historical episode has informed the development of policies. 
 To start with, the idealized view of Italian emigrants must be demystified: the 
liberalism of late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries should not lead to the 
conclusion that there were no push forces acting within Italy, nor should it support the 
mistaken idea that once Italians arrived at the Americas, for example, their social 
integration was automatic and devoid of difficulties. In respect to the first qualification 
– that push factors should also be taken into consideration –, Choate249 contends that 
although Italy was a powerful and respected state in Europe in the late nineteenth 
century, it lagged way behind other nations of the continent in terms of economic 
development. During the peak of mass emigrations, the country was still trying to catch 
up with states like France and Germany. This observation indicates that Italians, 
similarly to current immigrants, left their homes not just because other states needed 
their labor; in the face of hunger and poverty, the incentives given to movers by South 
American states, and the promises of a better life in North America – to name two 
popular destinations at the time – were also important factors in the decision making 
process of these individuals.
250
 Thus, “the reasons [to emigrate] were, on the one hand, 
the slow and difficult development of the Italian economy and, on the other, the 
economic expansion which characterized other countries between the second half of the 
nineteenth century and World War I”.251 In regard to the second claim – Italians ability 
to integrate in the recipient society –, accounts of the widespread prejudice against 
Mediterraneans in cities like New York shed new light into this assumption: of course 
Italian emigrants were eventually integrated in the host societies, but the large record of 
episodes of discrimination demonstrates that the commonly publicized image of these 
emigrants is partly idealized. Once again, much like current immigrants, Italians had to 
deal with some degree of stigmatization and discrimination.
252
 
 Despite similarities with contemporary migrations, the past outflow of Italian 
citizens did present some particular traits if compared to old and new experiences of 
human mobility. To begin with, “the Great emigration” was, as the name suggests, the 
largest emigration flow registered thus far in human history, counting with 
approximately 26 million movers between its inception in 1861 and the year of 1976.
253
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Another peculiarity of these flows in relation to old migratory movements lies in the 
innovative role played by the government of sending state: instead of simply standing 
by the population loss, the Southern European country became closely involved in the 
management of international movements of people.
254
 Thus, unlike the Irish and the 
Poles, Italian expatriates could rely on institutions from their homeland to guarantee the 
observance of their fundamental rights abroad – especially from 1901, year in which the 
second emigration law was approved. In this respect, it should be noticed that, back then, 
the Italian state was practically compelled to find a way to manage the phenomenon 
since millions of citizens were leaving the country every year. 
 Ultimately, the mass emigration served as much as a challenge as an opportunity 
to Italy. At first, it certainly represented a challenge in that the then recently united 
Kingdom of Italy was still attempting to establish itself as a modern state, and 
continuous population loss made the definition of “the people of Italy” a harder task.255 
The Mediterranean country was in search of an identity, of a national community that 
would provide support for the freshly established polity. From the standpoint of a state 
that was trying to come to grips with its own identity, the emigration of millions of 
citizens certainly imposed a further obstacle to the formation of a genuinely Italian 
people. In addition to this difficulty, politicians and land owners also expressed concern 
with the economic effects of the outflow of labors, in particular from the rural areas of 
the country. Together, these troubles spurred the adoption of restrictive emigration 
policies in the early years of emigration. However, once the inadequacy of such policies 
became clear, and the political class changed its approach towards emigration, the 
phenomenon started to present itself as a challenge that held valuable new opportunities 
for the state. For instance, Italy could not only use its expatriates to promote its 
reputation abroad, but also rip off economic benefits from emigration.
256
 
 Despite their potentialities, outflows of people could only be a source of benefits 
in case the migratory phenomenon was grasped and properly managed. Additionally, it 
was important to make sure that Italian citizens remained closely tied to their homeland. 
In light of the mix of challenge and opportunity presented by large-scale emigration, 
concrete efforts were made to frame emigrants as “Italians abroad”, to stimulate their 
return, and to facilitate/encourage the sending of remittances to Italy. State-sponsored 
institutions were created in countries with Italian communities with a view to assuring 
the maintenance of cultural and economic ties between the expatriates and the 
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peninsula.
257
 To this end, these institutions sought to promote solidarity amongst Italian 
citizens abroad, as well as loyalty to the homeland.
258
 In building this network of 
institutional support, Italy wanted to make sure that all its nationals – including the ones 
in its territory, the ones in Italian regions that were under the rule of other states
259
, and 
those dispersed around the world – were part of the so-called “Greater Italy”, a national 
community united by a common culture, language and tradition. 
 In more concrete terms, the emergence of the notion of a “Greater Italy” meant 
the development of very particular – and dubious – notions of nationality and 
citizenship.
260
 It should be clarified however, that although emigration had a lot to do 
with the formulation of these principles, Italy had already adopted ius sanguinis as the 
primordial criterion for the acquisition of nationality before the “Great Emigration”.261 
After the unification of the state in 1861, no clear definition of which individuals were 
to take Italian nationality was provided, and it was only in 1865, with the introduction 
of the New Civil Code, that a model of citizenship was finally defined. According to 
this model, a state was to be founded upon an ethnically defined nation; consequently, 
those who belonged to the Italian cultural and linguistic community were to be 
considered Italian nationals. In light of this ethnic principle, ius sanguinis provided a 
reasonable indicator of nationality.
262
 Thereafter, the large-scale departure of Italian 
citizens augmented the number of expatriate communities, and this fact imposed a 
challenge to the 1865 framework on nationality, which was aggravated by the variety of 
citizenship laws adopted by the countries receiving Italian subjects.
263
 
 Since Italy did not recognize dual nationality, but was interested in maintaining 
expatriates connected to the country, a number of legal measures were progressively 
devised by the government to assure that emigrants did not loose contact to their 
homeland, even if they had been legally detached from it. In order to keep these ties 
alive, as well as to encourage the repatriation of emigrants and to guarantee the 
continuous entrance of remittances, the 1901, the 1912 and even the 1992 acts made it 
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easier for expatriates and their offspring to return to the country and to regain their lost 
– in some cases, never obtained – citizenship.264 As a result, the evolution of the legal 
framework on nationality led to the establishment of a strong co-ethnic preference that 
is dominant in the country's legislation up to present days – although some liberal 
reforms are being sought currently.
265
 A proof of this co-ethnic bias may be found in the 
treatment of the problems generated by dual nationality: even though double belonging 
was not legally accepted until the end of the twentieth century, the Italian Parliament 
had tolerated its existence since 1912. The decision to accept this double status was 
motivated precisely by the will of maintaining ties with Italians abroad.
266
 Another, 
more recent example may be found in the 1992 new Nationality Act, which clearly 
disregarded that Italy has become a country of immigration, and introduced a program 
for individuals of Italian ethnicity and culture who have lost the country's nationality to 
reacquire it. 
 Arena, Nascimbene and Zincone
267
 contend that the 1992 law in particular was 
an outdated provision and a step backwards in relation to progresses made since the 
1912 Act.
268
 In addition, they argue that this law indicates that a “discreet nationalism” 
still pervades the country's political sphere, albeit in concealed manner. The main 
problem with the legal preference given to individuals of Italian descend is that it is 
based on the anachronistic notion of a “Greater Italy”, which is at odds with the 
country's current reality – after all, it has been for more than three decades now a 
destination for migrants. As a consequence of these developments, people of far Italian 
origins get easy access citizenship, whereas long-term foreign residents, their children, 
and refugees have to pass by long and discretionary processes with uncertain endings. 
According to the aforementioned authors
269
, the outdated character of the 1992 act may 
be partly explained by the fact that it was the result of a delayed-action provision of the 
1960s, a decade during which the country was still coping with emigration. However, 
the fact that the nationality reform was unanimously approved in the early 1990s 
demonstrates that nationalist myths related to the notion of a “Greater Italy” are still 
prevalent nowadays. In this respect, the “myth of productive return” and the “myth of 
L'altra Italia” (the Other Italy) are noteworthy. In regard to the first, it refers to the idea 
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that emigrants would eventually return to Italy bringing along with them human and 
financial capital, which would help to enrich the country. The second mythical story 
supports the first by adding to it the erroneous idea that foreigners of Italian descend are 
still culturally linked to their ancestors' homeland. 
 Together, these tales expose the “discreet nationalism” that still informs policy-
making in the field of nationality and citizenship, and that impinges directly upon the 
lives of foreigners in Italy.
270
 In fact, the persistence of nationalistic myths concerning 
Italy's history as a emigration country was evidenced by the low priority given to the 
revision of the law on nationality in the beginning of the 2000s: instead of working on a 
reform that favored long-term residents and second generations of immigrants, the 
legislation adopted then has reasserted the precedence given to Italian descendents 
living abroad. Yet, it should be noticed that other factors, such as the public opinion's 
backlash towards immigration and the center-left fear of electoral defeats help to 
explain why a nationality reform had not been eagerly pursued.
271
 Currently, this 
situation seems to be changing as a liberal proposal of reform – the 2009 Saribbi-
Granata Bill – is under discussion in the parliament. Interestingly, components of the 
center-right, as Gianfranco Fini, have been supportive of this pro-immigrant change of 
the nationality law.
272
 This positive turn, however, seems to come at the expense of 
additional influxes of foreigners. In sum, this section has attempted to demonstrate that 
the historical course of the Italian state as a emigration country has significantly 
influenced its self-representation, the understanding of current immigration flows, as 
well as policy-making. Conversely, the subsequent sections of this chapter introduce the 
main features of Italy as a country of immigration, devoting special attention to the 
perception of the phenomenon in the country. 
 
3.2 Immigration to Italy 
 
The objective of the second section of this chapter is twofold: first, it aims at providing 
a brief, yet general account of immigration to Italy. In other words, it describes the main 
and multifarious characteristics of this human phenomenon, ranging from its inception 
to the current situation. In doing so, it also attempts to re-evaluate some commonly held 
assumptions about the migration in Italy, such as its alleged negative impacts on the 
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labor market. The second part, in turn, does not look at migration as such, but at the 
social context in which incoming flows of immigrants were  incorporated over time. 
The objective of this exercise is first, to provide some hints on how the changing social, 
political and economic context impinges upon the perception of immigrants in the host 
society, and second, to demonstrate the progressive politicization and eventual 
securitization of this matter in the country. 
3.2.1 Immigrants: when, who, why, and where 
 
This section aims at sketching a general picture of immigration flows to Italy. As the 
title indicates, it specifies when influxes started and intensified, the current amount of 
immigrants in the country, the profile of these new residents, the reasons why they left 
their homes and chose Italy as a destination, their contributions and burdens to the host 
society, and the regions where they are geographically established. However, it should 
be remarked that the objective here is not to provide an exhaustive an account of 
immigration flows to Italy, but to present facts that help to make sense of the main 
perceptions of foreigners in the country, and of the evolution of immigration policy. 
 According to Sciortino and Colombo
273, immigration to the “bel paese” is a 
much older phenomenon than most assume: although the country's migratory balance 
only turned positive in mid-1970s, Italy had been an immigrant destination for more 
than a century when traditional recipients of inflows in the European continent decided 
to halt the entry of outsiders, thereby diverging a part of their influxes to Italy. In the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, Hungarians, Russians, Albanians, 
and German Jews entered Italy as refugees. In addition to these groups, a number of 
workers from both the European neighborhood and distant continents, such as 
Yugoslavians, Argentinians and Americans, deliberately choose to settle in the Southern 
European state. Italy was also an attractive destination to other categories of immigrants 
due to its rich culture and natural beauty.
274
 Therefore, Italy has been an autonomous 
destination of several migratory flows for long and, although their numerical 
significance was not high before the mid-70s
275
, the very existence of these inflows 
indicates that the country has never had one unique type of immigration, but rather a 
plurality.
276
 This fact makes the task of this section particularly complex in that 
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generalizations are unavoidably reductionist, and thus, cannot be successful in 
accurately depicting the phenomenon. Yet, as mentioned, the goal here is not to provide 
an exhaustive account of migration to Italy, but to describe facts that are considered 
important to understand the evolution of the policy framework, the main frames used by 
natives and politicians to approach immigration, and the inadequacy of some 
representations of the phenomenon. 
 Even though Italy has been a part of a plurality of migratory systems, according 
to one of the commonly held perceptions of human mobility in the country, 
contemporary migration flows  are composed by foreigners from the so-called Third 
World, who are poor, unemployed and perhaps suffering persecution – as mentioned in 
the previous section.
277
 These plights are said to be the main motivations of 
international movements of people to Italy. Hence, according to this view, people who 
decide to move to the Western hemisphere are escaping distressful situations in their 
own countries. However – so the tale goes –, Italy does not need immigrants' extra 
economic and social input, and since these individuals are considered neither necessary 
nor wanted, they are oftentimes obliged to resort to irregular means to surpass the 
borders of richer countries. What's more, due to the unauthorized character of their 
presence, most of them – so it is said – end up occupying marginal labor positions in the 
underground economy of the country of settlement.
278
 
 The occasional arrival of boats to the Italian seacoast, the frequent resort to 
regularizations, and the treatment of immigration as an emergency – as presently, with 
the African Spring –  have certainly helped to reinforce this view. Moreover, this 
perspective is supported by other misinformed understandings, and of particular 
relevance here are the ones concerning the number of foreigners in the country and the 
economic and social impacts of their presence. In 2009, for example, when Italy was in 
the midst of a period of economic hardship marked by the collapse of part of the 
domestic productive sector, by the reduction of labor positions, and by the increase of 
both the unemployment and internal migration rates, immigrants faced a 
disproportionate economic loss precisely because they were somehow associated to the 
causes of the crisis.
279
 In social terms, immigration is considered no less troubling for 
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the receiving country: the alleged connection between criminality and cross-border 
movements of people, for instance, not only remained alive over the past years, but has 
been exacerbated – as it is going to be further explained below. From the standpoint of 
such negative images, it is hardly surprising that immigration is considered such a 
problematic and threatening phenomenon. 
 Despite their widespread acceptance, these images do not seem to correspond to 
the reality of immigration in Italy. In light of this controversy, the information presented 
ahead attempts to describe this multifarious human phenomenon and to demonstrate that 
these common perceptions are misinformed and erroneous. To begin with, it is 
important to clarify the magnitude and basic traits of the migratory phenomenon. Even 
though in 2009, Italian citizens believed that immigrants represented 23% of the 
resident population
280
, as of January 1
st
 2010, the number of foreign-born residents in 
Italy actually amounted to 4.235.059 units, that is to say, approximately 7,0% of the 
overall population.
281 282
 However, the foreign population is not evenly distributed 
throughout the territory: whereas 60% of all immigrants live in Northern regions, 25,3% 
reside in the Central area, and only 13,3% are in the Mezzogiorno (southern part of 
Italy). What's more, the immigrant population has experienced an enormous expansion 
over the last years: although migratory inflows to Italy started four decades ago, during 
the first ten years of the new millennium alone, the number of foreigners increased from 
1 to more than 4 millions. Even more impressive than this augment is the fact that, 
between 2007 and 2009, the increment on the number of immigrants was of more than 1 
million. It is also interesting to note that, in 2010, one fifth of the country's migrants 
(22%) were still under the age of 18, and that 573 thousand of these minors were born 
in Italy
283
 – an indication that the second generation problem is growing and that the 
nationality law must be revised soon. 
 In regard to the presence of irregular foreigners, estimates indicate a figure 
between 500 and 700 thousand undocumented immigrants.
284
 However, in this respect, 
it is wise to remember that immigrants in Italy shift between status categories very 
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easily due to frequent amnesties, and to the precarious and short term character of many 
permits – a fact that has been worsened by recent policy changes. 285  Furthermore, 
although Italy has been often appointed as the soft underbelly of the Schengen zone, the 
image of thousands of poor and destitute risking their lives in the Mediterranean sea in 
an attempt to enter Europe does not correspond to the reality of most irregular 
immigrants currently living in the country. As Pastori, Monzini and Sciortino
286
 argue, 
“the largest irregular migratory systems operating in Europe take place through the 
abuse of visa conditions rather than through clandestine entry”287. In fact, most irregular 
workers in Europe are from countries that enjoy relatively open visa regimes. This 
means that the taken-for-granted connection between irregular migration systems and 
international criminal activities is not accurate; that is to say, not only smugglers are 
responsible for a small percentage of the clandestine population in Italy – and in Europe, 
for that matter –, but also smuggling operators are less structured and organized than 
generally assumed.
288
 In spite of these qualifications, irregular influxes have 
monopolized the public opinion and political decisions on immigration
289
, as it is going 
to be further explained below. 
 Concerning the provenience of immigrants, it is surprising to find out – at least 
from the viewpoint of the perceptions described above – that almost half of all aliens 
currently living in Italy come from the neighboring Eastern European region.
290
 
Romania is a case to note: nationals from this new EU member state occupy the first 
position in the rank of main nationalities, accounting for more than 1 million and 73 
thousand of foreign-born residents in the country.
291
 Not surprisingly, Albanians and 
Moroccans come right after Romanians, albeit their communities are half as big as the 
one of the first group. Asians, too, are an important group in the peninsula: there are 
almost 200 thousand citizens from the Popular Republic of China in Italy, and a 
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growing number of nationals from other Asian states, such as India and Pakistan.
292
 
When it comes to the annual growth of the number of foreigners, the eastern part of the 
old continent is again over-represented: more than 50% of newly arrived immigrants 
comes from this region.
293
 These figures indicate that although some immigrants may 
have left their countries of origin to escape persecution and extreme poverty, these 
motivations do not explain the mobility of the majority of those residing in Italy. Rather, 
the Italian situation seems to be in tune with the trend described in the 2009 Human 
Development Report, that is: “development and migration go hand in hand”.294 
 Additional factors – other than the numerical preponderance of Eastern 
Europeans in the country – support the view that Italy has not become a destination for 
the poorest individuals from the most underdeveloped and unstable parts of the world, 
such as: the main characteristics of immigrant groups, their reasons to emigrate, and 
Italy's power of attraction of movers. Concerning the profile of outsiders and their main 
motivations to leave their home countries, Reyneri
295
 contends that Italians must 
abandon the assumption that immigrants are escaping poverty or war not because none 
of the movers fit this stereotype, but because the largest part of Italy's foreign-born 
residents actually come from the urban areas of states with an intermediate level of 
development. Plus, most of them are young adults from families that rarely occupy the 
lowest social strata of their societies of origin. According to the author: “most new 
migrants are simply escaping the downfall of their growing expectations caused by the 
globalization of the Western everyday life models”.296 The latter statement indicates that 
mobility is connected to both economic and cultural expectations: whereas it is probably 
accurate to state that the majority of immigrants want to make money, there is also a 
less known dimension to emigration, one connected to these individuals' will of being 
free from family restrictions and traditional values, of adopting a consumerist or fun-
oriented lifestyle, or of improving their quality of life and that of their families.
297
 
 With regard to Italy's attractiveness as a destination, this power may be partly 
ascribed to the objective opportunities that the country's labor market for example, 
offers, as well as to the image that the country holds abroad. As a matter of fact, Italy's 
image, diffused through migration chains, makes the country particularly attractive to 
potential newcomers. First, due to the repeated legalization schemes, Italy is seen as a 
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place where it is possible for those crossing national borders irregularly to regularize 
their legal situation eventually. Second, due to the country's large informal sector, 
finding work in the gray economy is deemed to be a relatively easy task.
298299
 Even 
though it is undeniable that the underground economy has a strong pull effect on  
migration
300
, the formal domestic labor market of this European state has forces of its 
own, which also help to pull immigrants in the direction of the peninsula. Unlike other 
European immigration countries, Italy has never had an active program to recruit 
workers – partly because large inflows to the country started so late. Even so, according 
to Colombo and Sciortino
301
, the internal demand for foreign labor made up for the 
absence of such programs.
302
 Although the need for foreign manpower is fragmented, a 
number of economic sectors, such as agriculture and small industrial business, 
continuously pressure the government to increase legal migration channels. In fact, this 
demand is so significant that it gave birth to one of the strongest pro-immigration 
lobbies in the country, that of the employer's associations.
303
 As a result of these 
developments, foreign workers represent approximately one tenth of the labor force of 
Italy – or 2 million workers –, and in 2008, were responsible for 11,1% of its GNP.304 
 This objective need for workers is also explained by the reluctance of native 
Italians to accept low skilled jobs, as well as by the unbalanced demographic situation 
of the country. In regard to the first, it is important to mention that immigrant labor in 
Italy has mostly a complementary function.
305
 According to a study released in 2009 by 
Banca d'Italia
306
, immigrants are over-represented in low-skilled occupations – 16% –, 
and under-represented in sectors that require a high level of professional skills – less 
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than 1%. This placement of migrant labor explains why a society that has been facing 
high unemployment rates still needs manpower from abroad.
307
 This information also 
helps to discredit the economic and welfare-related accusations against aliens that often 
emerge in societies hosting a large number of immigrants. Whereas this data proves that 
migrants are not taking the jobs of native workers, this labor segmentation also indicates 
that the Italian economic sector and job market are pervaded by a certain degree of 
ethnic, national and gender discrimination.
308
 In fact, the so-called “immigrant jobs” 
have suffered a progressive degradation not only in terms of wages and union 
protection
309
, but also in terms of working conditions, including working hours, 
physical effort and risk of accidents.
310
 Consequently, foreign workers are extremely 
vulnerable. Another mistaken, yet widespread notion about labor migration is that the 
competition of foreign workers will decrease the average remuneration of natives. 
However, the contrary has been observed in Italy, that is: the growing number of aliens 
has had a modest, yet positive effect on the wages of national citizens.
311
 
 Immigrants are not dependent on the welfare system either. On the contrary, this 
group's fiscal contribution is much higher than the state expenditure on them.
312
 More 
than that, according to Sciortino
313
, migration may be seen as a phenomenon that 
supports the continuous functioning of welfare regimes in Europe. Italy, in particular, 
with its conservative welfare system
314
, needs a large pool of household services that 
cannot possibly be supplied without immigrant labor. This is because the increasingly 
participation of women in the labor market, coupled with population aging have made it 
difficult for family members to produce these services themselves. In this context, 
migration serves as an alternative to both the self-production of these services and to 
their public provision. Obviously, this analysis encompasses only one economic sector, 
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in addition to disclosing a problematic aspect of immigrant work in households – i.e. it 
is sustainable as long as it is informal.
315
 Yet, this example demonstrates how important 
the input of immigrants has become to Italy's productive and welfare systems. This 
importance, however, should not be considered a novel fact: according to Schierup and 
others
316, “migrants provided a cheap source of 'primitive accumulation' for the initial 
phase of the small-business revolution in the 1980s and 1990s”.317 
 The demographic profile of immigrants is also an extremely important asset to 
states characterized by eminent rates of population aging, as Italy. In such context, 
inflows of people are considered important because they are responsible for bringing the 
demographic balance back to a provisional equilibrium.
318
 In fact, whereas the average 
age of native citizens in the peninsular country is 43 years old, the one of foreign-born 
residents is much lower, 31.
319
 Moreover, less than 2% of the latter individuals are over 
65,  i.e. immigrants do not impose an additional burden on a welfare system that is 
already under much stress. Another interesting fact is that without immigration, the 
Italian population would be shrinking. In 2009, for example, the number of native 
citizens diminished in 70 thousand units. Thus, the minor population increment 
observed that year was exclusively attributable to the natural growth of the foreign-born 
community.
320
 
 At last, it is interesting to make some statistically informed remarks on the 
alleged propensity of immigrants, in particular unauthorized ones, to commit criminal 
acts since this perception has been receiving much attention from politicians and the 
electorate. The nexus migration-criminality has been reinforced over the past years – 
even though much of the empirical support for this contention has been questioned –, 
and the easy appeal of this assumption has recently culminated in the adoption of the 
“security package”, which, as said before, seems to be more concerned with 
immigration than with the actual provision of security to the citizenry. In light of this 
evolution, it is extremely relevant to clarify whether immigrants are indeed more 
involved in criminal activities or whether, for example, “immigrant's offenses incite 
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more scandal than those of co-nationals”.321 In 2009, Caritas-Migrantes322 released a 
study which indicated that, albeit immigrants lived under less favorable social 
conditions than Italian citizens, the criminality rates of the former group were just 
slightly higher than the ones observed for the latter.
323
 The study adds that, if the age 
difference between the groups is controlled for, their criminality rates are actually quite 
similar. If only regular immigrants are taken into account, the numbers are even less 
supportive of the linkage described above: for example, while between 2001 and 2005, 
the number of foreigners in possession of a residence permit increased more than 100%, 
the increment observed in the number of accusations involving these individuals was 
proportionally much lower, 45%. 
 Conversely, if only unauthorized immigrants are considered, the picture is less 
favorable: this group accounts for 70-80% of the criminal charges.
324
 Nevertheless, 
these figures should not immediately lead to the conclusion that there is a nexus 
between “illegal” migration and criminality. Several qualifications must be made in 
regard to this data: for one, a large part of these charges consist of “instrumental” crimes, 
that is to say, offenses related to these persons' statuses as immigrants.
325
 Much is also 
said about the high rate of incarceration of immigrants
326
, however, these numbers do 
not take into account that foreigners can rarely benefit from alternative penalties or from 
home arrest. Nor do they consider that legal and police institutions are generally biased 
against immigrants: once accused, foreigners are five times more likely to end up in 
prison. What's more, their sentences tend to be heavier than the ones of Italians who 
have committed the same crimes. Moreover, foreigners normally must rely on public 
defenders and might have difficulties in communicating.
327
 At last, it is relevant to note 
that irregular migrants are one of, if not the most vulnerable group in the society, and 
this fact also helps to explain why some of them end up resorting to criminal activities. 
The latter comment alludes to the topic of the next section, the social context in which 
inflows of foreigners have been taking place, and how these contextual changes 
functioned as a fertile soil for securitizing actors to frame immigrants and other 
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vulnerable social groups as dangerous to the public order and security of the country. 
3.2.2 Heading to the insecure North? Social climate and discrimination 
in Italy 
 
This section has as its main objective to describe the evolution of the context and of the 
social climate in which immigration flows to Italy have been taking place. Moreover, it 
attempts to demonstrate how contextual changes are related to the progressive 
securitization of immigration in the country. It should be noticed that, while the 
descriptions of the first decades of immigration are slightly superficial, particular 
attention is devoted to the period between 2007 and 2009. This focus is justified by the 
fact that the case study of the present work, the “security package”, was officially 
launched by the fourth Berlusconi government(2008-today) in May 2008. 
 As aforementioned, the presence of outsiders in Italy may be traced back to the 
period following the country's unification in 1861, even though the quantity of 
immigrants then was negligible if compared to current figures.
328
 In spite of the 
numerical unimportance of this early group of movers, the mere acknowledgment of the 
existence of inflows of people to the country has important implications for the 
conventional wisdom on the phenomenon. One of the implications of this less known 
facet of immigration to Italy is the fact that native Italians have had to deal with the 
presence of foreigners much before the 1970s, even if the number of aliens was not that 
high. In other words, a public discourse on immigration, although marginal, existed long 
before irregular immigrants and boat people started to elicit strong nationalistic 
emotions in the country. Colombo and Sciortino
329
 contend that this early public 
discourse on foreigners was not immediately marked by a discovery of the “Other”; 
rather, newspaper articles demonstrate that immigration was a part of Italy's self-
definition as a country. In light of immigration flows, Italians looked at their home 
country in a positive and in a negative way: on the one hand, the choice of Italy as a 
destination served to attest that the country offered a good quality of life to its residents; 
on the other, migration disclosed that, in relation to the countries of origin of some 
immigrant groups, Italy was still a backward and provincial society. Plus, during this 
early phase, immigrants were not considered responsible for the society's difficulties, 
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nor were they publicly connected to problems as terrorism and criminality.
330
 In fact, in 
the early 1980s, Italy was one of the countries with the lowest number of “racial” 
incidents in Europe. Back then, the general climate towards the increasing presence of 
foreigners was one of social tolerance.
331
 The analysis of the public discourse on 
immigrants confirms this view: according to Sciortino and Colombo
332
, although the 
presence of foreigners was thought to indicate the ills of a backward society plagued by 
unemployment and other economic difficulties, “foreigners were attracted by the quality 
of life and the tolerance and peaceful nature of the population”.333   
 During the 1970s and early 1980s, these characteristics, alongside the positive 
image held by Italy in Asian and African countries, were part of the appeal of the “bel 
paese” for those intending to look for a better life in the Northern hemisphere. Of course, 
other widely cited factors, such as the “pull forces” of the Italian segmented labor 
market and the aforesaid entry restrictions adopted by other European states, are of 
primary importance to understand the shift from what had been a traditionally negative 
migratory balance to a positive one. However, what is particularly interesting about the 
early history of immigration in the Mediterranean country is that the reported “social 
tolerance” is in sharp contrast with the current situation: according to the 2008 Special 
Eurobarometer issue
334
, discrimination is perceived as a widespread phenomenon in the 
Italian society, with native citizens being the least comfortable in Europe with having a 
neighbor of a different ethnic origin, and a political leader from an ethnic minority 
group. Thomas Hammarberg
335
, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of 
Europe, adds to these negative findings by identifying a continuous trend of racism and 
xenophobia in the country, targeting primarily foreigners, their descendents, and Roma 
and Sinti populations. Unfortunately, while the initial tolerance to immigration might 
have come as a surprise to current observers of the phenomenon, the latter findings 
would most probably be seen as unremarkable acknowledgments of a reality that has 
been more often than not featuring public debates and legislative innovations in the 
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country  – at least since the mid-1980s, as Sciortino and Colombo's 336  analysis 
demonstrate. 
 The rise of discrimination and xenophobia against immigrants and minority 
groups, and more broadly speaking, the unease felt by large parts of the Italian 
population with the new components of their society is not an isolated occurrence; 
rather, it is a result of wider societal transformations that certainly have something to do 
with the presence of a growing number of immigrants in Italy, but are not exclusively 
attributable to this phenomenon. Other economic, cultural and political changes are 
related to Italians' stand against the entry and settlement of foreigners in the country. 
Indeed, the inception of larger inflows of immigrants in Italy coincided with a moment 
of transition in the domestic economy, which was consolidating its transmutation from 
an industrial to a service society. This shift, however was not without its losers: between 
1980 and 1989, the incidence of poverty in the country increased from 8,3 to 14,4%, a 
change that turned Italy into one of the societies with the highest rates of economic 
inequality in the European continent.
337
 Therefore, immigration was experiencing its 
first intensification at a moment when life conditions in Italy were suffering some 
degree of degradation.
338
 As a result, a sense of insecurity was rising amongst citizens. 
 What's more, the period from 1980s to beginning of the 1990s corresponds to the 
years during which traditional structures of solidarity, such as trade unions, and the 
country's left-oriented culture started to give way not only to more conservative 
ideologies, but also to the pursuit of individual strategies of life, and to a consumerist 
society.
339
 This is not to say that the difficulties and instabilities caused by these changes 
justify discriminatory behaviors, but that Italians, in addition to having to cope with an 
increasingly diverse society, also had to adapt themselves to new structures and 
conditions of life. As Heisler and Layton-Henry
340
 contend, the association of migration 
to social and economic problems in receiving societies becomes particularly pronounced 
under circumstances of economic and/or political instability – even if immigrants 
cannot be directly linked to the sources of such instability. In tune with this contention is 
the fact that it was precisely during the late 1980s that immigration became a 
controversial and highly politicized matter in the country: the media and politicians 
started to discuss not only the potential social, economic and cultural impacts of the 
inflows of people became, but also to establish differences between categories of 
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immigrants, or rather between those who were to be considered “foreigners” and those 
who were “immigrants” or extracomunitarians.341 According to Paul Ginsborg342, even 
though the latter term served at first to objectively differentiate immigrants, its official 
tone could not hinder the development of an alternative connotation, one that implied 
the exclusion of these individuals from the national community. 
 The beginning of the subsequent decade was no less troubled than the 1980s: the 
fall of the Communist bloc, coupled with the “Clean hands” scandal343 contributed to 
the collapse of the largest political forces of the country, including the Christian 
Democratic Party and the Socialist Party, as well as to the abandonment of their 
underlying ideologies.
344
 Thereafter, Italy's political landscape started to be 
reconstructed with the emergence of new parties – notably Silvio Berlusconi's Forza 
Italia – and with the reinvention of older political forces. These profound changes, 
alongside the intensification of the process of economic globalization and the deepening 
of regional integration represented destabilizing factors for the population. 
 In this context, the increasing number of immigrants, the presence of a large 
number of undocumented individuals, and the occasional crises generated by the arrival 
of boats filled with foreigners, especially of Albanians, to the Italian sea borders fueled 
public and political speeches opposing the entrance of more movers. In fact, it was 
during these years that the country's extremist right-wing parties – namely, National 
Alliance and Northern League – started to based their electoral programs on Italy's 
alleged ethnic and cultural essence, and to articulate claims that migrants constituted a 
cultural threat to the country.
345
 What's more, from the mid-1990s onwards, the 
association of immigration and criminality started to be officially asserted by several 
Italian public bodies. During this period, the image of the Albanian criminal became so 
disseminated that hostile attitudes against foreigners were multiplied, and claims for 
increased security became a commonplace. It was then, as a result of these 
developments, that legality and law and order campaigns became a seemingly 
permanent part of politics in Italy.
346
 
 As for the current situation, it does not seem all that different from the one 
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observed during the last couple of decades: widespread social and economic changes 
continue to negatively affect the everyday life and long-term expectations of Italians, 
especially changes connected to the deepening of globalization and to the victory, and 
consequent imposition of neo-liberalism as the primary logic guiding economic and 
political processes across the globe.
347
 As a result of such transformations, Italians are 
put in a difficult position: if, on the one hand, the modest dreams of  finding a stable 
position in the labor market, and of owning one's place of residence seem ever more 
distant –  in particular for young adults trying to enter job market –348, on the other hand, 
well-established social problems have not faded away, with unemployment, economic 
informality, local clientelist structures, the mafia, and the developmental abyss between 
the Northern and Southern parts of the peninsula continuously plaguing the country's 
economic and political life. In fact, problems related to the economic and security 
realms, such as unemployment, inflation, and criminality represent some of the most 
worrisome issues for Italian citizens nowadays.
349
 
 Furthermore, Italy faces a number of challenges common to most post-industrial 
societies in the contemporary world: the population is aging, and its fertility rates are 
below the necessary to maintain numbers at the current levels; the welfare system is 
under increasing strain and its family-oriented character no longer corresponds to the 
prevalent relationships between the state and households; the country's recent rates of 
economic growth are negligible and the purchasing power of the citizenry frequently 
assumes a downward trend
350
; international economic and debt crises are a permanent 
concern; environmental problems are starting to demonstrate their negative effects; new 
pandemic diseases continue to appear, and terrorism and international criminal activities 
represent a lasting threat to the country.
351
 On the top of that, the dominance of the 
aforesaid neo-liberal logic progressively turns what Schumpeter named the logic of 
“creative destruction” into a reality. In other words, radical economic transformations 
are causing the destructuration of social orders, thereby promoting more inequality 
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within and between societies, as well as weakening the powers of states to provide 
welfare to their citizens.
352
 In this context, the task of achieving social integration – not 
only of immigrants, but of domestic societies as a whole – becomes even more 
arduous.
353
 In fact, according to Sartori
354
, a general and abstract sense of anxiety and 
unrest is emerging, and this sense is responsible for shaking the traditional system of 
values to which individuals and collectivities in Italy used to recur. In these 
circumstances, extensive and unsettling themes, like immigration may help to leverage 
the problem of security by contributing to its articulation or by emphasizing its 
existence.
355
 
 All in all, these distressful issues seem to have been translated into a sense of 
unease and insecurity in most Western countries, and Italy is no exception to this pattern. 
Different surveys conducted in the years of 2008 and 2009 demonstrate that living in a 
state of emergency has become the norm in the state.
356
 The data collected indicate that 
Italian citizens fear not only criminality and economic difficulties, but also 
environmental degradation, the unpredictable effects of the process of globalization, 
potential terrorist attacks, the workings of international criminal organizations, and the 
appearance of new epidemics.
357
 In fact, more than one third of the interviewees 
declared to be often preoccupied with these issues. Interestingly enough, the proportion 
of the population that feels insecure about matters that are global in character, such as 
problems concerning the environment, climate change and the consequences of 
globalization, has augmented significantly over the past three years (2007-2009), and 
these issues currently represent the main concerns of the citizenry. Equally worrisome is 
the fact that, in 2008, 35% of Italians said to frequently suffer from a “sense of anguish” 
(senso di angoscia) for no particular reason.
358
 
 The public insecurity disclosed by these numbers seems to be consistent with the 
courses of action chosen by Italians to deal with quotidian problems: over the past 9 
years, the number of people attending Accident and Emergency departments across the 
country has risen significantly, as has the amount of citizens resorting to hospitalization. 
The large amount of cases in which the Civil Protection Agency has been called to 
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intervene over the last years is also a noticeable fact, and one that helps to corroborate 
what seems to be a trend in the Mediterranean country: the prioritization of emergency 
action in detriment to long-term solutions to everyday troubles.
359
 In fact, the latter 
organ is not only contacted more and more often, but is also increasingly called to deal 
with events and problems that have nothing to do with natural disasters and fires – the 
organ's stated priorities. Remarkable examples in this respect are the participation of the 
Civil Protection Agency in rubbish disposal issues, as well as in incidents involving 
irregular immigrants and Roma groups. According to the researchers responsible for 
preparing this report
360
, the search for short-term, extraordinary solutions for “minor” 
problems reflect the difficulty of contemporary societies to foresee events, and thus, to 
effectively plan the future. Fear results from this incapacity to keep the world under 
control, and insecurity demands immediate actions. Needless to say, this pattern fits 
well into the description of “risk societies” provided in the previous chapter of the 
present study. 
 The downside of this “emergency approach” is that palliative solutions are 
oftentimes preferred to structural ones, with the consequence that the problems they are 
aimed at addressing may endure for very long periods of time. Despite this disadvantage, 
it is interesting to note that those who occupy power positions in the Mediterranean 
state have been resorting to this type of “fast-track” solutions more and more often.361 
For example, although the number of natural calamities, fires and other environmental 
emergencies registered during the years of 2008 and 2009 was 25% lower than the 
number reported in 2001 and 2002, the Italian government has issued more decrees 
requiring the intervention of the Civil Protection Agency recently than in the beginning 
of the decade. The frequent usage of this Agency to manage alleged emergencies 
indicates that politicians are well aware that a sense of unease and insecurity has been 
haunting many citizens. More than that, this frequent recourse to extraordinary actions 
demonstrates that the country's leaders are willing to instrumentally appropriate public 
fears for electoral purposes, after all the visibility of such actions attract media attention, 
in addition to conveying the message that something is being done to counteract 
pressing social problems. In fact, according to Quassoli
362
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the success of right-wing parties in some European countries can be partly 
ascribed to a solid combination that has come to dominate political debates as 
well as the political agenda of recent years: on the one hand, a growing 
insecurity or, rather, a growing sense of insecurity of a section of the 
electorate […]; on the other hand, the increased credibility of the policies put 
forward by the right to reassure the citizenry.
363
 
 
The reality, however is that, while governments may successfully quiet down the 
anxiety of the citizenry by resorting to these readily effective responses, the provision of 
lasting solutions to the problems listed above is much more difficult, if not impossible. 
This difficulty or, in certain cases, incapacity to solve contemporary troubles stems from 
several reasons, partly mentioned in the previous chapter, such as the global and 
unpredictable character of distressful events and the inadequacy of national governance 
apparatuses to deal with them. 
 In addition to these difficulties, in the Italian case, it is important to highlight the 
discrepancy existing between the public representation of certain problems and the 
empirical reality of the country. In this respect, criminality and irregular immigration are 
cases to note: concerning the former issue, although statistical data does not show much 
variation in the number of criminal offenses over the last decade, between the end of 
2007 and the Spring of 2008, approximately 88% of the population believed that the 
rate of criminality had assumed an upward trajectory in the country.
364
 Plus, more than 
half of the respondents had the same perception of local criminality. According to 
Sartori
365
, this negative view cannot be dissociated from the signs of decay observed in 
some Italian cities, especially the metropolises, since increasing urban degradation 
conveys the perception of disorder, and the idea that certain zones of the city are devoid 
of rule and authority. The second issue that, albeit disconnected from reality, has caused 
much alarm amongst Italians since the early 1990s is the arrival and settlement of 
immigrants, especially of “illegal” ones, as mentioned above. In spite of the draconian 
regulations and discourses against the presence of aliens in the country, most publicly 
held assumptions behind these measures and opinions do not find correspondence in 
reality, as seen in the previous subsection of this chapter. Yet, claims that immigrants are 
responsible for raising unemployment and criminality, for example, are commonly 
found in the news and in political speeches.
366
 
 Regardless of how disputable these connections are, they have been informing 
the actions of Italian politicians since the 1990s. Increasingly, these actors chose to 
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transform the foreigner and the criminal (often subsumed in one unique figure 
representing illegality) in a symbolic enemy in order to rip off electoral benefits of 
public fears.
367
 In this respect, the criminalization and “demonization” of immigrants is 
a case to note: in an epoch of rising insecurities, these individuals easily become 
scapegoats for other societal problems.
368
 According to Dal Lago
369
, the transformation 
of the foreigner into a threat serves the interests of political actors in that it not only 
perpetuates the “mindset of the state” – that is to say, it legitimizes the government’s 
domination over the territory –, but also satisfies the anxieties and fears of the electorate 
– even if not much is actually solved. As it is going to be shown in the fourth section of 
this chapter, the electoral program of the 2008 center-right coalition provides a good 
illustration of these practices. 
 A somewhat ironic picture emerges from the state of affairs described in this 
section: while people from the Southern and Eastern parts of the world leave their home 
countries – oftentimes economically, socially and politically unstable – in search of a 
safer and hopefully better life in the West, the citizens of the latter region – formed by 
rich, advanced, post-industrial societies – feel more and more unsafe, and not because 
credible threats of war and hunger effectively exist, but because – and here lies another 
irony – the insistence on trying to predict, to manage and to mitigate risks in an ever-
changing world exacerbates the feelings of uncertainty and insecurity – as it was 
explained in the second chapter of this work. This is not to say that threats do not exist, 
but that the attempt to anticipate risks, and to keep a world that is unpredictable under 
control have very often the opposite effect. Italy, too, seems to be trapped in this 
paradoxical logic of “risk societies”. 
 In this unpredictable and threatening context, immigrants are clearly the biggest 
losers, for they embody nearly all the aforesaid fears. Perhaps, it is precisely because 
human mobility is a fait social total
370
, as both Palidda
371
 and Dal Lago
372
 remark, that 
the phenomenon has been so easily and convincingly related to several troubles 
encountered in contemporary societies. As mentioned, immigrants in Italy (especially 
non-EU citizens, but also Romanian and in particular Roma and Sinti populations) are 
taken to be criminals, terrorists, welfare exploiters and job thefts, in addition to being 
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portrayed as dangers to the local culture, to social cohesion, and to the public order. 
Since the late 1980s, the presence of outsiders in Italy has been causing social alarm and 
some degree of insecurity, and such conditions have been manifesting themselves in the 
already referenced racist episodes, and more broadly speaking, in a general sense of 
hostility towards foreigners. 
 Both public fears and the enmity felt for outsiders have been successfully 
manipulated by Italian politicians, especially during the parliamentary elections of 
2008.
373
 As a result of these circumstances, immigrants' hopes of finding a better life in 
Italy are becoming a distant dream: the insecurities experienced by the Italian “risk” 
society are translated into instability of legal statuses, prejudice, discrimination, hostility, 
fear, and ever more restrictive immigration policies. Thus, as the title of the present 
section suggests, although immigrants are heading to more technologically advanced 
and economically developed societies, development has failed to forge security; rather, 
as the case of Italy demonstrates, the Northern hemisphere seems to be pervaded by 
insecurities, which directly affect the lives of foreigners residing in these societies. 
 
3.3 Italian migration policy: from the 1980s to 2002 
 
The objective of this section is to briefly present the evolution of immigration policy in 
Italy from the mid-1980s, period during which migratory inflows started to intensify, 
until 2002, when the restrictive Bossi-Fini Law amended the 1998 regulatory 
framework. The fifth and final section, in turn, is devoted to discussing in more detail 
the most recent policy changes contained in the 2008-2009 “security package”. 
 In the first section of this chapter, it was mentioned that the “Great Migration” 
influenced not only Italy's nationality laws, but also regulations concerning immigration; 
in fact, the very first policies aimed at managing this phenomenon were established in 
the 1865 New Civil Code, along with the first provisions on nationality.
374
 In tune with 
the dominant perspective at the time, the document was liberal and tolerant towards 
alien citizens
375
: foreigners were allowed to enter and settle in the Italian territory 
provided that they respected domestic laws and did not represent a threat to the state. 
They were also granted the same rights as Italians citizens, and were free to profess their 
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religious creeds.
376
 This wave of liberalism was shut down with the emergence of 
Fascism, which imposed strict border controls and established visa requirements for 
individuals coming from a set of countries. The main reason for this restrictive turn was 
the fear that foreigners turned out to be enemies of the regime. Since the Fascist state 
was not thrown down by a revolution, Italy's current legal apparatus is partly a legacy of 
Mussolini's regime and, for that reason, a security-oriented bias still pervades certain 
policy spheres.
377
 In fact, until 1987, republican regulations on immigration were based 
on the Fascist normative on public security, and for most of the twentieth century, the 
phenomenon had been managed by means of occasional administrative circulars that 
reflected the positions of the political coalition in power.
378
 
 However, since the mid-1980s – when immigrant flows first started to 
experience a quantitative intensification –, Italy has been obliged to revise its outdated 
legislation in order to properly manage the migratory phenomenon. According to 
Zanrosso
379
, despite the need to devise appropriate policies, over the past 25 years, 
regulation on immigration has presented a very high degree of instability – and so has 
the legal condition of foreigners. Some of the factors that explain the succession of 
uncoordinated and oftentimes inconsistent normative changes are the need to conform 
the country's internal norms to international agreements, as well as to the rulings of the 
Constitutional Court.
380
 Yet, as in the case of nationality, the political climate of the 
country and the state of the electoral fight have certainly affected the outcomes of these 
changes as well.
381
 Plus, as mentioned before, Italy's past as an emigration country 
significantly influenced policy-makers' views on inward migration. Indeed, the first 
relevant law on the issue –Law no.943 – adopted in 1986, addressed immigrants as first 
and foremost workers, an understanding that was certainly in consonance with the 
image of Italians abroad.
382
 
 In more detail, the law no.943, in addition to incorporating the principles of the 
then recently ratified International Labor Organization Convention no.143, had as its 
main purpose to regulate the flows of foreign-born workers to Italy with a view to 
providing a legal alternative to the increasing presence of irregular migrants, as well as 
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to assuring that newcomers did not compete with native workers for vacancies in the 
labor market. To this end, inflows were to be limited and planned according to the 
country's demand as well as to the availability of national and EU workers.
383
 What's 
more, the new legislation granted 'extracommunitarians' the same rights enjoyed by 
domestic laborers, including inter alia access to social and health facilities, the rights to 
education and housing and the right to maintain their cultural identity.
384
 Moreover, 
provisions for family reunification were also provided in this first document. Despite 
this equalization, the fiscal contributions of immigrants were 0,5% higher than those of 
local and EU workers – an extra charge intended to cover the costs of an eventual 
expulsion. Due to this additional burden, immigrant labor was less appealing for 
employers, a fact that alongside the complexity of bureaucratic procedures served as a 
deterrent to those willing to hire foreign manpower. In sum, despite the generous and 
liberal character of this first law, it failed to achieve its objectives, with employers still 
preferring to resort to informal labor.
385
 It is interesting to note that this was the case 
even though the law provided for the first regularization of unauthorized migrants. 
 Needless to say, the negative lessons learned from this early regulatory 
experience were taken into account in the design of the subsequent law, Law no.39 (or 
Martelli Law). More than that, the unsatisfactory outcomes of this first legislation 
inaugurated what would later on become a visible trend in the evolution of policy-
making in the field, namely: the tendency of policy-makers to fall into a vicious 
learning process, in which the negative feedback of a set of norms leads to additional 
reforms, whose disappointing results trigger yet another process of revision and so forth, 
thereby generating a cycle that leads to a perpetual process of reform – a trait that helps 
to explain the aforementioned degree of instability of immigration policy.
386
 This was 
precisely the case of the 1990 regularization: in trying to fix the mistakes of the past 
amnesty – whose rigorous criteria for legalization resulted in an inadequate outcome –, 
the new provision ended up adopting requirements that were too loose, and a even 
looser implementation process.
387
 Past mistakes were not the only factor informing the 
1990 law: as said in the second section, it was in the late 1980s that episodes of racism 
                                                 
383
Giovanna Zincone. Italian Immigrants and Immigration Policy-making, 2006. 
384
Bruno Nascimbene. The Regularization of Clandestine Immigrants in Italy. European Journal of 
Migration and Law., v.2, 2000, pp.337-359. Available at: 
<<http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/ejml2&div=27
&id=&page=>>. 
385
Giovanna Zincone. Italian Immigrants and Immigration Policy-making, 2006. 
386
Giovanna Zincone. Italian Immigrants and Immigration Policy-making, 2006. 
387
Giovanna Zincone. Italian Immigrants and Immigration Policy-making, 2006. 
81 
and discrimination against immigrants started to appear consistently on the news
388
, and 
one particular case, known as the Masslo murder, spurred a governmental emergency 
reaction which immediately culminated in the adoption of the decree no.416 (December 
1989), later on incorporated in the Martelli Law. Emergency reactions of this sort, too, 
have become more than an exceptional influence in policy-making in Italy; in fact, it 
was in the face of unexpected phenomena that most of the regulations in the field of 
immigration were first adopted.
389
 
 In spite of the aforesaid negative influences, the 1990 regulation was a turning 
point for Italy in immigration matters: the provisions of this integral law made is clear 
that the Italian government no longer considered immigration flows as a transitory event, 
but rather acknowledged that the phenomenon would continue to impose challenges and 
provide opportunities to the country.
390
 This meant that it was necessary to create a 
regulation that was more complete and inclusive than the 1986 one, that is to say, a law 
concerned not only with immigration for employment purposes, but that also addressed 
other types of influxes, such as entry for reasons of tourism, asylum, self-employment, 
amongst others. And this was exactly what the Martelli Law did: it regulated the refugee 
status, as well as the ingress of non-EU citizens for purposes other than work.
391
 
Moreover, in order to better manage the entry of foreign-born workers to Italy, the law 
introduced the concept of flows and the notion of programmed entry: accordingly, the 
government was required to issue annual flow decrees, which would establish the 
country's demand of foreign labor for the upcoming year.
392
 A complex bundle of 
institutional actors were to collaborate in coordinating the planned legal immigration, 
including several ministries and national unions. 
 According to Zincone
393
, this overcrowding of the decision-making process is a 
characteristic feature of the Italian political system, and one that seldom works well. In 
regard to the planned annual inflows, for example, the author highlights that the final 
decisions on the size of the yearly quota were more often than not taken by a reduced 
amount of actors and that, until 1998, the decrees were issued at the end of the years 
whose number of legal entries they were aimed at establishing. On the top of that, the 
quotas usually reflected more the amount of people whose status had been regularized 
by amnesties, or those who entered the country through family reunification  than the 
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actual arrival of new workers.
394
 Despite these deficiencies, the Martelli Law also 
maintained some of the positive provisions of its antecedent, notably the notion of 
equality among workers – regardless of nationality – and the equal access to social 
rights. Yet, the resources allocated to this and other goals, such as the provision of 
temporary accommodation and integration measures, were minimal, with much of the 
financial burden transferred to local administrations.
395
 The 1990 Law also counted with 
an innovative aspect in respect to the previous regulation: it introduced and specifically 
regulated the procedure of expulsion of third-country nationals, which had been hitherto 
provided by the public security law of the Fascist regime.
396
 
 According to Foot
397
, although the text of the Martelli Law was apparently 
liberal, “it turned out, in practice, to be a way of imposing further controls, expulsions 
and restrictions on migration and migrants”.398 Italy – already known for its porous 
borders – had a twofold objective with this law: first, to put a stop to the inflows of 
irregular immigrants by increasing punitive and preventive measures, such as 
expulsions orders and visa requirements; second, to take control of the chaotic situation 
by regularizing thousands of foreigners. However, once again, bureaucratic obstacles to 
entry and to regularization have had the effect of discouraging immigrants from taking 
the legal road.
399
 This failure coupled with the waves of Albanian migrants crossing the 
Adriatic sea, and with the state's inability to expel most of those with deportation orders 
culminated, in 1992, in the Boniver decree, a piece of legislation that allowed for 
immediate expulsion of immigrants caught committing “serious” crimes, without the 
right to trial or to appeal from the decision. This prohibitionist decree shows that in the 
early 1990s immigration had already become a source of much social commotion and 
alarm, with aliens being associated to danger and crime.
400
 More than that, it shows that 
immigrant's rights were already eroded in the name of control and security. 
 Another innovation that followed the Martelli law was the creation of the ad hoc 
Ministry for Italians Abroad and Immigration, whose main objective was improving 
policy-making coordination in the field of immigration. This innovation, however, 
failed to achieve this purpose, in particular because the ministry was overpowered by 
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other institutional actors dealing with immigration.
401
 Thereafter, in 1993, another organ 
was set up to handle the matter, namely the Department of Social Affairs, within which 
a General Direction on Immigration was created. The importance of mentioning this 
particular institutional innovation lies in the fact that it was within this Ministry that the 
1994 Contri proposal – which would subsequently lead to the Dini Decree and later on 
to the Turco-Napolitano Law – was drafted. The Contri Draft consisted of a proposal to 
reform the law on immigration designed with the help of experts and civil-servants, and 
due to this high level of expertise, its text included advanced pro-immigrant provisions, 
such as the right of undocumented immigrants to access health and educational 
services.
402
 Zincone
403
 stresses that the latter measure, the right of schooling to irregular 
minors, derived from informal local practices. Based on this observation, she contends 
that sometimes regulations may originate from bottom-up, that is to say, from the ideas 
and practices of civil society actors and local administrations. 
 The following legislative piece on immigration, the Dini Decree (decree no.489), 
was issued in 1995, and as aforesaid, its text incorporated a number of measures drafted 
in the Contri proposal. As a followup of the latter work, this decree attempted to look at, 
and regulate immigration in light of the country's former experiences.
404
 However, the 
main objective of decree was not to promote a general reform of the regulatory 
framework, but to regularize the situation of the large amount of undocumented 
immigrants who were taking up work in the country back then. The 1995-1996 
regularization was different from the previous ones in that it was not founded upon the 
notion of amnesty (sanatoria) but on the principle of regularization (regularizzazione). 
On the differences between these principles, it is important to note that, unlike the 
former, the latter was also concerned with the regularization of the tax status of 
migrants.
405
 Additionally, the Dini decree regularized specific aspects of inflows, 
notably the entry of seasonal workers, some particularities concerning border controls 
and the procedure of expulsion of undocumented foreigners. According to Dal Lago
406
, 
although the actual effects of these restrictive measures were limited – deportations, for 
one, were not carried out in the expected amount –, the decree did achieve some 
important political objectives: first, it consolidated the “closed borders” principle and 
expulsions as the main policy responses to the emergency situation in which Italy found 
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itself as a result of irregular migration; secondly, it allowed the country's political forces 
to find a compromise in this policy field. 
 Despite the importance of this decree – illustrated by the fact that it was restated 
six times –, its text was not converted into law.407 Therefore, the much needed general 
reform of the legal acts on immigration had to wait until 1998, when finally the Turco-
Napolitano Law (Law no.40), was designed and approved with the intention of 
providing a unique and general regulatory framework to the migratory phenomenon. In 
contrast to former laws, the 1998 act was comprehensive, that is to say, its provisions 
impinged upon several aspects of immigration, ranging from entry conditions and 
border controls to integration measures. In this sense, Nascimbene
408
 states that the 
Legislator aimed at inaugurating a new era of immigration in Italy. Indeed, just the fact 
that this reform did not result from any drastic situation was already a great novelty, at 
least in terms of policy-making. Yet, as a followup of the Contri draft, the Turco-
Napolitano Law also maintained some aspects of past regulations, such as the treatment 
of immigrants as individuals and potential citizens – as opposed to only workers –, the 
equality of access to social rights, and the granting of the rights to health and education 
to unauthorized immigrants. Novel liberal elements also featured in the law: a residence 
permit for job-seekers was created, provisions for the “sponsorship” of newcomers by 
Italian citizens, legal foreigners and organizations were established, conditions for 
family reunification were broadened, and the decrees on inflows were to become more 
generous.
409
 
 Officially, the goals of the 1998 law were the following: first, to fight 
clandestine immigration and the criminal exploitation of cross-border movements of 
people; second, to establish limited, planned and regular inflows of immigrants to Italy; 
and third, to introduce integration measures to newly arrived third-country nationals, as 
well as to those individuals already established in the country.
410
 This list of objectives 
demonstrates that a dual approach towards immigration had been consolidated in Italy: 
on the one hand, the new legislation took a restrictive stand toward new inflows in that 
its provisions visibly aimed at reducing the entry of migrants and at diminishing the 
number of undocumented foreigners; on the other hand, the law sought to assure the 
integration of those who were already settled in the territory through the observance of 
these individuals' fundamental rights and through measures promoting social 
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integration.
411
 
 Concerning the restrictive bias, the adoption of several repressive measures 
illustrates well the point: the law defined various types of forced expulsions, created 
“temporary detention centers” for irregular migrants – where they could be upheld for 
up to 30 days –, reinforced border controls, made it more difficult for migrants to 
acquire long-term residence permits, and restricted the access to certain social rights to 
those with legal permanent residence in the country.
412
 In part, these measures resulted 
from Italy's need to comply with the Schengen requirements –  notably the provisions 
concerning border controls and the adoption of the Schengen Information System (SIS). 
In fact, it is argued that in Southern European states, EU Treaty obligations have had the 
effect of reinforcing the repressive aspects of immigration regulations.
413
 
Notwithstanding the importance of this external factor, domestic politics undoubtedly 
shaped the law's restrictive facet: the creation of internment centers for one, resulted 
from a compromise between the center-left government and the opposition. Meanwhile, 
pro-immigrants innovative measures, such as active and passive electoral participation 
in local administrations, were dropped along the negotiation process. The political 
climate in Italy was indeed pervaded by social alarm and panic, and while right-wing 
parties could take advantage of these public anxieties, the left-wing was obliged to 
accept a certain degree of hostility towards foreigners, which had been translated into 
the repressive side of the 1998 law.
414
 
 Thereafter, public fears related to the presence of foreigners have continued to 
inform the country's political disputes, as well as policy-making on immigration. 
Although the restrictive aspects of the Turco-Napolitano law could have quieted down 
the electorate and thus, diminished the political relevance of immigration, the 
unsatisfactory results of the 1998 framework actually provided the right-wing coalition 
with ammunition against both their political opponents and immigrants.
415
 Owning to 
the Ulivo's – center-left alliance – incapacity of making the best of the law's provisions, 
the right-wing House of Freedoms (CdL) found itself in a comfortable position; that is, 
the coalition could use the issue to justifiably criticize the government, to foment 
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dissent within the majority, and to feed an electorally beneficial “politics of unease”, 
which profited from the perception that immigration flows were still out of control and 
were thereby, raising insecurity and urban degradation.
416
 As Colombo and Sciortino
417
 
contend, the politicians of the CdL cleverly took advantage of the situation, a strategy 
that was visibly pursued in the text of one of the main law proposals that preceded the 
2002 reform, the Berlusconi-Bossi bill: 
 
Immigration is consequently used as a picklock; to disrupt the social order 
(thereby increasing the power of arbitrage between the unstructured social 
forces) e thus, to put the hands in the electoral loot (formed by a new 
lumpenproletariat made out of a mass of immigrants, which, it is 
speculatively said, would vote for the left-wing). 
418
 
 
 In this context, the reform of the 1998 framework ended up becoming one of the 
hottest topics of the political campaign for the 2001 national elections. Needless to say, 
the issue played a pivotal role in the victory of the center-right coalition in both the 
upper and lower houses of the Italian Parliament. However, once the CdL took over the 
power, the shift from political rhetoric to action proved to be more difficult than 
expected: the heterogeneous majority headed by Berlusconi had a hard time elaborating 
and approving the bill, and not only due to the opposition of left-wing parties, but also 
due to disagreements within the governing alliance itself.
419
 Amongst the main 
controversial points of the bill, it is interesting to cite: the introduction of a fifth 
regularization scheme, the possibility of transforming irregular entry and presence into 
criminal offenses, and the proposal of adopting a policy framework based on the 
German guest-worker model – a functionalist move that would serve to prevent 
immigrants from settling in Italy.
420
 The bargaining process surrounding these and other 
issues toned down the extremist character of the bill. As a result of negotiations and 
compromises, the actual Bossi-Fini reform (Law no.189), albeit containing some 
repressive elements, did not include the polemical crime of clandestine immigration, nor 
did it introduce quotes for family reunification and the requirement of 3 years of legal 
residence (instead of one) for this type of reunification.
421
 Moreover, the law did not 
curtail the rights previously granted to documented and undocumented immigrants. The 
latter group also benefited from yet another amnesty – the largest one in Europe thus far 
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–, a victory attributable to the pressure of the moderates components of the majority, in 
particular to its centrist Catholic bloc.
422
 
 Notwithstanding the attenuation of the original tone of the reform, many 
restrictive provisions were maintained in its final version. To begin with, although the 
law did not set up a guest-worker scheme, it successfully tightened the linkage between 
employment and the acquisition/maintenance of a residence permit. To this end, the law 
eradicated the practice of granting permits to job-seekers, and diminished the period of 
acceptable unemployment from 12 to 6 months.
423
 In respect to the latter provision, it is 
also interesting to clarify that, in practice, unemployed foreigners only had 3 months to 
find a new work position, since the reform also established that requests to renew 
residence permits should be made 90 days before the expiration date of the old one 
(instead of the original 30 days). The life of those intending to get a permanent 
residence permit was also made more difficult in that they had to regularly live in Italy 
for 6 rather than 5 years. Employers of foreign manpower, too, were subjected to new 
demands: in addition to providing immigrants with a regular work contract, they were 
asked to ensure the availability of accommodation to the new employees, as well as the 
availability of funds to cover their expenses to go back home. Based on these changes, 
Sciortino and Colombo
424
 argue that “the new law is, in reality, very close to factually 
equalize legal presence and work”.425 
 The prohibitionist character of the reform does not stop there: new regulations 
concerning the expulsion of immigrants were established as well. In more detail, the law 
increased the amount of foreigners who could be subjected to this procedure by 
extending the penalty of expulsion to those charged with infringement of copyrights or 
with trade of counterfeit goods, as well as to those engaged in marriages of 
convenience.
426
 Undocumented aliens, in turn, could simply be escorted to the border 
and expelled. Furthermore, in case an individual did not comply with an order to leave 
Italy or was caught a second time without appropriate papers, he or she would be 
charged as though having committed a crime. This meant that, under these 
circumstances, undocumented foreigners could be arrested from 6 to 12 months. If 
caught violating the law for a third time, imprisonment could last from 1 up to 4 
years.
427
 At last, other three provisions deserve reference here: the obligation to collect 
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immigrant's fingerprints, the possibility of using the navy to contrast illegal sea landings, 
and the tightening of punishment to those involved in irregular entries. The reason why 
these three measures were specifically highlighted is that, according to Sciortino and 
Colombo
428
 they are superfluous, that is to say: even though they send out the 
impression that the government is taking a strong stand against clandestine immigration, 
in practice, they do not change much. 
 Despite the adoption of several restrictive measures, all in all, the final version 
of the law fell short of the radical discontinuity publicized during the 2001 electoral 
campaign.
429
 Yet, the legal reform was broad enough to make the country's regulatory 
framework on immigration move backward. Instead of regarding immigrants as human 
beings, of promoting legal means for these individuals to enter the country, and of 
assuring legal stability for those who are already contributing to the growth of the 
Italian economy and society, the revision of the 1998 act looked at immigration as a 
danger or, at best, as a necessary evil, and devised instruments to deal accordingly with 
the phenomenon: the repressive provisions described above not only treat immigrants 
with suspicion, but also send out a number of discriminatory messages against them.
430
 
 It should be mentioned that after the approval of the reform, a number of 
sentences of the Italian Constitutional Court have eliminated some of its repressive 
aspects. For example, both the provision that allowed authorities to escort 
undocumented immigrants to the border and expel them, and the one that required the 
mandatory imprisonment of irregular foreigners under certain circumstances were 
declared unconstitutional.
431
 Furthermore, in 2006, Prodi's center-left government 
attempted to counter-reform the immigration policy framework by bringing back some 
aspects of the original Turco-Napolitano Law, and by adding some innovative measures. 
However, the proposed Amato-Ferrero Bill was blocked in parliamentary activities, and 
later on, with the fall of the center-left government, was completely abandoned.
432
 
 
3.4 Free from fear? The Italian infamous “Security Package” 
 
The objective of this final section is to describe the main characteristics of the Italian 
“security package”, officially launched in May 2008 and approved during the years 
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2008 and 2009. For obvious reasons, especial attention is paid to the provisions that 
impinge upon immigration and the rights of immigrants. The second part of the present 
chapter provided a description of the social climate in Italy since the 1980s, and this 
exercise put in evidence the growing sense of unease felt by the Italian public. The cited 
surveys also indicated that this feeling was particularly pronounced between the autumn 
of 2007 and the spring of 2008. Suggestively, these months coincided with the political 
campaigning for the 2008 parliamentary elections. Even more significant than this 
coincidence is the fact that the winners of the 2008 ballot – the center-right coalition 
formed by Silvio Berlusconi's People of Freedoms (PdL), Gianfranco Fini's National 
Alliance (AN) and Umberto Bossi's Northern League (LnP)
433
 – strongly relied on the 
aforesaid popular feelings to gain the majority of the seats in the Italian parliament. 
 Evidence of the instrumental usage of public fears may be found in the law and 
order platform upon which the victorious alliance based its campaign
434
: along with the 
promotion of an economic revitalization, the objective of addressing the country's 
pressing security problems was placed high in the coalition's agenda. The center-right 
electoral program directly called for “More security, more justice”435, a goal that came 
in third place in the alliance's list of missions for the future of Italy. It is also noteworthy 
that out of 12 measures designed to enhance the security of citizens, 7 directly 
concerned immigrants or, rather, the fight against irregular migration. This number 
alone indicates that the clandestini were considered one of the main security problems 
of the country, even though, as clarified, Italian citizens were concerned with a much 
larger array of topics. Despite the plurality of sources of insecurity listed above, the “[...] 
anti-immigrant sentiment was one of the reasons for the centre-right coalition’s electoral 
success”.436 In fact, Berluconi's bloc seems to have played the security card very well 
since it acquired a large and homogeneous majority in the Parliament: “large” because 
the left-wing opposition suffered a substantial loss, with  the Rainbow Left (Sinistra 
Arcobaleno) failing to achieve the required threshold of 4% of the votes
437
; 
“homogeneous” because, whereas the Catholic representation in the majority decreased, 
the presence of the Northern League was strongly reinforced. Given that the members of 
leftist and Catholic groups are generally pro-immigration and that the ones of the right 
                                                 
433
The original names of the parties are respectively: Il Popolo delle Libertà, Alleanza Nazionale and 
Lega Nord. 
434
Evelyn Shea. Elections and the Fear of the Crime, 2009. 
435
 Originally in Italian: “Più sicurezza, più giustizia”. In: Il Popolo delle Libertà. 7 Missione per il Futuro 
dell'Italia. 2008. Available at: <<http://www.votaberlusconi.it/speciali/PROGRAMMA2008.pdf>>. 
436
Giovanna Zincone. Immigration and Immigrant Policy in Europe, 2009, p.22. 
437
Massimo Merlino. The Italian (In)security Package, 2009. 
90 
tend to oppose it, this change was certainly significant for the subsequent policy-making 
in the field of immigration.
438
 
 Not surprisingly, as mentioned in the introductory section of this study, one of 
the first measures taken by the new center-right government was to announce the 
adoption of a “security package”, in other words, of a set of pieces of legislation that 
would free Italians from fear and guarantee the observance of their right to security. 
According to the Italian Premier, Silvio Berlusconi, these measures were devised to 
restore the citizenry’s confidence on the state439, a body that, in order to present itself as 
such, cannot refrain from assuring this primary right to its people.
440
 This point is 
indicative of the political leader's promptitude to connect the provision of security to the 
significance of the state. In fact, terms like legality, public order, territory, state and 
citizenry pervaded both the electoral program of the center-right and Berlusconi's first 
speech on the alleged “national security emergency”. This vocabulary was seemingly 
used to make a distinction between what and who was in and out the polity, as well as to 
reclaim the importance of the traditional framework of the national governing body. As 
Saleri
441
 argues, in framing the problem in such nationalistic terms, the government not 
only delineated the security trouble as it wished, but also presented itself as the subject 
responsible to take action, as the agent who ought to act immediately to reassure its 
citizens and to eradicate their fears. 
 Interestingly, the “package” was first introduced in Naples, in the midst of the 
local rubbish disposal emergency. In this context, the members of the government 
appear to have taken advantage of the sense of urgency of the local situation to present 
another pressing issue, another emergency, one that concerned the lack of security and 
the right of citizens to live free from fear. Since Italy, as Naples, was said to be facing 
an emergency, it was only reasonable to take urgent measures to address this national 
problem as well. That was precisely what the Italian government set out to do with the 
“security package”: in light of the presumed urgency of security problems, new 
legislation had to be extraordinary and promptly operative. The measures announced by 
the Minister of the Interior Roberto Maroni apparently satisfied these requirements, as it 
is explained ahead. 
 A list of the main components of the government's legislative “package” is 
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provided below: 
 
 1  Law Decree no.92/23 May 2008, concerning “Urgent Measures in the Field of 
Public Security”, later on amended and converted into law by the Law no.125/24 July 
2008. 
 2  The draft law on security (Senate Act no.733 and Chamber Act no.2180), 
concerning “Provisions in the Field of Public Security”, which became Law no.94/15 
July 2009. 
 3  Three legislative decrees, all of which modified the legislation transposing EU 
directives into national provisions: 
 3.1  Legislative Decree no.160/3 October 2008, on the right to family reunification 
 (Directive 2003/86/CE); 
 3.2  Legislative Decree no.159/3 October 2008, on the procedures to recognize and 
 revoke the refugee status (Directive 2005/85/CE); and 
 3.3  Legislative Decree on the freedom of movement of Communitarian citizens,
 which was later on withdrawn (Directive 2004/38/EC). 
 4  Law no.85/30 July 2009, with which Italy becomes a party in the Treaty of Prüm; 
and 
 5  Decree of the Interior Ministry no.183/8 August 2009 on the citizens' patrols. 
 
Although the package includes other legislative measures (see Annex 1), the laws and 
decrees listed above may be considered the most important regulatory components of 
the government's strategy. In spite of differences in form and scope, all the above-
mentioned instruments impinge upon the condition of foreigners in Italy and help to 
perpetuate the idea that insecurity is to a certain extent attributable to the presence of 
outsiders in the country. In this respect, Saleri
442
 observes that, even though the adoption 
of this legislative kit evoked the impression that the government had “rationalized”443 
the problem of insecurity, Italian political leaders actually refrained from directly 
identifying its causes, that is, from pointing out the sources of fear. In fact, when 
announcing the “security package”, Berlusconi never stated that immigrants  
represented a menace to the country's security. And yet, objective measures dealing 
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directly with foreigners were subsequently presented with the goal of tackling insecurity. 
In this respect, the author argues that even though the Italian prime-minister did not 
claim that migration was one of the causes of insecurity, the legislation put in place to 
remedy the population's sense of unease formulates an explanatory system, which 
connects public security problems, such as criminality, to immigration, thereby causing 
a syntactic slip between these phenomena.
444
 This means that the “security package” 
alludes to associations that transfer the negative connotations of several distressful 
phenomena to immigrants. By this means, the package helped to reinforce the narrative 
that includes immigration as a threat to the Italian society. In doing so, the government 
conveys the impression that action is being taken to tackle pressing national troubles, 
while leaving open the possibility of treating a wide array of matters under the banner of 
security. The number of legal instruments contained in the “package” and their mixed 
content seem to reflect precisely this choice to treat the problem in a loose and broad 
manner. 
 Despite the amount and heterogeneity of legislative measures, the centerpiece of 
the security strategy is the Law no.94, whose provisions complement the Decree no.92 
(converted into law by the Law no.125). These two pieces of legislation are considered 
particularly important precisely for their comprehensive character: both include 
provisions that deal with a very wide range of issues. It is precisely because the Law 
no.94 is deemed as the most important and integral part of the “security package” that 
the present study focuses on the parliamentary procedures that led to its approval. 
However, given the complementary character of this law and the Law Decree no.92, the 
scope of the remaining of this chapter is to shortly present the central points of both of 
them, in particular the ones concerning immigration. The next chapter will include more 
details on how these provisions affect immigrant's rights, as well as on the process of 
approval of the laws. 
 In accordance with the alleged urgency of the security problem in Italy, the 
Council of Ministers not only announced the adoption of the “security package”, but 
also immediately issued the Law Decree no.92, a promptly operative piece of legislation 
that, due to its nature, satisfied the requirements of “urgency” and  “extraordinarity” of 
the moment. This decree, published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale on the 23
rd
 of May 2008 
and converted into law on the 24
th
 of July of the same year, consisted of 13 articles, 
many of which touched upon the legal condition of immigrants in Italy.
445
 For starters, 
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the text
446
 counted with several new norms to fight clandestine immigration. Article 1 
rendered the procedure of expulsion easier, and not only for those found irregularly in 
the country's territory, but also for EU citizens and legal immigrants. According to this 
modification, all categories of foreign-born residents may be subjected to expulsion if 
sentenced to more than a couple of years of imprisonment. Previously, a jail sentence 
above 10 years was required, and only third-country nationals could be expelled. The 
same Article 1 modified Article 61 of the Italian Penal Code by adding the notion of 
“irregularity of residence status” to the list of aggravating circumstances of criminal 
offenses. In practice, this means that an undocumented foreign-born individual found 
guilty for a crime in Italy may receive a prison sentence one third longer than the one 
normally applied, and this merely due to his administrative condition in the country.
447
 
Additionally, the fifth article of the decree establishes that the “facilitation of 
clandestine immigration” is a criminal offense punishable by prison sentence and 
property seizure. Here, facilitation refers specifically to the cessation of property to an 
irregular migrant. Thus, according to this rule, which was later on revised, a landlord 
who rented out an apartment or so to an individual devoid of proper documents could 
face imprisonment from 6 months to 3 years, in addition to having his/her property 
confiscated.
448
 This implied that the owner had to make sure that the residence status of 
his/her tenant was regular throughout the whole duration of the lease. In the text of the 
Law no.94, this measure was made less strict: first, the jail sentence became valid only 
to those landlords who aimed at profiting from the migrant's situation; second, the 
owner only had to verify the legal situation of his potential tenant when signing or 
renewing the contract.
449
 Another provision related to irregular migration concerns the 
“temporary assistance and detention centers” (Centri di Permanenza Temporanea e 
Assistenza – CPTA), which were renamed “identification and expulsion centers” (Centri 
di Identificazione ed Espulsione – CEI). Although their structure did not change, this 
nominal alteration highlights that the goal of expelling unwanted immigrants has 
officially become the main function of these centers.
450
 
 Another change brought about by the new security legislation regards the powers 
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of mayors in the field of public security, which were significantly amplified. According 
to Article 6, mayors were conferred the competence of adopting urgent regulations in 
the case of security emergencies. Moreover, they now have the additional responsibility 
of facilitating the cooperation between the national and local polices. Also, they were 
granted access to the Ministry of Interior's databases. The expansion of these leaders' 
powers is important here because it may affect immigrants directly and indirectly: for 
one, mayors may report irregular foreigners to the competent authorities, so that the 
latter can take appropriate measures to expel these persons.
451
 Furthermore, since the 
text of the article does not define the term “public security” precisely, mayors were left 
with power to use security regulations at their own discretion.
452
 At last, the Law Decree 
also regulated the participation of the Army in territorial control. The deployment of 
soldiers can take place in order to prevent criminality in exceptional situations, and to 
surveil particularly vulnerable sites or targets. In accordance with this new provision, on 
July 2008 the Ministries of Defense and Interior decided to resort to the Italian Armed 
Forces in order to surveil the CEIs, amongst other places.
453
 
 As for the so-called Security Bill (S 733 and AC 1280), it was first presented by 
Italian Premier, Silvio Berlusconi alongside the Ministers of the Interior and Justice, 
Roberto Maroni and Angelino Alfano, not long after the adoption of the Law Decree 
no.92, on June 3
rd
 2008.
454
 Despite being rapidly devised, the text of what would 
become the Law no.94 was only approved in July 2009, after being subjected to 
parliamentary appraisal three times – twice in the Senate, and once in the Chamber of 
Deputies. The length of this process was not without a good reason: several of the 
provisions introduced by the Bill were highly controversial, particularly the ones 
concerning immigration. The Security Act changed profoundly the regulatory 
framework on immigration originally set up by the Turco-Napolitano Law, albeit not 
promoting an integral reform of the 1998 law.
455
 Additionally, the Law no.94, as most of 
the legislative measures of the “security package”, touched upon the legal condition of 
foreigners by altering other sources of law, such as the Penal Code and laws on 
citizenship. The most important provisions of the Act are described below. 
 Similarly to the decree no.92, the Security Act has introduced several norms 
aimed at contrasting irregular immigration. Despite the importance of these norms, the 
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repressive character of the law is by no means restrained to the treatment of this specific 
category of foreigners. The law's opening article, for example, establishes additional 
constraints to the entrance of aliens in Italy, vetoing the ingress of foreigners who have 
been convicted for a list of crimes, including offenses related to the exploitation of 
prostitution, and to the facilitation of clandestine immigration. This restrictive rule also 
affects those in possession of residence permits requiring renewal, since their criminal 
background too will be checked according to the novel regulation.
456
 What's more, other 
provisions created by the new law help to hinder the acquisition and maintenance of a 
legal status in Italy. To start with, the law creates an integration agreement to which 
newcomers must subscribe in order to live regularly in the country. This agreement 
defines a number of integration objectives that must be fulfilled before the expiration 
date of the migrant's permit. In case the contract is not honored, the foreigner's permit is 
revoked, and he/she is expelled from the country.
457
 Ironically, the implementation of 
this demanding provision is to be done without additional expenses to the state. 
Applicants for long-term residence permit, too, were subjected to a new integration rule: 
to be granted this status, immigrant are now required to pass a language test.
458
 
 A second difficulty imposed by the new legislation to the acquisition and 
maintenance of a legal status is the creation of a prohibitive financial “contribution” (80 
to 200 euros) for the procedures of issuance and renewal of the residence permit. The 
resources resulting from this provision are aimed at financing the activities of a newly 
established Repatriation Fund, whose objective is to cover expenses related to the return 
of immigrants to their countries of origin.
459
 One more provision related to the 
acquisition of permits establishes that, as of July 2009, the right to family reunification 
of spouses is officially limited in order to avoid polygamous marriages. By this means, 
the issuance of residence documents to a migrant's new partner may be denied in case 
the applicant's first spouse is still in possession of a permit derived from the same 
procedure. Although this provision is seemingly reasonable, it neglects that the 
maintenance of the legal status of more than one spouse is not motivated by 
polygamous unions, but rather by the necessity to assure the presence of both parents to 
the children of the foreign couple – in case they have them.460 
 In regard to the stay of foreign-born nationals in Italy, it is relevant to recall that 
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immigrants are now required to present documents attesting their legal status in order to 
access public proceedings, such as the recognition of civil acts – including marriages – 
and the granting of public licenses and authorizations. For those working in the public 
administration, in turn, it was introduced the obligation to report irregular immigrants. 
The original text of this norm was far more repressive than the provision just described 
in that the aforesaid requirement was also applicable to health assistance facilities and 
educational institutes. However, after heated debates and popular manifestations, this 
requirement was finally erased from the draft law. In case it had been approved, this 
measure would have transformed doctors and teachers into “spies” of irregular migrants, 
since they would be obliged to denounce aliens in irregular situation.
461
 Moreover, such 
measure would surely have worked to demotivate a large group of foreigners to look for 
these public services, even if they were in need of help. Another qualification to this law 
was made by the Ministry of the Interior, which clarified that the obligation to present 
documents does not apply to public acts related to the issuance of birth certificates or to 
the acknowledgment of parentage. Even though these measures do not affect legal 
migrants directly, changes in the procedures of public registration (iscrizione anagrafica) 
have imposed further obstacles also to these individuals: several deadlines to renew or 
make a new registry were shortened, and migrants are now required to present a 
certification that their accommodations fulfill a set of sanitary conditions.
462
 
 One of the most controversial provisions of the Law no.94 was the creation of 
the reato di clandestinità, that is to say, the transformation of irregular entry and stay in 
Italy into a criminal offense. Initially, the perpetrator of such crimes was to face a jail 
sentence from 6 months up to 4 years, but this punishment was later on replaced by a 
financial penalty of 5 to 10 thousand euros.
463
 The creation of this criminal offense has 
been constantly contested, and not only due to its controversial character, but also 
because its constitutionality is not clear. In fact, recently, on April 28
th
 2011, the 
European Court of Justice has ruled against the provision establishing the offense by 
claiming that the creation of the “crime of illegal immigration” – including the norm 
that provides for the imprisonment of irregular immigrants who fail to comply with an 
expulsion order – breaches the EU directive 2008/115/CE on common standards and 
procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals.
464
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The creation of this offense was not, however, the only extreme measure adopted to 
fight irregular immigration. The Security law also extended the duration of detention of 
irregular immigrants in CEIs from 60 days to 180 days. Furthermore, in an attempt to 
catch the so-called “overstayers” – aliens who enter the country in a short-term visa, and 
then overstay the period established in the permit –, another criminal offense was 
created: according to the new rule, a foreigner may be sentenced from 6 months to 1 
year in prison in case he/she disobeys an order to leave the country, and overstays more 
than 60 days.
465
 
 What's more, the powers of mayors in the field of public security were 
broadened once again with the objective of contrasting disturbing situations, including 
the ones involving immigrants. In this respect, it is important to mention that the 
Security Law established that mayors are officially allowed to rely on the help of 
citizen's patrolling organizations – the so-called “ronde” – to identify persons or events 
that may disturb the local public security or generate situations of social unrest.
466
 The 
Decree of the Interior Ministry no.183, issued on August 2009, further specified how 
these organizations are to be regulated. At last, it is important to mention new provisions 
on two matters that albeit very different, also aim at detecting and contrasting the 
presence of irregular aliens in the country. The first concerns international money 
transfers. According to the law no.94, financial agencies offering this type of service to 
foreigners must request the costumer's residence permit, and archive a copy of this 
document for 10 years. Moreover, in case the agency comes across a non-regularized 
resident, a report must be filled to the public security authorities. In case an agency does 
not comply with these regulations, the license to operate shall be withdrawn. The 
second set of rules concerns the law on the obtainment of Italian citizenship by marriage. 
In order to avoid marriages of convenience, the Security Act increased the period of 
legal residence required to apply for citizenship from 6 months to two years.
467
 
Interestingly, these restrictive measures were counterbalanced by a provision that 
benefits high skilled migrants, that is: foreigners holding  Master or PhD titles obtained 
in an Italian university can get a temporary residence permit (no longer than 12 months) 
to look for a job in the country.
468
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 In addition to the restrictive provisions just described, the Law no.94 established 
other regulations that negatively affected the legal condition and the rights of foreign-
born nationals living in Italy. However, as mentioned before, only the most important 
and radical provisions were highlighted above. Together, the prohibitive character of 
this set of rules puts in evidence that the recent legislative choices in Italy have been 
informed exclusively by a repressive mentality, one that looks at immigrants first and 
foremost as a threat. Therefore, these measures fail to consider that immigration cannot 
be efficiently managed in such simplistic terms: as mentioned above, the inward 
movement of people is a structural and complex phenomenon, and one that has to do, 
above all, with real human beings. 
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4 On Security and Rights: analyzing of the debates over the Law no.94 
 
The main purpose of the last chapter of this work is to present a critical discourse 
analysis of the parliamentary debates that led to the approval of the Security Law no.94, 
concerning “Provisions in the Field of Public Security”. As explained previously, the 
objective of this analysis is to discover in what manner the advocates of this repressive 
Law managed to suppress and silence the voices that opposed it, in particular the ones 
that accused the legislative piece of violating the individual freedoms and human rights 
of immigrants. The previous chapter explained in some detail how and when a security 
narrative on immigration came into being in Italy, as well as the ways in which this 
negative and exclusionary conception influenced policy-making in the field of 
immigration from the mid-1980s until nowadays. However, not much was said about 
the other views of the migratory phenomenon, including the “rights-based” discourse on 
immigration. 
 Given this oversight, this chapter begins spelling out how a discourse based on 
individual freedoms and human rights was used by institutional and civil society actors, 
both in and outside of Italy, to counteract the main migration-related provisions of the 
so-called “security package”. Therefore, this part demonstrates, in an applied manner, 
the main characteristics of what was referred to here as the “rights-based” discourse on 
immigration, a discourse built upon liberal and democratic principles and values, and 
that presents immigration as a multiple phenomenon, formed first and foremost by 
human beings. As it is explained below, these critiques are in line with those used by the 
center-left parliamentary group to oppose the approval of the Security Bill S 733 and 
AC 2180. Thereafter, the second section introduces in more detail the methods used in 
the analysis. Thus, the different stages of a critical discourse analysis are presented, as 
well as the main strengths and shortcomings of this type of interpretative methodology. 
Finally, the third section presents the actual analysis of the parliamentary debates that 
culminated in the Law no. 94. Since the center-left and center-right coalitions were in 
opposite sides in the political struggle over the definition and treatment of the migratory 
phenomenon, the analyses of the speeches delivered by their members were made 
separately: first, the center-left's pro-immigration discourses were the object of analysis. 
Thereafter, the securitized discourses of the majority group were studied. 
 
4.1 Critiques to the “Security Package”: Immigrants, human beings 
 
100 
“Immigration is a multifarious phenomenon” and “immigrants are first and foremost 
human beings”: these statements were reiterated several times in the present study and, 
even so, it was the negative image of immigration that received the most attention thus 
far. This section counterbalances this bias by introducing the main social and 
institutional reactions and critiques to the Italian “security package”. Thereby, it 
presents an alternative view of immigration in Italy, one that may even include some 
aspects of the dominant securitarian framework, but that, above all, approaches 
international mobility as a complex and human phenomenon. The idea here is to, first, 
demonstrate that the preeminence of the security narrative did not prevent other actors 
from questioning and challenging this negative discursive articulation, and second, to 
introduce in a more palpable way the political and social context in which the main 
legislative piece of the “security package” – Law no.94 – was subjected to 
parliamentary scrutiny. In respect to this context, it is interesting to note that many of 
the arguments raised by civil society organizations and international institutions against 
the Bill were replicated in the Italian Parliament by the center-left opposition. As it 
should be clear by now, this alternative view of immigration may be understood in the 
terms of the social theory of language presented in the first chapter
469
, so that: in a 
context dominated by a discourse type that portrays immigration as a security threat, 
such discursive reactions and critiques are parts of subaltern discourses, which attempt 
to challenge the hegemonic status of the securitarian one. In other words, these 
discourses are at the other side of the political battlefield, and they have been, up to now, 
mitigated and silenced by the dominant security narrative. 
 As clarified, despite the repressive turn in immigration policy, Italy is a liberal 
democratic state and, as such, it cannot simply choose to dispose of the individual 
freedoms and human rights of international movers. Nevertheless, according to the 
critics of the “security package”, this is precisely what the Southern European state has 
done with the approval of the set of security rules announced in 2008.
470
 These actors 
argue that, by adopting a number of highly repressive legislative measures to fight 
irregular immigration, the state has legitimized breaches of immigrant's most 
fundamental rights, such as the right to family life, and the right to equally before the 
law. Before specifying why and how some of the new provisions adopted by the Italian 
government violate principles that lie at the heart of liberal democracies, it is important 
to identify which institutional and civil society actors expressed concern about, and 
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attempted to challenge the security policy innovations – after all, discursive practices of 
social agents are influenced by their identity and placement in society. According to 
Merlino
471
, actors situated at three different levels of political action – national, 
European and international – raised criticism against the “security package”. 
 At the international level, the Council of Europe, represented by the 
Commissioner for human rights Thomas Hammarberg, expressed deep concerns about 
the direction immigration policy-making has been taking in Italy. According to his 
report
472
, the novel migration-related pieces of legislation “raise serious issues of 
compatibility with human rights standards”473. It is interesting to highlight that this 
negative evaluation was made in spite of the government's attempt to convince the 
international representative that the state of emergency and subsequent formulation of 
new security measures did not entail violations either to immigrants' or to nationals' 
fundamental rights and freedoms.
474
 The Commissioner has thereafter, warned the 
Italian government that, regardless of the pressures and difficulties brought about by 
international movements of people, national states are required to abide by human rights 
laws and standards. What's more, in regard to the criminalizing aspects of the Law 
Decree no.125 and the Security Bill S 733
475
, Commissioner Hammarberg argued that: 
 
Criminalization is a disproportionate measure which exceeds a state’s 
legitimate interest in controlling its borders and corrodes established 
international law standards that run counter to this kind of measures. To 
criminalize irregular migrants, in effect, equates them with the smugglers or 
employers who, in many cases, have exploited them. Such a policy would 
cause further stigmatization and marginalization, even though the majority of 
migrants contribute to the development of European states and their 
societies.
476
 
 
 In addition to the Council of Europe, other international organizations have 
criticized the Mediterranean country's new security legislation, as well as several 
immediate measures enacted against immigrants and Roma and Sinti populations, such 
as the collection of fingerprints of Roma children. Amongst these organizations, 
Merlino
477
 underlines the negative assessments made by the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Italy (OSCE) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 
both of which condemned the country's treatment of the Roma and Sinti. The “security 
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package” has also faced criticism from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
operating at the international level. In this respect, it is noteworthy, for instance, that 
Amnesty International denounced Italian authorities for jeopardizing the rights and 
freedoms of immigrants and asylum-seekers as a result of the efforts to reduce the 
numbers of undocumented aliens in the country.
478
 
 European Union institutions, too, have expressed criticism to the new security 
legislation, in particular in light of the potential consequences of some its measures to 
the lives of foreign-born persons. The European Parliament (EP) and the European 
Commission
479
 not only questioned the idea of censusing the communities of Roma 
people in the country, but also stressed that a number of measures included in the 
“security package” were incompatible with EU law.480  Amongst the provisions that 
conflicted with European directives were, for example, the expulsion of individuals 
sentenced to more than two years of imprisonment and the inclusion of irregular 
immigration status in the list of circumstances that aggravate criminal offenses. 
Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the crime of irregular entry and stay 
in the territory of the country was more than simply criticized by European institutions; 
the ECJ has recently ruled against the criminalization of irregular immigration in a 
decision that contested both the possibility of incarcerating immigrants that do not 
comply with an order to leave the country, and the criminal punishment of irregular 
entry or stay with a fine of 5 to 10 thousand euros (which was to be followed or 
preceded by the expulsion of the accused).
481
 EU civil society organizations have also 
reacted to the novel legal and institutional developments related to immigration, 
especially the ones concerning the situation of Romani people living in Italy.
482
 
 At the domestic level, the “security package” has also caused much commotion: 
the Catholic Church, and the groups and organizations associated to it, notably the 
Italian branch of Caritas
483
, together with a large number of NGOs and associations of 
Italian doctors – amongst other civil society actors –, attacked the parts of the new 
security laws that concerned immigration. In fact, these actors have formed a network 
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against the “security package”484, which served to provide up to date information on the 
matter, as well as to organize and to announce public manifestations against the laws. 
According to Merlino
485
, the harsher critic to the novel legislation has been the Catholic 
Church. Indeed, Catholic groups did not limit themselves to linking the policy 
innovations to racial discrimination, but took a step further and alerted to the possible 
emergence of a renewed fascist wave in Italy. The Italian branch of Caritas has also 
devoted a part of the 2009 Almanac on Immigration
486
 to the assessment of the potential 
consequences of the different pieces of legislation that compose the “security package”. 
As for the results of these evaluations, they corroborate the above-mentioned concerns, 
that is: several of the provisions that regard immigration are said to violate fundamental 
human rights, and not only of irregular subjects, but also of European citizens, and of 
third-country nationals living regularly in the country.
487
 Besides that, there is a general 
worry that measures that criminalize immigrants will worsen the already complicate 
relationship between foreigners and some parts of the native population, and thereby 
help to increase the number of racial and xenophobic incidents in Italy. 
 As mentioned above, several civil society organizations non-related to the 
Church have also rejected the government's repressive security package. In an interview 
to La Reppublica
488
, a daily newspaper of large circulation in Italy, representatives of 
the Medici Senza Frontiere (Doctors without borders) in the country criticized the 
proposal to extend the detention of immigrants in the “Identification and Expulsion 
Centers” (CEI) to 18 months, especially in consideration of the horrible conditions of 
these places, which, in addition to being inhumane, are often overcrowded. The NGOs 
ActionAid Italia and Soleterre were also featured in this news report, both of them 
condemning and questioning the efficacy of the new provisions. Damiano Rizzi, the 
president of Soleterre, argued for example, that by relying exclusively on repressive 
measures, the approach chosen by the government is counterproductive since most of 
the foreign-born nationals residing in the country are actually important resources to the 
Italian economy. Concerning the complaints made by associations of doctors, the 
Presidency of the Council of the Italian Society of Migration Medicine
489
 strongly 
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rejected the proposal of invalidating the principle of medical confidentiality, a 
modification that would have allowed medical staff to denounce undocumented 
immigrants who looked for heath assistance. More than that, they criticized the 
government for merely discussing the possibility of abolishing the norm that prohibited 
doctors to denounce irregular aliens in that this debate alone had spread fear amongst 
immigrants and, consequently, had diminished the proportion of foreign patients looking 
for medical assistance.
490
 
 All in all, even though the actors mentioned above are extremely different in 
nature and operate in diverse levels of governance, they appear to have a unanimous 
opinion about the migration-related measures included in the “security package”, that is: 
they fail to comply with basic human rights principles. In view of this common 
evaluation – which, as said, is shared by the country's left-wing parties –, it is 
interesting to specify what provisions are said to violate which individual freedoms and 
human rights, and to explain why these breaches were expected in case the new 
regulation became fully operative. Therefore, the remaining of this section presents the 
expected consequences of the new security legislation to the rights of immigrants in 
Italy. Once again, the analysis focuses on the two main pieces of legislation included in 
the “security package”, namely: the Law Decree no.92 ( converted into law by Law 
no.125), and the Law no.94. 
 To start with a tendency common to both legislative pieces, i.e. the 
criminalization foreign-born nationals living irregularly in Italy, it is argued that the 
decision to criminally prosecute of this category of aliens is disproportionate to the 
offense allegedly committed by them.
491
 Before explaining this statement, it is 
important to notice that the “crime of irregular entry and stay” is not the only legal 
innovation responsible for criminalizing foreign-born individuals in Italy– even though  
it is certainly the most direct provision in this sense. Additional legislative modifications, 
as the inclusion of irregularity of status into the list of aggravating circumstances of the 
Penal Code, and the reduction of the minimal length of sentences to expel migrants 
(from 10 to 2 years) also help to criminalize these individuals in that they ,too, convey 
the notion that undocumented migrants are malefactors. Another measure that 
approaches immigrants as though they were criminals is the one that provides for the 
incarceration of those who disobey an order to leave the country. In short, these and 
other less direct provisions are said to criminalize immigrants, and not only 
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institutionally speaking, but also in the collective imagination of the society. 
 As for the reason why criminal punishments are considered disproportionate to 
the alleged offense, this evaluation is relate to the nature of the crime perpetrated: 
immigrants caught “illegally” in the state's territory, and then charged on this basis, are 
being indicted for their administrative statuses, and not for their actions – a basic 
premise of the Criminal Code.
492
 And, even if one considers that unauthorized entry and 
sojourn in a state's territory are not exactly proper doings, it seems unreasonable to 
criminally prosecute people simply because they did not comply with a set of 
administrative rules. If the Italian government is doing so, it must be working under the 
assumption that every clandestino/immigrant is potentially a criminal. In respect to this 
governmental posture, it seems to find some corroboration in the possibility of 
deporting aliens and EU citizens who have been sentenced to more than a couple of 
years of imprisonment: since this security measure is motivated by the presumed 
dangerousness of the expelled individuals, and taking into account that a two years' 
prison term is not a particularly high sentence, the decision to modify the rule could 
only have been based on the idea that immigrants are dangerous. 
493
 
 What's more, from a technical viewpoint, rules that criminalize foreigners are of 
difficult implementation, especially the ones requiring their imprisonment.
494
 Partly, 
such technical difficulties stem from internal problems of the Italian judicial and 
penitentiary systems: while the latter is unprepared to receive new inmates due to 
problems of overcrowding in the detention facilities, the former is extremely slow and 
inefficient. In this context, the expenditure of human and financial resources to 
criminally charge a pool of defendants that could sum up to 700 thousand people was 
more than senseless, it was factually impracticable. However, the list of technical and 
operational fouls of the new security measures related to the criminalization of aliens 
did not stop there. Given the obscure and continuous character of the novel 
reprehensible action  – i.e. irregular entry and sojourn –, it would be hard to establish 
precisely when and how the conduct was carried out, and this difficulty would surely 
interfere with the judicial proceedings.
495
 Furthermore, the text that established the 
“crime of irregular migration” was formulated in such a way that the penal action was 
subjected to the execution of an administrative procedure. Put differently, the 
enforcement of the expulsion procedure by the questore (police commissioner) implied 
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the ending of the penal action against the irregular foreigner, and this circumstance, in 
addition to being odd in itself, generated a serious problem: since the deportation of the 
unwanted alien could be carried out without the clearance of the judicial authority 
responsible for the case, the right to defense of the accused was factually limited.
496
 
 However, it is not only the right to defense that is violated by the new provisions: 
the nexus established between immigration status and criminal acts breaches the 
principles of equality before the law and of non-discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality – both of which are universal rights established by the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR) and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR).
497
 The inclusion of “irregular migration” in the list of aggravating 
circumstances is illustrative of this point as it implies that, by the mere faculty of being 
an unauthorized foreign citizen, an individual is liable to receive a sentence that is one 
third higher than the one applied to other residents who committed a similar 
transgression (a fact that also implies that the provision is contrary to the principle of 
proportionality). The “crime of irregular migration” is also noteworthy here, as only 
third-country nationals could possibly perpetrate the offense. Hence, based on these 
evaluations, the Italian Caritas criticized these criminalizing measures and accused the 
Italian government of creating 
 
[…] a special criminal law for foreigners, where the different penal treatment 
is based solely on the qualification/status of non-Italian citizen and not on a 
concrete evaluation of the higher dangerousness that this status may imply in 
terms of penal actions. Another consequence is the violation of the principle 
of equality/parity of treatment [...].
498
 
 
Still concerning criminal penalties, only this time for Italian citizens, critics of the 
“package” contend that the punishment first provided for the crime of letting 
accommodation to irregular foreigners was not only disproportionate and unfair, but 
also put landlords in a very difficult position for it required them to assume a “vigilance 
function”, which obviously went far beyond the mere realization of a contract. In regard 
to the argument that the penalty was disproportionate and unjust, this disapproval was 
grounded both on the severity of the punishment – a prison term, plus the confiscation 
of the property – , and on the fact that if two Italians were found guilty for the exact 
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same infraction, the consequences would be of administrative character.
499
 In fact, it 
was in light of these problems that the provision – firstly established in the Law Decree 
no.92 – was reformulated in the Law no.94, as seen above. Despite that, the original 
version of the measure deserved some space here in that its restrictive character was 
surely based on the aforesaid presumption that irregular immigrants are somewhat 
dangerous. The social dissemination of this presumption becomes riskier in light of 
another provision of the Law no.94, the institutionalization of citizen's patrolling groups. 
The so-called ronde not only violate underlying pillars of the modern nation-state, i.e. 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of the means of violence and the responsibility for 
the public security, but also potentially lead to a number of problematic and disturbing 
social situations. When it comes to immigrants, the components of such patrolling 
groups might deliberately choose to target such individuals simply because they are 
foreigners, especially in a society in which the migration-security nexus is so deeply 
rooted into the policy framework. Therefore, the ronde may unintentionally become an 
official means to discriminate against immigrants.
500
 
 Another controversial security measure concerning unwanted immigration was 
the extension of the period of detention of unidentified immigrants in the CIEs from 60 
to 180 days. Even if one disregards these facilities' inadequate conditions, this decision 
is condemnable, especially in consideration of these centers' poor performance over the 
last years.
501
 As a matter of fact, the CIEs have never worked as expected; that is to say, 
the detention of unidentified individuals in these places has hardly ever resulted in the 
determination of their personal identities and subsequent deportation. In this respect, it 
is noteworthy that the Ministry of Interior itself recognizes that the number of removals 
of third-country nationals does not surpass 50% of the number of foreigners held in 
these centers.
502
 In light of these well-known deficiencies, the decision to extend the 
duration of the period of detention was deemed to be unreasonable, extremely 
burdensome, and disrespectful of immigrants' personal freedoms. In fact, many 
arguments against the continuous operation of these facilities existed even before the 
extension of the arrest period was approved – an observation that only makes this 
governmental decision more surprising. A study conducted in 2006 by the Directorate-
General of Internal Policies of the European Parliament
503
, for example, disclosed the 
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extremely poor and dehumanising conditions of the Italian centers. According to the 
report,  immigrants were kept in “prison-like detention conditions”504 and the services 
provided in these places were inadequate, with foreigners being unable to access, for 
instance, information about their legal rights, as well as  health and psychological 
assistance.   
 The human rights of irregular aliens in Italy were also negatively affected by the 
article that establishes the requirement to present a residence permit to access public 
services and proceedings. Even though the original text of the article was modified in a 
less restrictive direction – the requirement applies neither to medical and educational 
establishments and nor to the release of birth and parentage certificates –, the requisite 
was maintained for the realization of marriages. As a result, the novel provision is 
accused of limiting the right of irregular immigrants to establish a family, which, 
according to article 16 of the UDHR, is an inalienable right of human beings, regardless 
of their administrative statuses.
505
 As for the subsections of the provision that were 
modified – i.e. access to health and educational institutes and to parentage declarations 
–, it is important to highlight that they were not easily erased from the Bill. On the 
contrary, these issues were subjects of intense public debates until the Chamber of 
Deputies decided to mitigate the repressive content of the article. In more detail, before 
being altered, the provision was considered extremely polemic because it was said to 
violate constitutional, as well as international norms. Indeed, according to Caritas
506
, if 
approved, the requisite of presenting a legal document would have constrained irregular 
immigrants' rights to family life, to health assistance and to education. Furthermore, the 
new limitations would have endangered the overall resident population of the country, 
since undocumented individuals would probably be reluctant to look for health 
assistance, even if infected by transmissible diseases.
507
 And yet, this was not the only 
provision of the “security package” that could backfire on the Italian state: for instance, 
the new, more restrictive regulations on money transfer may drive immigrants devoid of 
appropriate documents to look for alternative ways of sending financial resources to 
their home countries
508
. Needless to say, criminal organizations could easily take 
advantage of this situation, and provide this “service” themselves. 
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 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the rights and legal condition of regular 
foreign-born residents have also suffered some degree of degradation as a result of these 
new security-oriented immigration policies. As of 2008, regularized residents face 
heightened difficulties in establishing a stable and secure family life in Italy. For starters, 
the Law no.94 complements the already restrictive Legislative Decree no.160
509
 by 
adding yet another constraint to the right to family reunification: in order to avoid 
polygamous marriages, the issuance of documents to migrants' new spouses shall be 
denied in case the applicant's first partner is still in possession of a permit.
510
 However, 
as mentioned, this provision neglects the possibility that the couple, albeit separated, 
have children together, and that these minors hold the right to have both parents nearby. 
Besides that, the extension of the period for the acquisition of citizenship by marriage 
has also complicated the lives of foreigners and of their partners. According to the 
government, this measure aims at avoiding unions of convenience, but the legislators 
ignore that this modification actually treats newlywed individuals as suspects of 
fraudulent behavior, even though they did nothing to deserve such treatment.
511
 
 In regard to the changes in the procedures of public registration, the newly 
established obligation to present a “hygienic-sanitary certificate” of the place of 
residence to the anagrafe poses problems both to foreign nationals and to Italian 
citizens. Estimations indicate that a large part of the houses in Italy would not pass an 
inspection of this sort.
512
 This means that if this requirement is strictly implemented, 
many citizens and non-citizens will be excluded from the public registries and 
consequently, will be deprived of a number of rights connected to this bureaucratic 
procedure, such as the right to social assistance.
513
 Moreover, the state will loose an 
important instrument of surveillance and control of the population. On the top of that, 
procedures like the renewal of residence permits, and the issuance of documents to 
attest the continuous and regular sojourn of a foreigner in the territory of the country – 
necessary, for instance, to apply for a permanent residence permit – would be harder to 
get.
514
 Hence, the government has factually made it more difficult for immigrants to get 
and to maintain a legal residence status. 
 As for the other migration-related provisions of the new Security Law, such as 
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the novel integration requirements and the financial contribution to the issuance and 
renewal of residence permits, their main objective, too, seems to be that of imposing 
obstacles to the legal entry and stay of immigrants in Italy. In fact, concerning the 
creation of an integration contract for newcomers and the organization of language tests 
for long-term residents, it is noteworthy that the only precise statement in their regard in 
the Law is that they are to take place without additional financial burdens to state.
515
 
There are no other specifications, no regulations about how this complex process shall 
be best implemented. The financial contribution is a restrictive innovation as well: not 
only are the values asked – 80 to 200 euros – extremely high and thus, prohibitive to 
most immigrants, but also the additional resources gathered as a result of this procedure 
were meant to finance a repatriation fund – yet another decision that privileges the fight 
against irregular immigration.
516
 
 In short, none of these provisions seem to be aimed at promoting the integration 
of immigrants into the Italian society; nor does the financial contribution appear to be 
aimed at covering the expenses of the bureaucratic procedures related to the granting of 
permits. Rather, alongside the other Legislative and Law Decrees of the “security 
package”, these repressive measures seem to be the final ramifications the Bossi-Fini 
Law in that they clearly complement the 2002 policy reform
517
: they finally managed to 
criminalize irregular immigrants, to deteriorate the legal condition of foreign-born 
residents, and to constrain even more the few channels of legal immigration to the 
country. However, as seen, the main result of these efforts is likely to be the violation of 
individual freedoms and human rights – at least more than the stop of inflows of people. 
Hence, ultimately, this security-oriented approach to immigration is expected to result in 
“[...] the construction of a society [...] based on the hierarchical differentiation of non-
citizens' legal statuses” 518 , with citizenship representing the “[...] ultimate status 
privilege, the final factor of exclusion and discrimination, the last premodern relic of 
personal inequalities in contrast with the acclaimed universality and equality of 
fundamental rights”.519 
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4.2 Critical Discourse Analysis: a Methodological Note 
 
The first chapter of the present paper introduced the main aspects of the social theory of 
language developed by Norman Fairclough
520
, a discourse analyst whose 
methodological framework allows social researchers to explore the significance of 
language in the production, maintenance and transformation of power and hegemony. 
According to the author, language is a privileged means – albeit not the sole one – to 
investigate the perpetuation and change of relations of domination in society. This is 
because language, understood first and foremost as a social practice that conditions and 
is conditioned by other societal processes, occupies an important place in modern 
societies: it is deeply involved in power struggles between political forces, and not only 
as a means to produce and maintain power, but also as a stake in the contest. 
 As most societies in the so-called Western world are configured as liberal 
democracies – i.e. government forms where the exercise of power finds its limits in a 
bundle of rights and duties derived inter alia from the principles of liberty, individuality 
and equality –, their political realm cannot but be characterized by disputes that take 
place primarily in and over language. As explained in the second chapter of this study, 
immigration and securitization are two of the subjects of contest in these states' political 
field: whereas the first is a complex, and multifarious phenomenon that is seen and 
represented in a variety of ways, the second is a process of social construction that may 
be differently enacted by various actors, and established through a large set of means – 
discourses, policy instruments, images, etc. As a result of these multiple possibilities, 
different discourses on immigration have been formulated over time in societies hosting 
a large amount of foreign-born nationals, including in Italy – the case studied of this 
work. As this Southern European state became a country of immigration, a discourse 
that portrays cross-border movements of people as a threat to the state, to its national 
identity, to the domestic economy and to the public order was slowly articulated and 
integrated into its immigration policy framework. Progressively, this security-oriented 
view took precedence over other discourses on the phenomenon, such as the economic 
and humanitarian ones, and this evolution culminated in the adoption of a “security 
package” that, as explained, has as much to do with immigration as it does with 
organized crime and mafia. Since these discourses on the migratory phenomenon in 
Italy may be considered social practices, one may state that they are intrinsically 
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imbricated in the wider social context of the Mediterranean country. Indeed, the third 
chapter of this study not only presented different narratives on the migration flows to 
Italy, but also showed that these accounts are inseparable parts of the country's social 
and historical records. Therefore, discourses on immigration, too, are a part and a result 
of the struggles for power happening within the society – an observation in tune with 
Buonfino's
521
 contention that different discourses on migration reflect the existence of a 
number of political forces engaged in continuous political battles for power in society. 
 In light of the relevance of language in the political realm and of the socially 
constructed character of the securitized view of immigration, the discursive dimension 
of social practices seems to be an ideal site to research in what manner a narrative that 
includes the migratory phenomenon as a security concern becomes dominant and 
reduces human mobility to a threat that must be controlled, managed, mitigated and 
ultimately annihilated – even when it comes to liberal democratic states. More 
specifically, in order to investigate how the dominant securitized discourse on 
immigration negotiates its contractions with, and suppresses a rights-based and liberal 
view of the phenomenon, this study conducts a critical analysis of the political speeches 
delivered during the parliamentary procedures that culminated in the adoption of the 
centerpiece of the Italian “security package” – the Security law no 94. In other words, 
the analysis provided in this chapter attempts to demonstrate the ways in which different 
Italian political actors fought over the dominant discursive representation of 
immigration, and how the strongest political forces – in this case, the center-right 
majority – managed to approve a security-oriented reform of the country's immigration 
policy that circumvented and relegated to a second plane some of the founding 
principles of the liberal and democratic Italian state, such as equality and the respect for 
human rights. The present section aims at explaining how this critical discourse analysis 
is to be done in practice. Which formal features of the aforementioned debates should 
be observed? How are they connected to the wider social context? What do they 
indicate and why? 
 However, before answering these and other practical questions, it should be 
stressed that the objective here is not to provide an exhaustive account of the different 
methods of conducting critical discourse analysis. This is because, according to Bloor 
and Bloor
522
, there is neither one unique formula to do so, nor a precise methodological 
boundary that should by all means be respected; rather, there is a plurality of interesting 
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ways of critically investigating texts, which are influenced both by the scope of the 
research, and by the analyst's own standpoint on the issue under investigation. 
Concerning the latter argument, Fairclough
523
 warns researchers that, by the mere 
faculty of being critical, this type of analysis is partial. Indeed, if the intent of such 
investigations is to fight oppression in its linguistic forms, the analyst cannot aim at 
reaching the same level of objectivity claimed by scientists working with other 
methodological tools. This requires an ethical commitment on the part of researchers: 
when exposing their conclusions, they must openly recognize that the results obtained 
are unavoidably limited. Despite this apparent shortcoming, one cannot forget that it is 
precisely due to the critical character of this type of analysis that it is possible to unravel 
the ways in which language and discourse are used by powerful actors to maintain 
systemic structures of inequality and oppression in our societies. Since these ideological 
structures are taken for granted in quotidian social practices, it is not possible to disclose 
their operation unless a positive commitment to justice, fairness and equality is made. 
Hence, in order to operate critically, one must be ready to challenge the status quo, and 
to disclose the historically informed character of social structures, even if this implies 
compromising some degree of scientific objectivity.
524
 
 As for the present study, the method of discourse analysis used is compatible 
with the social theory of language developed by Norman Fairclough.
525
 The reason why 
the term “compatible” was used to express this choice is that although the aforesaid 
author provides a few general guidelines that explain how to canvass textual materials, 
he stresses that there is no unique way of making a critical discourse analysis. 
According to him, researchers must identify those that are the best tools to answer the 
questions posed in their specific studies. Bearing this qualification in mind, the author 
of the present paper assembled/copied some tables that re-construct the general 
methodological framework provided by Norman Fairclough in the book Language and 
Power.
526
 Although these tables should not serve as a blueprint of the methodological 
procedure, they may be of value in assisting the explanation provided in this section, 
and the actual study presented later on. 
 In order to make sense of the general guidelines of the procedure of critical 
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discourse analysis proposed by Fairclough
527
, we must first take a step back into his 
theory of language. As previously explained, for this author, language is a social 
practice that cannot be separated from the  context in which it is used. In regard to the 
notion of social context, one must recall that the author's understanding of this 
expression transcends the simple idea of immediate situation; if language is a 
constitutive part of society, this means that more general social structures influence and 
are influenced by the usage of this “means of communication”. Based on this premise, 
Fairclough
528
 argues that, when analyzing discourses, researchers should look beyond 
the text, meaning that  attention must be payed to three different levels of social 
organization, namely: the particular  situation of the interaction, the institutional level, 
and the level of the society as a whole. All of these societal layers shape the member's 
resources (MR) upon which agents conventionally draw when producing and 
interpreting texts. These macro-conditions are, in turn, shaped by individual practices, 
particularly when people engage creatively in interactions. 
 The relevance of recalling that discourses are imbricated in different societal 
levels lies in the fact that Fairclough
529
 distinguishes between three stages of discourse 
analysis, each of which corresponds to a different societal level. In other words, the 
author contends that 
 
in seeing language as a discourse and as a social practice, one is committing 
oneself not just to analysing texts, not just to analysing the processes of 
production and interpretation, but to analysing the relationship between texts, 
processes and their social conditions, both the immediate conditions of the 
situational context and the more remote conditions of institutional and social 
structures.
530
 
 
Therefore, a critical discourse analysis should consist of three steps, namely: description, 
interpretation and explanation. The first stage, description, is concerned with the formal 
features of texts. The second stage, the one of interpretation, refers to the analysis of the 
relationship between text and interaction. The last stage, explanation, concerns the study 
of the relationship between the interaction and the overall social context of production 
and interpretation of texts. 
 In more detail, in the first stage, the one of textual analysis, the researcher looks 
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at the form and organization of texts, which should not be understood as unproblematic 
categories, but rather as potential traces of and cues to hidden ideological values in the 
text. Formal features – such as vocabulary and grammatical structures – are said to 
possess three types of values, which may or may not be imbued with ideology, namely: 
experimental, relational and expressive. Traits that contain experimental value indicate 
how the text producer represents her experiences of the social and natural worlds; that is 
to say, these traits are connected to the contents of the text, and help to unveil the 
knowledge and beliefs of the person delivering a speech or writing a text. Relational 
values, in turn, are contained in formal features that allude to the social relationships 
being realized through the text in the discourse. Therefore, they refer to the relations 
between people within the discourse as well as to more general social relationships in 
society. At last, a formal feature is said to have expressive value when it is a trace of and 
a cue to how the producer evaluates the reality to which he is related. In other words, 
expressive values of formal features are related to the subjects, as well as to their social 
identities. It should be added that Fairclough
531
 deals with the possibility of formal 
features possessing what he calls “connective” value. Even though this value is internal 
to texts – it is to be found in formal traits that establish meaningful connections between 
different sentences and parts of a text, as conjunctions and definite articles –, it may 
point to the existence of ideological contents within a discourse, as well as to situations 
that are external to the text. 
 But what formal features should be observed in a text? How can one assess the 
value of a feature? And when is a formal feature endowed with ideological contents? 
Before answering these questions, it is important to clarify that any text, in whichever 
language it happens to be written or uttered, is composed of a mixture of formal features: 
particular words are used, grammatical structures are chosen, figures of speech are 
resorted to, semantic relationships are established, conjunctions are placed, etc. In other 
words, languages provide text producers' with an enormous amount of linguistic 
features and structures, which they may assemble as they wish in order to convey 
meaning. As a result of this production process, formal features may express one or 
more of the values described above. Nevertheless, this does not mean that ideological 
contents will necessarily be coded in such traits and thus, not all of the formal linguistic 
components of discourses will be relevant in critical studies. In sum, these observations 
indicate that what is of interest for the discourse analyst is not the mere formal 
description of the text; rather, the critical researcher attempts to find out whether and in 
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which ways formal linguistic features are engaged in the production, maintenance and 
transformation of established ideological notions, power relations, and social identities. 
In light of this purpose, the description phase cannot be conducted separately from the 
other two stages of the analysis; put differently, in order to interpret textural properties 
of texts, the researcher must pay attention to these formal aspects as well as to the 
discourse types upon which they rely. And this is to say that the three stages of 
discourse analysis cannot be clearly divided; on the contrary, they are supposed to 
complement and inform each other. 
 In fact, it is based on previous knowledge of the institutional, social and political 
contexts in which discourses occur that the analyst will be able to identify implicit 
contents, presuppositions, and traces of ideological processes in texts. Thus, it is not 
possible to indicate a priori what formal features should be observed in a text; instead, 
the inquire at this stage of the analysis must be reversed, that is to say, the analyst has to 
ask himself whether and how, for instance, certain ideological representations of the 
world (experimental values) are coded in the vocabulary used in a text, or in its 
grammatical structure. In respect to vocabulary, for example, the words, the way they 
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co-occur or are collocated in the text, and the meaning relations established between 
them may all be indicative of particular ideological beliefs. What's more – considering 
vocabulary –, the choice of wordings may indicate that the text helps to create or to 
sustain an unequal social relationship between the interlocutors (relational values). The 
usage of linguistic formalities or of slang terms in social interactions illustrates well this 
point. Vocabulary features may also include an evaluation of the world (expressive 
value). This happens, for example, when ordinary classification schemes – common 
ways to divide reality into parts – are used in non-conventional manners. 
 Grammatical structures, too, should be evaluated in this manner: if, for instance, 
the agency of an event or process is unclear, the analyst may ask himself, considering 
the social and political context of the discourse, whether such obfuscation was 
ideologically motivated or not. Relational values may also be embedded into 
grammatical traits. The usage of first- and second- person pronouns in their plural forms, 
and the modes of the sentences chosen by interlocutors (declarative, imperative, and 
interrogative) are two common means to express relationships of solidarity and power 
between the social agents taking part in an interaction. In addition to grammatical 
structures and vocabulary, other formal features of discourses may contain traces of and 
cues to ideological dimensions, such as the connectors that link different sentences and 
parts of texts, the interactional conventions drawn upon during the discourse (e.g. turn-
talking), and the large-scale structure of the text studied (e.g. the format of interviews, 
or news reports). In sum, as mentioned before, while several formal features may be 
meaningful from the analytical viewpoint, many of them will surely be irrelevant, and 
this means that the researcher must  thoroughly examine the material studied with an 
eye not only to its formal aspects and to the social context in which social interactions 
occurred, but also to his particular research question.  Table 1 summarizes the most 
important aspects of the descriptive stage of the critical discourse analysis, providing 
examples of formal features that commonly express ideological beliefs, support social 
relations, and reinforce social identities. As mentioned, this table was elaborated 
following the general guidelines provided by Fairclough in the book Language and 
Power.
532
 Concerning the formal traits listed in the table, it is important to stress once 
again that they do not exhaust the innumerable linguistic features available in language; 
they simply exemplify the formal features with experiential, relational, expressive and 
connective values that are most commonly endowed with ideological representations. 
 The second stage of the procedure of critical discourse analysis is called 
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interpretation, and as briefly mentioned above, is concerned with the relationship 
between the text and the social interaction in which this text is produced and interpreted. 
According to Fairclough
533, studying this relationship is important because “the values 
of textual features only become real, socially operative, if they are embedded in social 
interaction, where texts are produced and interpreted against a background of common-
sense assumptions (part of MR) which give textual features their values”.534 As it was 
explained in the second chapter, the processes of production and interpretation of texts 
are based on a dialectical interplay between textual cues and the resources (MR) upon 
which social agents draw in order to produce or to make sense of texts. A summary of 
these processes is presented on table 2. The two distinct parts of the table indicate that 
production and interpretation of texts take place at two levels: at the level of the text and 
at the level of the interactional context. Concerning the former level (lower part of the 
table), the illustration shows that  in order to make sense of, or to create meaningful 
messages, participants in discourse practices are required to know the linguistic 
conventions of a language, ranging from formal aspects, such as the language's 
phonology, vocabulary and grammar, to semantic and structural facets, such as the how 
meaning connections are established between words and sentences, and the ordinary 
text structures – schemata – relied upon. 
 In turn, the upper part of the table refers to the level of the interactional context: 
it is based on the interpretation of the surrounding social circumstances that text 
producers and interpreters determine which discourse types should be used to create or 
interpret texts. In other words, those taking part in a social interaction use external 
contextual characteristics – for example, physical aspects of the environment and 
properties of other participants –, as well as their member's resources to identify the 
situation type in which they are placed, and as a result of this evaluation, they know the 
conventions that should be drawn upon to interpret or to produce linguistic messages. 
More specifically, situational contexts have four main dimensions: the first dimension, 
the one that determines the content of the interaction, may be defined by answering the 
following question: “what is going on?”. By providing a response to this inquiry, the 
text producer/interpreter defines the situational context in terms of an activity type, a 
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topic and a purpose, and this exercise allows him or her to act in accordance with what 
is socially acceptable. For instance, in any given institutional setting, such as the 
parliament, several activities take place. In general assemblies, for example, 
parliamentarians may be required to discuss a particular bill, to propose amendments to 
its text, or to vote on its content. Each of these activities define the set of topics that 
may be covered by participants, as well as the purpose of the social interaction. The 
division of activities into categories is common in most social contexts, and helps to 
guide the actions of participants. 
 The second dimension of the situational context refers to the subjects positions 
set up in an interaction. Thus, the question guiding the interpretation of this aspect of 
social contexts is: “who is involved?”. Needless to say, subject positions are 
multidimensional categories: in the case of parliamentarians, for instance, they are not 
simply deputies or senators; rather, they are members of political parties, of 
parliamentary groups, of the political majority or of the opposition, of specific 
commissions, amongst many other institutional and social roles. One may identify 
different levels of subject positions: the first level derives from the activity taking place; 
121 
the second, from the social positions related to the institutional and social orders; and 
the third refers to the immediate context, that is, to the different speaking and listening 
positions within the actual discourse practice. The third dimension of the situational 
context is closely connected to the previous one: it concerns the relations between 
subjects. Therefore, the question that helps to describe this dimension is: “in what 
relations?”. This inquiry differs from the former one in that the analytical focus is 
shifted from the subjects themselves to the relationships established between them in a 
discourse. In more detail, this means that variables like power and social distance 
become relevant, as they help to determine the nature of relationships between subjects.  
At last, the fourth dimension of the situational context concerns the function of 
language in social interactions. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the question “what 
is the role of language?” attempts to determine more than the genre predominant in an 
interaction (interview, narrative, etc); additionally, it tries to discover whether language 
is instrumentally used, if it is a means to achieve particular goals, if specific 
communication channels (spoken or written) are preferred due to these objectives, etc. 
In short, the idea in this fourth step is establishing what is the usage of language in the 
context of the interaction. 
 Overall, by providing answers to these questions, an individual is capable of 
determining the discourse types that should be/are used in a given circumstance, and the 
text producer/interpreter will operate within the boundaries provided by this discourse 
type. Thereby, the sets of formal and semantic conventions belonging to the identified 
discourse type, the constrains it imposes on contents, subjects, relations
535
, and on the 
connections within parts of texts, and between texts and situational contexts are 
responsible for determining the meaning potential of the text produced or interpreted. It 
is important to remember that we are talking about a process of interpretation, that is to 
say, a process in which text producers and interpreters read the cues of the situational 
context in accordance to their particular member's resources. In other words, it is in 
accordance to the social orders and to the repertoire of situational types that particular 
participants bring into the social context that the process of interpretation will take place. 
Bringing up this point is important not only to highlight that it is possible for individuals 
to “misinterpret” a social situation – i.e. assign a meaning to it that is different from its 
mainstream understanding – , but also to recall that inasmuch as interlocutors rely on 
social orders and situation types to engage in discourse practices, ideologies and power 
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relations deeply influence the procedures of text production and interpretation. It is in 
this sense that Fairclough
536
 contends that “just as even a single sentence has 
traditionally been seen to imply a whole language, so a single discourse implies a whole 
society”.537 
 Despite the importance assigned to the situational context of discourses, this is 
not the sole contextual feature influencing processes of text production and 
interpretation; as indicated in the upper part of table 2, the intertextual context, too, 
informs these procedures. According to Fairclough
538
, texts do not occur in a social 
vacuum; rather, they are parts of historical series, of chains and networks of texts, which 
are repeatedly created and recreated in different circumstances. The notion of 
intertextuality was developed based on this observation, and refers to the ways authors 
and speakers incorporate aspects of previous texts into their contributions through, for 
example, direct citations and references, or through more indirect means, such as the 
usage of different genres and discourse types in one text. In this sense, texts are said to 
be “dialogic” – at least to some extent. Once discourse participants identify the 
historical series to which a particular text belongs, the text's background provides these 
individuals with information about what can be taken to be a common ground, that is, 
about what can be presupposed by the participants. Therefore, when text 
producers/interpreters work out the intertextual context of a discourse, a number of 
sincere or manipulative presuppositions can be made. It is important to keep an eye on 
them because they often have ideological functions – i.e. they become common-sense 
assumptions that help to maintain and perpetuate power. It is interesting to mention that 
presuppositions do not have to evoke specific texts, but may simple refer to the textual 
experience and/or background knowledge of interpreters. Text producers, in turn, may 
raise intertextual elements in order to  contest them in their discourses, or they may 
mixture heterogeneous discourse types in order to sustain a particular representation or 
the world, including contested ideological beliefs. 
 Finally, it is based on the textual, situational and intertextual contexts of an 
utterance, as well as on member's resources that discourse participants assign values to 
speech acts, and figure out which schemata, frames, and scripts should be used in the 
processes of interpretation or production of a text. Concerning speech acts, the 
expression refers to the performative character of utterances or, in other words, to the 
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action performed by the text producer by virtue of producing the text. In more detail, 
when people make statements, promises, or threats – to name a few possibilities – they 
are not merely conveying information, they are actually doing something, they are 
acting through words. In spite of being pragmatic, these discursive actions are still 
subjects of some degree of interpretation: for example, the same speech act in different 
situational contexts may have different values (a question in a classroom is likely to be a 
command, whereas in other contexts, this is seldom the case), and diverse contexts 
might require different degrees of speech directness (the formulation “would you 
please?” can only be replaced by “do it!” in very particular situational contexts). Usually, 
conventions that determine the values of speech acts and the degree of directness 
allowed in particular situations are laid in discourse types, which, as seen, frequently 
embody ideological representations about the world, social subjects and the relations 
amongst them. Therefore, the critical discourse analyst should mind who uses speech 
acts and in which ways these linguistic devices are used. 
 As for frames, scripts and schemata, they are mental frameworks – and thus, 
parts of member's resources – that human beings conventionally draw upon to interpret 
and to produce texts once they have figure out the textual, situational and intertextual 
contexts of a discourse. More specifically, a schema is the mental representation of an 
activity type, and of the large-scale textual structure associated to this activity. For 
instance, telephone calls, medical consultations and interviews are activity types with 
predictable elements and sequences, and therefore, discourse participants can rely on 
interpretative schemata to operate discursively in these contexts. Frames, too, are mental 
representations, however, they depict elements and entities in the social and natural 
worlds (animate and inanimate things, processes and abstract concepts). Scripts, in turn, 
are representations of subjects involved in particular social activities and of the 
relationships between these subjects. In the aforementioned examples of the 
consultation and the interview, specific scripts for doctors, patients, interviewers and 
interviewees are socially provided. Also interesting to notice is the fact that these types 
of representations are interconnected, and may even overlap in certain cases. Similarly 
to the other interpretative devices, schemata, frames and scripts are important to the 
critical discourse analyst because they embody ideological beliefs, and are often 
ideologically variable, so struggles for power in and over language may be spotted in 
these aspects. 
 The third and last stage of a critical discourse analysis, namely explanation, aims 
at demonstrating that discourses are social practices and that, as such,  they are part of 
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wider societal  processes, which not only determine the contents of particular discursive 
interactions – as seen above –, but which are also influenced by the long term effects of 
localized linguistic practices. Indeed, when social agents rely on their member's 
resources to interpret the context of a discursive interaction, they unintentionally 
reproduce the dominant social order; however, it is important to recognize that they may 
also help to alter this order, especially in case they challenge persistently the status 
quo.
539
 Hence, it seems that this notion of social reproduction – and change – connects 
different levels of social organization, and not any level, but the ones whose relationship 
is the object of study of the third stage of discourse analysis, that is, the level of the 
interactional context and the overall social context. More specifically, given the 
concerns of Fairclough's
540
 book – relations of power and social struggles –, and the 
general objective of the present study – analyze the discursive dimension of a political 
struggle –, this phase of the analysis consists in “seeing a discourse as part of processes 
of social struggle, within a matrix of relations of power”.541 
  
 Fairclough
542
 contends that the stage of explanation has two dimensions: the first 
one focuses on  processes of social struggle, whereas the second dimension is concerned 
with social relations of power. In this sense, discourses may be seen and contextualized 
as either parts of social contentions for power, and consequently, as the effects of such 
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struggles on social structures (in this case, the future, structural consequences of 
discourses are emphasized), or they may be seen as one of the aspects of social reality 
that is determined by the dominant social relations of power, which, in turn, result from 
past power struggles (in this case, emphasis is put on the social determination of 
discourse, i.e. on the consequences of past struggles for power). In view of this 
configuration, both the social effects of discourses and their social determinants must be 
investigated, and since both dimensions ultimately have to do with all levels of social 
organization (from particular social interactions to the macro-structures of the social 
world), Fairclough
543
 contends that these two aspects should be investigated at the 
societal, institutional and situational levels. As a result of this expanded analytical focus, 
the same discourse may be seen from different perspectives, as a societal, institutional 
or situational practice. This is to say that the same features of discourses must be studied 
from different standpoints – as  illustrated in table 3 –, and in light of this demand, the 
analyst should ask himself firstly, what power relations at each of these levels shape the 
discourse, and secondly, which elements of the member's resources drawn upon by 
discourse participants are ideologically informed. 
 As for the effects of discourse practices, they may be either normative or 
creative: in regard to the former, it refers to the cases where the social determinants of 
discourses are reproduced in the linguistic interaction. In more practical terms, this 
means that text producers and interpreters act in accordance with their socially 
determined member's resources, without questioning the situation and interpreting it as 
a typical circumstance. In contrast, the creative possibility points to cases where 
discourses contribute to the transformation of member's resources, a course of action 
that may over time help to transform the social relations upon which these resources are 
founded. Therefore, the second case refers to situations in which text producers and 
interpreters act creatively in relation to their member's resources – either because they 
want to challenge established powers, or because the concrete situation in which they 
found themselves is atypical, that is to say, does not match any familiar situational type. 
In such cases, text producers and interpreters may be creative by questioning the 
situation, by adapting and combining different discourse types, genres, etc. What is 
important to note here is that, although one person cannot change the world, systematic 
alterations of discourse types, for example, may lead to changes in the social relations 
underlying conventional ways of acting. In summarizing this latter part of the third 
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stage of analysis, Fairclough
544
 states that the researcher should ask himself: “how is 
this discourse positioned in relation to struggles at the situational, institutional and 
societal levels? Are these struggles overt or covert? Is the discourse normative with 
respect to MR or creative? Does it contribute to sustaining existing power relations or to 
transforming them?”.545 
 Before ending this methodological note, a few qualifications concerning this 
three-dimensional analytical framework should be made. First, as mentioned previously, 
the position of the researcher unavoidably conditions the results of this type of study, 
especially in the second stage of the analysis as the analyst must put himself in the 
position of the producers/interpreters of the material studied. Furthermore, this difficulty 
points to yet another problem: the researcher must be conscious that, in analyzing 
discourses and developing his/her line of argumentation, he/she, too, is subjected to the 
influence of societal structures and power relations. Thus, he/she must watch out for 
common-sense and ideological assumptions in his own speech. Second, although this 
methodological framework was divided in a linear sequence of stages, the boundaries 
between description, interpretation and explanation cannot be well defined. As clarified 
before, these stages are not only intrinsically inter-connected, but they are also supposed 
to constantly inform each other. In this respect, it is also noteworthy that the sequence in 
which the stages were presented does not have to be strictly respected. Fairclough
546
 
says that, depending on the study, it may be necessary to introduce the overall social 
context – a part of the explanation – before proceeding to the textual analysis. The third 
qualification is somehow related to the latter argument: although the third stage of the 
analysis is extremely important, Fairclough
547
 argues that it is difficult for discourse 
analysts to extrapolate the analysis of the situational level to provide a fully-fledged 
account of the societal state of the world. This would require a great deal of sociological 
research, one that goes way beyond the analysis of linguistic social practices. Given this 
shortcoming, Fairclough
548
 contends that the optimal solution would be to develop an 
interdisciplinary research. However, in case the analyst cannot count with the direct 
collaboration of other social scientists – as in the case of the author of the present study 
–, he should rely upon relevant scholarly literature on the phenomena studied, and 
recognize the limits of his/her research. 
 These qualifications are important to situate the overall structure of the present  
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dissertation in the context of the analytical framework described above. In light of the 
three-dimensional procedure proposed by Fairclough, the two first chapters of this study 
may be understood as parts of the explanation stage of the analysis in that they help to 
contextualize both the overall context in which discourses on security and migration 
emerge, as well as the history of immigration in Italy and the securitization of this 
matter over time. So, for example, all the discursive frames conventionally used by 
Italians to approach immigrants might be relevant in the analysis of the parliamentary 
debates that led to the approval of the Security Law no.94. 
 
4.3 Security versus rights: an analysis of the debates over the Law no.94 
 
The main objective of the final section of this chapter is to present the analysis of the 
parliamentary debates that led to the approval of the Law no.94, concerning “Provisions 
in the Field of Public Security”. As clarified, the migration-related sections of this 
legislative piece treat human mobility as a security concern in detriment to the other 
dimensions of this social phenomenon. In fact, this particular Law was chosen as the 
main object of study here not only because it was the centerpiece of the “security 
package”, but also because it regulated immigration as though it was primarily a 
security matter. The repressive handling of the topic has, however, generated much 
controversy, as shown in the first section of this chapter. Needless to say, the dispute 
over immigration regulation was replicated on the parliamentary debates concerning the 
Bill. Indeed, out of approximately 185 speeches on the draft law
549
, at least 158 touched 
upon immigration and the conditions of foreign-born residents in Italy. In view of the 
high level of politicization of the issue, the Italian legislative houses seem to be 
appropriate sites to investigate how a security-oriented narrative on immigration 
succeeded at mitigating and silencing a discourse that lies at the very heart of liberal 
democracies, namely the discourse on fundamental freedoms and human rights. 
 Since the draft of the piece of legislation studied here was submitted to 
parliamentary appraisal three times
550
 – firstly, in the Senate, then in the Chamber of 
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Deputies and thereafter, in the Senate again –, several sessions of both branches of the 
Italian legislative power had to be examined. Annex 2 contains a list of these sessions. It 
should also be noticed that due to the controversial character of some of the articles of 
the bill, more than a year passed by from the day the first version of the draft law was 
introduced – July 3rd 2008 –  to the day its final text was at last published in the 
Gazzetta Ufficiale – the 15th of July of 2009. 
 Given the large amount of primary sources available, the length of the 
parliamentary discussions and the complexity of the methodological framework, it 
seems appropriate to divide the analysis presented here in two parts, each of which deals 
with one of the main political groups represented in the Italian legislative institutions – 
the center-right and center-left coalitions. This division is expected to render the 
investigation more intelligible not only because the most important political grouping in 
the Parliament had opposite opinions in regard to the security legislation, but also 
because these opinions clearly replicated the security versus rights juncture delineated 
above – albeit there were exceptions in both cases. Besides being divided in two 
sections, the investigation focuses on three main topics, namely: the process of 
securitization of immigration, the “rights-based” discourse on immigration, and the 
manners in which these contrasting discourses are brought together by the center-right 
and center-left political coalitions. Note that these matters correspond to the main 
components of the general research question of this study: how does the securitarian 
view of immigration negotiates its contradictions with, and silences the “rights-based” 
discourse on immigration? What's more, given the hypotheses of presented in the 
Introduction, especial attention is payed to the ways in which political actors 
discursively use the legal categorization of foreign-born residents in Italy. 
 As for the three-dimensional character of the critical discourse analysis, it must 
be kept in mind that, although an attempt is made to respect the division proposed by 
Norman Fairclough
551
, the intrinsic imbrication of the three stages of analysis makes it 
hard to deal with them separately. Even though no clear-cut division between the 
processes of description, interpretation and explanation is made ahead, a number of 
comments are provided as to which methodological “tools” are being resorted to in the 
assessment of the textual material. Additionally, the analysis makes references to the 
information presented in the first and second chapters of this study, after all, as 
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explained above, the historical and institutional aspects of migration flows in Italy are a 
part of the explanation stage and thereby, inform the current representations of the 
migratory phenomenon, as well as the discussions taking place in the chambers. In fact, 
whereas some of these aspects, such as the image of immigrants as the world's poor and 
destitute, may be seen as the frames used by political actors to approach international 
movements of people, others, as the historical evolution of immigration policy, are parts 
of the situational and intertextual contexts of political interactions. 
 Before passing to the assessment of the textual material itself, it is important to 
provide the reader with basic information about the political developments that 
culminated in the approval of the Security Law no.94. This brief introduction shall be 
thought of as a part of the situational context in which political discussions and 
deliberations took place, in that text producers and interpreters – Senators and Deputies 
– had to rely on the interpretation of this overall state of affairs in order to meaningfully 
interact with their counterparts. As mentioned before, the center-right coalition formed 
by PdL, National Alliance and the Northern League (LNP) – and other smaller  parties – 
not only held the largest part of the sits in the Parliament, but could also take advantage 
of a broad and homogeneous majority in both legislative chambers.
552
 The center-left 
opposition, on the other hand, had been extremely weakened by the 2008 ballot. In fact, 
as a result of losses suffered by left-wing parties in this election, the group directly 
depended on the support of the moderate sections of PdL – which were proportionally 
smaller after the withdrawn of the Union of Christian and Center Democrats
553
 (UDC) 
from the alliance – to approve and/or reject draft laws. Fortunately for them, when it 
came to immigration, the majority was still quite divided in that parties with a strongly 
anti-immigration program, as the Northern League, had to co-exist with Catholic 
elements and other moderate figures.
554
 
 Internal disagreements concerning immigration had indeed cost the governing 
majority important defeats in the Parliament, and two of them are of particular 
significance here. First, the defeat of the proposal to institutionalize voluntary citizens' 
associations to patrol the territory of the state (ronde). This provision was actually 
rejected twice by secret votes in the Senate and in the Chamber of Deputies. Second, the 
defeat of the proposal to extend the maximum period of detention of unidentified 
immigrants in the CIEs from 2 to 18 months, which followed the exact same path as the 
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previous proposal, that is, the text was turned down once and subsequently reformulated 
(the maximum duration of detention was reduced to 6 months), only to be turned down 
again by a secret ballot in both houses. These defeats are especially interesting here 
because, as described above, both the legalization of the so-called ronde and the 
extension of maximum duration of the detention of migrants in the CIEs were included 
in the Security Bill. Even more  surprising than the government's insistence in having 
these measures turned into law was the fact that they ended up sanctioned in both 
chambers not long after they had been rejected.
555
 
 This puzzling situation indicates that an external factor must have influenced the 
law-making procedure in the Parliament. And, in fact, the government did: following 
the first round of discussions in the Chamber of Deputies, the Council of Ministers 
asked for a vote of confidence on the Bill
556
, which meant that members of the majority 
– moderates and radicals alike – were practically compelled to vote in favor of the law. 
Oppositional parties were directly affected by the decision as well, since they were 
prevented from proposing real amendments to the text of the draft law. One of the 
factors leading to the adoption of this exceptional instrument was surely the suspicion  
that the Bill would not pass a secret ballot in the Chamber of Deputies, a concern not at 
all unjustified given that moderate deputies of the majority had formulated a document 
(referred to as “Document of the 101”) expressing their opposition to several migration-
related measures contained in the Security Bill. Thereafter, when the draft law had 
already been sent back to the Senate for a second appraisal, the government, once again, 
decided to ask for a vote of confidence on the text. As a result, the Security Law no.94 
was approved by a large majority of the parliamentarians both in the Senate and in the 
Chamber of Deputies. 
4.3.1 Center-left: more security, more rights 
 
The purpose of the present subsection is to analyze the speeches delivered by the 
components of the center-left parliamentary group in the debates that preceded the 
sanction of the Security Law. The main parties of this oppositional force are the 
Democratic Party (PD), represented in 2008 by Walter Veltroni, Italy of Values (IdV), 
headed by the prosecutor Antonio Di Pietro, and UDC, whose main figure is Pier 
Ferdinando Casini. Even though UDC has been for most of its existence a part of the 
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center-right coalition and, as of 2008, represents one of the largest centrist political 
forces in the Parliament, the speeches of its members were included in this subsection as 
well. The connection between the center-left bloc and Casini's party, albeit debatable, 
does not seem all that arbitrary when it comes to immigration. Indeed, the positions of 
these groups were well aligned, and both of them were in strong discord with the center-
right's view on the matter. In this respect, it is suggestive that members of the UDC use 
the personal pronouns “you” (voi) and “we” (noi) to refer respectively to the center-
right majority, and to the oppositional forces – a fact that supports the treatment given to 
this party here. Even though all of these centrist/center-left parties somehow associate 
migration to security in their political programs
557
, they may be said to be pro-
immigration forces. This is not to say that they would support indiscriminate migration 
policies, but rather that they adopt a broader perspective when evaluating this complex 
social phenomenon – as demonstrated ahead. For one, they recognize the pressing 
economic needs of the country, as well as the potential benefits of receiving foreigners. 
In light of these factors, components of these parties advocate that only a well-informed 
policy aimed at regulating new influxes and at promoting the integration of third-
country nationals, combined with a strong stand against irregular forms of entry and 
sojourn would efficiently respond to the challenges brought about by immigration.
558
 
 In spite of defending expulsion procedures and the establishment of an effective 
and severe policy to combat irregular immigration, the center-left political group also 
argues that these actions cannot forgo individual freedoms and human rights. It was 
based on these “rights-based” considerations that Senators and Deputies belonging to 
these parties opposed and questioned several aspects of the Security Bill. In this sense, 
it is reasonable to contend that the Italian center-left group occupies the opposite side of 
the political battlefield in which the migratory phenomenon is discussed, defined, and 
managed. In fact, parliamentarians of the minority appeared to be very eager to 
counteract the advances of the center-right on immigration regulation, since they were 
responsible for approximately 120 discursive interventions (out of the aforementioned 
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185), the majority of which (101) concerned immigration. So, in Fairclough's
559
 terms, 
the existence of this group seems to be a strong a sign of ideological diversity, that is to 
say, a sign that the migration-security nexus and its ramifications do not go completely 
unchallenged. Therefore, despite the dominance of the security narrative on immigration, 
ideological struggles are still being fought over the phenomenon's definition, 
representation, handling, etc. Since Italy is a parliamentary democracy, this ideological 
variation is expressed within the pivotal element of this government system, the 
Parliament
560
 – i.e. the institutional order in which discourses are embedded. 
 Indeed, the Parliament is an institutionalized site of political conflict, where 
individuals representing different ideological views are engaged in struggles in and over 
language.
561
 The institutional character of this setting was remarked above in order to 
highlight that, despite the overt marking of power relationships within this site, the 
direct exercise of power occurs in a meticulously controlled environment.
562
 Therefore, 
as the examples contained in the methodological section of this chapter stressed, 
Senators and Deputies of the majority (i.e. the main  power holders) are not allowed to 
act as they wish in this institutional context; on the contrary, they are required to resort 
to a discourse type that fits the situational context of the particular interactions in which 
they participate. Thereby, members' discursive interventions are constrained in terms of 
content, format, and timing. Besides, the relationships of parliamentarians one to 
another, as well as the roles they assume are defined and limited not only by a number 
of internal organizational rules but also by their ideological positions. All of these 
situational constraints are clearly reflected in the textual material analyzed in this study, 
and are probably the first noticeable characteristic of parliamentary speeches (note that 
this trait pertains to both sides of the political spectrum). In fact, a fast glance at the 
transcriptions is enough to observe that strict interactional conventions are established. 
 A parliamentary session (both in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies) starts 
with the announcement of the agenda (in Italian, “ordine del giorno”) by the President, 
and this is normally followed by a number of discursive contributions, which are 
structured according to the activity type correspondent to the daily program – again, this 
means that the interventions should respect limits in terms of content, duration, etc. 
Even general discussions are severely controlled by the president of the Chamber 
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concerned, and formal requirements, albeit looser in the latter case, are always operative. 
For example, the turn-talk system does not follow the mood of parliamentarians; instead, 
these actors must either ask to talk or enter their names on a list in order to get a turn 
(perhaps, this unnatural evolution of the discussion explains why most of the discursive 
contributions resemble more a monologue than a dialogue). In regard to these general 
rules of conduct, it is interesting to note that they are often broken or challenged, and 
that such transgressions usually appear to be ideologically motivated.. Examples of 
these practices are over-speaking, unauthorized interruptions, and discourses about 
topics that do not concern the discussion. Behaviors as the ones just mentioned are 
especially prominent amongst the members of the left-wing group, who, in the case 
studied, insist in including migration-related remarks, and critiques to the issuance of 
law decrees and votes of confidence in their speeches – regardless of the content under 
discussion. It is reasonable to suggest that the observed tendency of the center-left 
coalition to violate institutional rules of conduct, and also to speak more than any other 
parliamentary group were prompted by a feeling of indignation and impotence in front 
of the majority bloc, especially after the government asked for a vote of confidence on 
the Security Bill. For instance, Federico Palomba (IdV) – who, in a tone of protest, 
addresses the vote of confidence when he should be delivering a speech about 
amendments to the Bill – instrumentally violates the rules of interaction with the goal of 
challenging the majority and the government. In a certain point of his intervention, the 
Deputy directly addresses this practice: “Thus, we will not fall for the suggestion to 
illustrate amendments that cannot be put to vote […]”.563 By deliberately refusing to 
follow the conventional large scale structure of parliamentary discursive interaction, he 
does not want to dare the President or to question the operational norms of the Lower 
House; rather, he aims at challenging his colleagues of the center-right majority by 
saying: I refuse to be a part of this fake political dispute. 
 As for the particular structure of the parliamentary sessions dedicated to the draft 
law, these  were initially divided into the following activity types: presentation of the 
proposed legislation, introduction of procedural and preliminary questions, general 
discussions, illustration of amendments and debates over specific articles, and at last, 
final vote on the text. The usage of the adverb “initially” above was not unintended: as a 
result of the decision of the Council of Ministers to exert its power to impose a vote of 
confidence over the Bill, the structure and the content of the parliamentary sessions 
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were altered so as to reinforce the power of the majority not only over moderate rightist 
and leftist actors, but also over the dominant image of immigration in Italy. As a result 
of this manoeuvre, no amendments could be presented, and from that moment onwards,  
discussions were virtually useless. The three max-amendments that composed the 
government's version of the Bill were closed, and the final result of the ballot was 
known before it had taken place. Thus, if during the sessions preceding the 
announcement of the vote of confidence, the center-left could hope to persuade parts of 
the moderate majority to boycott the governing coalition, this hope was completely lost 
after the Council of Ministers' announcement. Again, it is possible to observe an 
ideologically motivated subversion of the parliamentary procedures that regulate 
discursive interactions. By asking for a vote of  confidence, the center-right has not only 
managed to control/silence its political basis (i.e. the moderates of PdL), but has also 
left its opponents disarmed in that discourses could no longer be used as a persuasion 
device, nor could them serve as a means to alter certain provisions of the draft law. 
 As mentioned, before the announcement of the vote of confidence, the center-
left directly attempted to take advantage of discourse as a persuasive instrument. In the 
Chamber – where the Document of the 101 had been formulated –, Deputies often 
appealed to the good sense of some elements of the majority either by calling upon their 
christian and caring consciousness or by denouncing the suppression of these Deputies' 
freedom of vote. Fabio Evangelisti, for example, stated the following about the 
impossibility to register marriages between irregular residents, and other repressive 
migration-related norms of the Security Bill: 
 
I ask myself: the believers (credenti), those who in this room often brag about 
being on the side of the believers, don't they have anything to say about this 
intangible right, that derives from its elevation to sacrament? […] Now, I ask 
where did those parliamentary colleagues end up, that famous group of one-
hundred parliamentarians of the majority, who had asked to the President of 
the Council and to the President of the Chamber to exclude these points, 
together with the preexisting provision according to which medical staff 
should denounce those who resorted to health assistance.
564
 
 
In to respect this quotation, it is interesting to notice the mode of the phrases: they are 
structured as wh-questions, which involve listeners in a process of  “interpellation”, 
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calling upon them to provide an answer, to break free from political constraints, to raise 
their voices, and to express themselves – after all, it was the access to discourse, and not 
their opinions, that had been limited by their political alignment to the Northern League 
and other extremist elements. 
 These appeals to the moderate sections of PdL were also discursively connected 
to a wider discussion, one that concerns the common usage of exceptional legislative 
instruments by the government, and the dangers that the “instrumental” manipulation of 
such tools represents to the democratic prerogatives of the Parliament, as well as to the 
political rights of the electorate. Law decrees and votes of confidence – suggestively 
preceded by the numerical adjective “umteenth” in several discourses of the center-left  
– are said to effectively limit the freedom of the political game because, as a result of 
their adoption, interventions of Deputies and Senators are at best symbolic, and at worst, 
pretenses, that is to say, simulations of what should happen in a liberal democracy. 
According to Federico Palomba, in this context, parliamentarians are no more than 
“spectators”, constrained to watch as decisions are factually taken elsewhere. What is 
interesting about the usage of this figure of speech is that it is consonant with what 
could be identified as the overall “leftist” representation of the Security Bill, that is: this 
legislative piece is, alongside the other measures of the “security package”, seen and 
presented as no more than a “propaganda”, a “manifesto-rule”, an “electoral spot”, 
meant to be seen and appreciated, but devoid of any real content. One of the recurring 
expressions used in the speeches of the center-left illustrates well this point: the 
governing coalition keeps pulling the wool over electors' eyes (gettare fumo negli occhi). 
 More than that, according to Gianrico Carofiglio (PD), the Security Bill is a 
“sort of metaphor” of the general approach adopted by the political majority to deal with 
societal problems, that is: the emergency approach. As mentioned, one of the main 
characteristics attributed to this approach is precisely its symbolic character. A glance at 
some of the adjectives and expressions that normally co-occur
565
 (not necessarily 
sequentially) with some of the terms used to refer to the Bill and to its component parts 
– i.e. norm (norma), measure (provvedimento and misura), provision (disposizione), 
among others – corroborates this representation of the legislative piece: apart from 
“symbolic” and “metaphoric”, terms as “emblematic”, “announcement effect”, 
“electoral spot”, “ideological” and “propagandist” were also relatively common means 
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to describe and to refer to the Bill. However, these were not the only words that seemed 
to convey the idea that the Security law had been elaborated to be seen, and seen only. 
The provision was also said to be “inutile”, “irrational”, “blind”, “inappropriate”, 
“wrong”, “impracticable”, “inapplicable”, “counterproductive”. It is also interesting to 
note that these adjectives were used in contrast to other adjectives, which, in turn, 
indicated what a legislative measure should be, namely: intelligent, rational, efficacious, 
serious, necessary, real, etc. 
 In addition to conveying the notion that the Security Bill was no more than a 
electoral spot, the usage of such words to sort out “good” from “bad” legislative 
measures demonstrates that the political actors of the center-left  have in mind a 
classificatory scheme against which it was possible to judge the value of such norms. 
Given the emphasis put on the notions of rationality, reality and efficiency, this scheme 
seems to be in tune with a traditional means-ends rationality, which, as said in the 
second chapter of this work, underlies the modern conception of national state. In this 
framework, the state and the political realm are given precise functions: “[Security] is a 
challenge that entails a duty of politics. Politics must address it [security] with rigor and 
planning”.566 In this quote, it is interesting to note that the center-left alliance founds its 
line of argumentation against the Security draft law on the idea of rationality, that is, on 
the notion that one must analytically process reality in order to devise and enact 
appropriate regulations (indeed, statistical data and scientific researches are often 
quoted in their politicians speeches). Meanwhile, the center-right coalition bases its 
discourses on the idea of concrete and immediate action, and attacks the left precisely 
for failing to take action, for failing to respond to the needs of the citizenry (often 
illustrated with references to news reports). The position of the latter group is indeed 
very consistent with the emergency approach mentioned above in that it allows for 
immediacy of action. In other words, it allows “provisions [to] succeed from emergency 
to emergency, based on the last news topic”.567 
 In light of these considerations, parliamentarians from the center-left coalition 
point to the existence of a double simulation in the “security package”: first, the 
simulation of a democratic game, which was in effect doomed as soon as law decrees 
and votes of confidence were announced; and second, the simulation of governmental 
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action, that is to say, the pretense that the “security package” is composed of measures 
that can effectively help to curb insecurity. According to the speeches delivered by 
center-left parliamentarians, these measures, despite having been announced and 
enacted as appropriate solutions to the growing sense of unease, could not possibly 
mitigate the sources of insecurity for they were not based on a rational assessment of the 
reality. In regard to this overspread representation of the “security package” and of the 
Security Bill as covers – as opposed to measures that confront and deal with (affrontare) 
problems –, it is interesting to note that in the very last speech delivered by the center-
left coalition in the Senate, Anna Finocchiaro (PD) makes a direct intertextual reference 
to Jean Baudrillard
568
 that captures the essence of her group's argument against the draft 
law: “this measure, in my opinion, has the strength to constitute an admirable example 
of signifier without signified […]”569. Thereby, she is directly stating that image and 
votes are all that matter to the center-right bloc in that the “security package” has no 
substance. 
 However, this security-oriented mode of governance is not only accused of 
deceiving Italian citizens; it is also directly and indirectly blamed for setting in motion a 
vicious circle that reproduces and reinforces the sense of insecurity of the population. 
Once again, the citizenry is presented as the silent interlocutor, who is deluded by a 
world of the center-right's creation. By doing so, the political actors locate what, for 
them, is one of the sources of societal insecurity: the government and its majority. To 
start with, parliamentarians at the opposition directly state: “not only the substance is 
left aside, but there is a factual attempt to create a sort of vicious circle in which first, 
fear is fed […], and after this process is set in motion, one pretends simultaneously to 
provide answers”.570 Albeit the subject of the sentence is indefinite, there seems to be an 
overall agreement over which actor should be held responsible for this manifest-rule, 
namely: the right-wing component of the majority, Lega Nord. In fact, Giulio Calvisi 
(PD)
571
 describes the new “security” provisions – which, for him, do no more than to 
persecute foreigners – as the Bossi-Bossi Law, making thereby a direct reference to the 
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previous immigration legislation approved by the center-right government, the Bossi-
Fini Law. This is an extremely face-threatening statement on the part of the opposition, 
and one of the few that the members of the majority – especially, of the Northern 
League – feel compelled to respond directly to. 
 This notion that insecurity is fed by the majority bloc pervades several 
discourses of the center-left coalition in less direct ways: nearly every Senator or 
Deputy who talks about the new immigration regulations follows a particular schema, 
which in addition to containing a list of the weak points of the component parts of the 
Security Bill, always stresses its “repressive”, “harmful” and “humiliating” character, 
especially towards the most vulnerable parts of the resident population, such as the 
homeless people, children, Roma and Sinti populations, and immigrants. It is argued 
that the adoption of repressive measures that impinge upon these groups' rights and 
legal condition – i.e. the creation of what they describe as a “double law” (doppio diritto) 
– is also “dangerous” in that it will ultimately relegate these people to the margins of the 
society, i.e. to a place where the concepts of clandestinity and illegality may be used in a 
literal sense. This assumption repeatedly underlies the discursive interventions of the 
center-left, whose members make an almost abusive usage of conditional and future 
verbal tenses in order to delineate the possible, dark future of Italy in case the law is 
approved. What's more, they state over and over that the new security measures violate 
constitutional provisions, democratic values, and international laws. This seems to be an 
attempt to convey the notion that the Security Bill paradoxically generates more 
insecurity, and that it is also founded upon a paradox: it is a public security law that 
resorts to clandestine, illegal methods to achieve its alleged objectives. In light of these 
accusations, the term “security” becomes a direct target of ideological contest: in 
several speeches, the “security” package and law become the “insecurity” package and 
law. 
 The direct ideological contestation of the word “security” should not lead to the 
conclusion that the center-left group did not consider the sense of insecurity a valid/real 
social problem, but rather that they relied on a conception of “security” that differed 
from the one that, according to them, was used by the majority. Since the latter political 
force was accused of making a set of propagandist norms, center-left politicians did not 
attempt to reconstruct the notion of security that underlay the overall legislative 
provision (after all, it was considered a zibaldone or a mixture of heterogeneous 
measures put together for electoral purposes). Yet, as it is going to be further explained 
later on, they did identify and question what seemed to be the main source of insecurity 
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to the center-right bloc, namely immigration. The speech delivered by the Deputy 
Donata Lenzi (PD) illustrates well the ideological contest over the meaning of security: 
 
In our idea of security it is necessary, thus, to assert, first of all, a principle of 
legality: the law is valid to all, it is always respected, also when we do not 
like it […]. Our idea of security recognizes the use of force only to those who 
have and are called to this duty […]. Security to us is the fight against “black 
labor” [reference to undocumented work] […].  Security to us is the certainty 
of punishment […]. Security is […].572 
 
In this passage, it is possible to observe that the center-left alliance tries to distance 
itself from the center-right, as well as from its conception of security (note, for instance, 
the relational value of the first-person plural pronouns us and our) by formulating its 
own definition. However, the message itself, more than providing an alternative 
substance to the concept of security, seems to be aimed at contrasting the center-right 
coalition's definition, or rather, the measures these actors were advancing in the 
Parliament under the banner of security. Each of the statements (the law is valid to all, 
use of force to those who are called to this duty, etc) is a direct attack to a provision of 
the draft law (against a discriminatory right, against the establishment of the ronde, etc). 
So, the rhetoric device used by Ms. Lenzi, that is, the repetition of declarative sentences 
of the type “security is”, has more of a relational value than an actual experimental 
value – as it would appear at first given the structure of the sentence. Put differently, the 
center-left does not clearly define security either, but takes a stand against the majority 
and against its ideas/measures to deal with (in)security. 
 One argument that the center-left does make concerning security is that 
immigrants, regular or irregular, are not intrinsically dangerous, criminals, or 
delinquents. Based on this assessment, the Security Bill becomes yet again a target of 
criticism: 
 
Why do the procedures to obtain the residence permit must find space in a 
legislative piece about security? Why do the necessary “hygienic-sanitary” 
conditions must find a place in a legislative piece about security? Why do the 
opportunities for foreigners to learn the Italian language, etc, must find such 
placement, if not due to a completely securitarian logic, whereby serious and 
difficult social and cultural problems that should be addressed through the 
pursuit of serious immigration policies are solved by us as though they were 
                                                 
572Original in Italian: “Nella nostra idea di sicurezza è necessario allora che sia affermato, prima di tutto, 
un principio di legalità: la legge vale per tutti, la si rispetta sempre, anche quando non ci piace, […]. 
La nostra idea di sicurezza riconosce l'esercizio della forza solo a coloro che hanno e sono chiamati a 
questo compito […]. Sicurezza per noi è lotta al lavoro nero […]. Sicurezza è certezza della pena […]. 
Sicurezza è […].”. Donata Lenzi, Partito Democratico, Session no.169, Chamber of Deputies, 
30/04/2009. 
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security questions, which, therefore, have to do with security.
573
 
 
In the above-quoted passage, the controversies of the draft law on security are presented 
in the form of interrogative sentences so as to provoke a reaction/feeling of perplexity in 
the text interpreters. It is a way to invite the listener to re-build (if possible) the logical 
connection that underlies the inclusion of a whole set of immigration policies into a 
provision aimed at addressing public security matters. Needless to say, the premise of 
this argumentation is that there is no reasonable justification to treat immigrants as 
threats. And, that is not all: the speaker also presents immigration as a phenomenon that 
entails social and cultural problems – as opposed to one that implies exclusively 
security troubles. Thereby, Senator Adamo (PD) effectively contests the migration-
security nexus, which, as it is shown in the next subsection, is an important ideological 
assumption for the center-right coalition in that it holds the whole “security package” 
together. 
 For the center-left group, immigration is an “epochal” and “dramatic” theme – as 
Senator Gianpiero D'Alia (UDC) describes it –, and one that requires a plurality of 
interventions in order to be properly governed. More than that, immigrants are said to 
possess one status that goes beyond any official categorization devised by the 
apparatuses of national states: that of human beings. They underline that neither the 
Italian Constitution nor the international human rights instruments signed and ratified 
by the Italian state differentiate between national citizens and foreigners when it comes 
to the respect to individual freedoms and fundamental rights. It was based precisely on 
this broader view of the migratory phenomenon, and more specifically, on the 
acknowledgment of the humanity of movers (what was referred to throughout this work 
as the “rights-based” discourse type), that parliamentarians of the opposition parties 
formulated most of their critiques to the migration-related measures that compose the 
Security Bill. In addition to pointing out the technical and operational problems of a 
number of legislative innovations, such as the “crime of irregular immigration”, and the 
extension of the period of detention of unidentified immigrants in the CIEs, these 
politicians  articulated a number of critiques based on human rights considerations. 
                                                 
573Original in Italian: “Perché le modalità per avere il permesso di soggiorno devono trovare spazio in un 
provvedimento sulla sicurezza? Perché le condizioni igienico-sanitarie necessarie per avere 
l'iscrizione anagrafica devono trovare collocazione in un provvedimento sulla sicurezza? Perché 
l'opportunità che gli stranieri imparino la lingua italiana, eccetera, deve trovare tale collocazione, se 
non per una logica del tutto sicuritaria, in base alla quale problematiche sociali e culturali serie e 
pesanti, che andrebbero affrontate per perseguire delle politiche sull'immigrazione serie, vengono da 
noi risolte come fossero questioni sicuritarie che, dunque, hanno a che fare con la sicurezza”. Marilena 
Adamo, Partito Democratico, Session no.94, Senate of the Republic, 18/11/2008. 
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Much like the social and institutional organizations that opposed the new Security law 
(mentioned in the first section of this chapter), representatives of DC, UDC and IdV 
recalled in nearly every discursive intervention that principles, values and rights like 
dignity, equality before the law, freedom, right to health, to family life, to instruction, to 
defense, among others, cannot be sacrificed in the name of security – especially, if the 
conception of “security” in question is refutable. Security is deemed important, but it 
cannot be pursued at the expense of individual freedoms: 
 
In this sense, it is important to recall that the security subject goes hand in 
hand with the theme of rights to freedom. This is a problem of a difficult 
equilibrium and dosage, but that we must find if we want to consider 
ourselves a democracy. 
574
 
 
Im sum, at first view, it seems that politicians of the opposition are very clear about the 
human component of cross-border movements of people. They are defenders of rights 
and freedoms, since they recognize, as the quotation demonstrates, that these elements 
are the cornerstone of a liberal and democratic nation. Hence, in the social struggle over 
the discourse on immigration, the center-left represents the contestants at the other side 
of the battlefield, that is to say, the powerless who make a bid for power by discursively 
contesting not only the two central concepts dealt with throughout the present study, 
security and immigration, but also the relationship established between them. Since the 
critiques advanced by the center-left to the individual articles of the Security Bill are 
similar to the ones described above (in the first section of this chapter), they are not 
going to be repeated here. More relevant than the specific arguments raised during the 
debate are the ways in which text producers discursively articulated some of these 
negative reviews. 
 As mentioned before, the comprehensive view of the migratory phenomenon 
adopted by the oppositional group does not imply – so the center-left politicians argue – 
a position of do-goodism (buonismo) towards immigrant communities in Italy – an 
allegation against the left-wing group that is commonly found in the speeches of centrist 
and right-wing parties. As mentioned in the beginning of this section, according to the 
forces that compose the minority, it is indeed important to fight the irregular entry and 
stay of foreigners in Italy. Nevertheless, even though they contend that immigration is, 
in general, a phenomenon that requires a rigorous and severe treatment, they tend to 
                                                 
574Original in Italian: “In tal senso occorre ricordare che il tema della sicurezza viaggia di pari passo con 
il tema dei diritti di libertà. Si tratta di un problema, di un equilibrio e di un dosaggio difficili, ma che 
dobbiamo trovare se vogliamo ritenerci una democrazia”. Jean Leonard Touadi. Italia dei Valori, 
Secuta no.169, Chamber of Deputies, 30/04/2009. 
142 
highlight that this should not be a “good” (buono) or a “bad” (cattivo) treatment, but a 
“fair” (giusto) one. 
 
I believe that the state must be neither bad, nor good: the state must only be 
fair (acclamation from the deputies of the groups Union of Centre, 
Democratic Party, and Italy of Values), it must be sympathetic to [those] who 
come to Italy and assist our sick people, our children, our elderly, and open 
our factories. The state must, conversely, be inflexible towards the 
prostitution racket, the drug racket and the criminality racket.
575
 
 
This schematic classification that places “good” and “bad”576 immigration policies in 
opposition is recurrently used by center-left politicians (no wonder opposition parties 
acclaimed Casini's statement), and it makes a direct reference to an external discourse: 
that delivered by the Interior Minister Roberto Maroni, who publicly stated that “to 
contrast the clandestine immigration it is not necessary to be do-gooder (buonisti) but 
bad (cattivi), determined, to assert the rigor of the law”. 577  Although Senators and 
Deputies of the opposition attempted to distance themselves from the label “buonisti”, 
they instrumentally took over the other term used by Mr. Maroni, “cattivi”, to represent 
what, for them, is the political essence of the draft law: badness. Accordingly, they 
portray the provision as a “hostile” instrument of exclusion, informed by a cruel, 
xenophobic, racist, evil and discriminatory logic. Allusions to the Fascist state, to the 
Soviet regime and to Nazism help to reinforce this image of cruelty, the image of a state 
that persecutes the most vulnerable parts of its population, of a state that sets up a 
special law to outsiders, of a state that treats its residents as suspects, and a state that 
functions based on a blind defensive and exclusionary logic. 
 In contrast to this image, centrist and leftist politicians try to introduce not a do-
gooder state, but a fair one (see quotation above); that is to say, a state where the rule of 
the law is prevalent and equal to all, and where social phenomena are handled in 
conformity with their real nature (remember that rationality is said to inform the center-
left's approach to public policy). In short, the reasoning behind these arguments is the 
                                                 
575Original in Italian: “Credo che lo Stato non debba essere né cattivo, né buono: lo Stato deve solo essere 
giusto (Applausi dei deputati dei gruppi Unione di Centro, Partito Democratico e Italia dei Valori), 
deve essere comprensivo verso chi viene in Italia e assiste i nostri malati, i nostri figli, i nostri anziani 
e apre le nostre fabbriche. Lo Stato deve, invece, essere inflessibile verso i racket della prostituzione, 
della droga e della criminalità”. Pier Ferdinando Casini. Union of Christian and Center Democrats, 
Session no.177, Chamber of Deputies, 14/05/2009. 
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Note that these adjectives (good and bad) are not used to denote the efficiency or appropriateness of 
immigration policy, but in the sense of being mean or good towards immigrants. 
577Original in Italian: “Per contrastare l'immigrazione clandestina non bisogna essere buonisti ma cattivi, 
determinati, per affermare il rigore della legge”. Roberto Maroni. In: La Repubblica. La ricetta di 
Maroni: “Basta bontà 
 saremo cattivi contro i clandestini”. 02/02/2009. Available in: 
<<http://www.repubblica.it/2009/02/sezioni/cronaca/immigrati-4/maroni-cattivi/maroni-cattivi.html>>. 
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following: a “rights-based” society is a fair society, and a fair society is a secure one. 
Thus, a logic of inclusion, rather than one of exclusion, is identified as the preferred 
strategy to contrast marginality and its ramifications, that is to say, illegality and 
clandestinity: 
 
the immigrants, the people without fixed residence, and other types of 
marginality are subjected to a treatment under the banner of repression, whilst 
their condition would deserve an inclusive treatment on the part of the state. 
In fact, I recall to all of us, a safe city is a just city.
578
 
 
 What's more, in the comments made by these parliamentarians on what should 
be the character and functions of a state, Italy is not only presented as a liberal 
democracy localized in Europe, but it is also introduced (directly and indirectly) as a 
moral, and civilized society. According to Senator D'Alia (UDC)
579
, when intolerance, 
racism, and badness reign a country's approach to the “other”, civility and democracy 
fade away, and barbarism takes over (note that, again, rights, justice and security are 
closely intertwined). Senator D'Alia (UDC) is not the only one to put the debate in these 
terms: the notion of “civility” (civiltà) appears frequently in the discursive interventions 
of members of the center-left group and, even though it is not clearly defined, it is 
generally collocated in a context where other states are being referred to. In this regard, 
it is noteworthy that the other countries cited in such contexts are not chosen randomly: 
the Mediterranean democracy is only compared to, and included in a “elite” group, 
formed by Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European 
Union as a whole (from time to time, other European states are brought up, but these 
four are the most cited ones). This suggests that Italian politicians think of themselves, 
or rather, of Italy as a Western democracy that stands alongside other developed 
“centers of civilization”. In turn, this self-representation implies that there is a “Rest” in 
need of protection and help. Hence, the placement of Italy in this sort of developmental 
hierarchy also entails a number of responsibilities: internally, it implies a responsibility 
towards foreigners and marginal groups of the society; internationally, a responsibility 
towards the “Rest” of the world. Fabio Evangelisti (IdV) sums up this point well when 
he states that: “to think about a world divided between a barricaded, closed society, 
nestled in its welfare at the expense of a multitude of desperate [people] appears as the 
                                                 
578Original in Italian: “Gli immigrati, le persone senza fissa dimora e altri tipi di marginalità subiscono un 
trattamento all'insegna della repressione, mentre la loro condizione meriterebbe da parte dello Stato un 
trattamento inclusivo. Infatti, lo ricordo a tutti noi, una città sicura è una città giusta”. Jean Leonard 
Touadi. Italia dei Valori, Secuta no.169, Chamber of Deputies, 30/04/2009. 
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Gianpiero D'Alia. Unione di Centro, Session no.143, Senate of the Republic, 05/02/2009. 
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worst of the fates in which abandon our children”.580 Note that, despite rejecting the 
idea of a closed society, the Deputy reifies the aforesaid division of the world by 
metaphorically referring to other countries as “our children”, that is to say, as vulnerable 
and inexperienced individuals in need of constant assistance. Besides, he implies that 
these nations should follow the path delineated by the Western world, which includes 
inter alia civility, democracy, rule of law, and human rights. 
 As for the foreign-born individuals living in Italy, they are discursively 
approached through a frame that fits well the developmental hierarchy described in the 
previous paragraph. In other words, the image of a “multitude of desperate people” 
escaping distressful situations – or the vision of “pauperism” described by Colombo and 
Sciortino
581
 – appears as a common way to depict “the” immigrant, regardless of his/her 
status. The insistence of center-left parliamentarians to portray immigrants as such – 
even when they provide additional information on immigration that contradicts this 
representation – seems to be aimed at inciting a feeling of solidarity towards the other, 
and at reinforcing the “humanitarian” component of their line of argumentation – after 
all, few politicians would be brave enough to publicly defend the repatriation of 
individuals escaping war and persecution. Another common image of the immigrant 
was also alluded to above, in the quotation of Casini's speech. The parliamentarian used 
the following sentence to refer to foreigners: “[...] to assist our sick people, our children, 
our elderly, and open our factories”. This description or, rather, this attribution of 
functions was most certainly not arbitrarily formulated. Instead, it makes a direct 
reference to an important aspect of the Italian social and economic context, namely its 
unbalanced demographic situation, and to the role immigration plays in redressing this 
worrisome condition. But that is not all: it is well-known that a large part of Italian 
families informally employs foreign-born housekeepers (colf) and/or caretakers 
(badante), who, despite being irregularly in the country, represent an important asset to 
these families, as well as to the Italian economy (remember: Italy has a conservative 
welfare system, which depends on the provision of household services). Therefore, this 
indirect reference to immigrants, which describes not their attributes, but their functions 
serves to remind the listeners/text interpreters of the economic and demographic values 
of the inflow of foreign-born persons. Thus, if the previous frame could be said to be a 
humanitarian one, this may be labeled “utilitarian”. 
                                                 
580Original in Italian: “Pensare un mondo diviso tra una minoranza barricata, chiusa, arroccata nel suo 
benessere a spese di una moltitudine di disperati, appare come il peggiore dei destini in cui 
abbandonare i nostri figli”. Fabio Evangelisti, Italia dei Valori, Session no.171, Chamber of Deputies, 
05/05/2009. 
581
Asher Colombo and Giuseppe Sciortino. Italian immigration, 2004. 
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 However, there seems to be even more into the recurrent usage of the image of 
carers and housekeepers than economic reasons. See, for instance, the following passage: 
“the thousands of carers and housekeepers, that help so much and that bring so much 
love to our families, what do they have to do with those criminals that traffic human 
beings and commit crimes in our territory?”582 This question, uttered by Senator Nicola 
Latorre (PD), gives a hint of what is so appealing about this image: the badanti and colf 
are not considered “just arms” – as immigrants are conventionally described. This is 
because they are thought to do more than help Italian families in the provision of 
domestic services, they bring love into their homes! In short – even if one considers Mr. 
Latorre's assertion a bit of an overstatement –, these homeworkers are presented as the 
ultimate representation of the good immigrant, completely integrated into the Italian 
family-centered
583
 society. Furthermore, since they are known for being undocumented, 
their image of “good migrants” serves to corroborate the notion that irregularity is not a 
synonym of illegality. Thereby, the usage of this category of foreigners helps to refute 
the assumption that irregular immigrants are necessarily criminals. Similarly to the case 
of the “poor and destitute”, text interpreters can hardly disagree with the idea that these 
women (another appealing property of the frame) should not be equated to malefactors. 
Therefore, this is a powerful means of persuasion, as well as a way to problematize the 
negative assumptions that underlie the novel set of security measures. 
 There is one last mental representation that is often resorted to by members of 
the center-left coalition to support their pro-immigration narrative: the image of the 
Italian emigrant. As mentioned in the third chapter of this study, Italy had been for 
approximately a century a source of foreign manpower to Europe and to the Americas. 
Even though this historical record may be differently interpreted – as explained before –, 
it provided opposition parties with ammunition against the repressive treatment of 
immigrants. What's more, this frame is enriched by references to the waves of internal 
immigrants that left the Italian Mezzogiorno in search of a better life in the 
industrialized North throughout the twentieth century. In respect to this historical frame, 
it is very interesting to reproduce a direct quotation read out loud in the Chamber of 
Deputies by Fabio Evangelisti (IdV): 
 
“Usually they are short and dark-skinned. They don't love water. Many of 
them stink because they use the same clothes for many weeks. They build 
                                                 
582Original in Italian: “Le migliaia di badanti e colf, che tanto aiuto e amore portano nelle nostre famiglie, 
consa c'entrano con quei criminali che trafficano esseri umani e delinquono sul nostro territorio?”. 
Nicola Latorre, Partito Democratico, Session no.143, 05/02/2009. 
583
Paul Ginsborg. Storia d'Italia dal Dopoguerra a Oggi, 1991. 
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themselves shacks of wood and aluminum in the peripheral areas of the city, 
where they live nearby each other. When they manage to get closer to the city 
center, they rent decaying apartments at great costs. They always present 
themselves in two and look for a room with a kitchen. After a few days they 
become four, six, ten. Amongst them, they speak languages incomprehensible 
to us, probably ancient dialects. Several children are used to beg, but 
oftentimes, in front of churches, women dressed in black and men almost 
always older invoke pity with petulant and whiny tones. They make many 
children, which they can barely support, and are very united among 
themselves. It is said that they are devoted to thievery, and that if obstructed, 
they become violent. Our women avoid them, not only because they are 
unattractive and wild, but also because there are rumors that a few rapes took 
place in peripheral streets, as women went back home from work. Our 
government leaders opened the entrance for too many in the borders, but 
above all they were unable to distinguish between those who enter our 
country to work and those who think about living on expedient solutions, or 
even on criminal activities.”584 
  
Initially, this speech causes discomfort, surprise, and a sensation of unsettling in the 
average reader/listener. These feelings may be ascribed to two main reasons: firstly, the 
text is a blatantly discriminatory description of immigrants. Indeed, not even its 
apparently neutral narrative (observe, for instance, that the text is seemingly dry, mostly 
composed of simple declarative sentences, in a style that resembles the one used in 
informative textbooks) is capable of mitigating its politically incorrectness. Second, the 
discourse is uttered in an unexpected context and by an unexpected speaker: as specified 
above, Fabio Evangelisti, from IdV, is the parliamentarian reading it aloud during a 
session. If the Deputy's political alignment to the pro-immigration center-left coalition is 
taken into consideration, the speech sounds even more puzzling – remember that his 
subject position as a member of the opposition constrains the content of his 
contributions. However, as soon as the politician finishes to quote the passage, he turns 
the table around on the components of the majority by revealing its source: the text had 
been retrieved from a 1912 report of the American Congress' Inspectorate for 
Immigration, and the immigrants described are Italian citizens, who by then were 
arriving in large numbers to the North American continent. 
                                                 
584Original in Italian: “Generalmente sono di piccola statura e di pelle scura. Non amano l'acqua. Molti di 
loro puzzano perché tengono lo stesso vestito per molte settimane. Si costruiscono baracche di legno 
ed alluminio nelle periferie delle città, dove vivono vicini gli uni agli altri. Quando riescono ad 
avvicinarsi al centro, affittano a caro prezzo appartamenti fatiscenti. Si presentano di solito in due e 
cercano una stanza con uso cucina. Dopo pochi giorni diventano quattro, sei, dieci. Tra loro parlano 
lingue a noi incomprensibili, probabilmente antichi dialetti. Molti bambini vengono utilizzati per 
chiedere l'elemosina, ma sovente davanti alle chiese donne vestite di scuro e uomini quasi sempre 
anziani invocano pietà con toni lamentosi e petulanti. Fanno molti figli che faticano a mantenere e 
sono assai uniti tra di loro. Dicono che siano dediti al furto e se ostacolati violenti. Le nostre donne li 
evitano, non solo perché poco attraenti e selvatici, ma perché si è diffusa la voce di alcuni stupri 
consumati dopo agguati in strade periferiche, quando le donne tornano dal lavoro. I nostri governanti 
hanno aperto troppo gli ingressi alle frontiere, ma soprattutto non hanno saputo selezionare tra coloro 
che entrano nel nostro Paese per lavorare e quelli che pensano di vivere di espedienti o addirittura di 
attività criminali”. Fabio Evangelisti, Italia dei Valori, Session no.175, Italian Chamber of Deputies, 
12/05/2009. 
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 This is a powerful and certainly an ideologically invested way to use the image 
of Italian emigrants: he clearly aims at defending a less repressive, and more inclusive 
immigration policy. By reading this passage and revealing its origin, Evangelisti claims 
to be unveiling the real, or at least a more accurate picture of the Italian emigration 
history, of the challenges movers had to overcome, and of the prejudices they were 
obliged to deal with. More than that, since the passage appears, at first, to describe the 
situation of foreigners living currently in Italy, it approximates the old and the new 
social occurrences, and thereby, invites the listener to re-evaluate the contemporary 
reality in light of the historical episode. Obviously, many assumptions underlie 
Evangelisti's discursive strategy, and one is of particular importance here: the premise 
that nationalist sentiments will trigger a process of identification between current Italian 
citizens and emigrants back in the beginning of the twentieth century. In other words, 
the discursive strategy is only persuasive in so far as text interpreters include emigrants 
into the category of “us, Italians”. This means that, once again, Evangelisti manages to 
take over a mental representation that is usually attributed to right-wing parties – i.e. 
nationalism –  and to use it in the favor of immigrants. As a result of the correspondence 
established between old and new migration flows, a bond of solidarity may be created 
between native citizens and foreign-born residents, and this bond is expected to generate 
a more sympathetic view of immigrants. 
 Before concluding this subsection, a final remark about the centrist/center-left 
position towards immigration should be made. As mentioned throughout the analysis, 
these politicians tend to advocate stronger policies to fight irregular immigration, 
whereas taking the side of undocumented immigrants already working in the country. 
What's more, they defend that, regardless of immigrants' administrative statuses, they 
are, above all, human beings endowed with a number of inalienable rights. 
Notwithstanding the fair and ethical character of the latter arguments, these two 
positions – fight against unauthorized immigration and defense of irregular immigrants 
– are not easy to conciliate. These difficulties were often translated in the center-left 
discourses into a confusing narrative, which does not linearly explain how the contrast 
to unauthorized entry and sojourn is to be made, and how foreigners residing irregularly 
in the country are to be treated. Additionally, from time to time, centrist and leftist 
politicians seem to fall in contradiction. For example, if, on the one hand, they claim 
that the origin of irregularity is the Bossi-Fini Law – for it closed all the legal doors into 
the country –, that most regular immigrants were at some point of their journey 
undocumented, and that it is undeniable that Italy needs foreign labor, one the other 
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hand, they state that the lack of legal status is a gateway to illegality – thereby, 
indirectly replicating the migration-security nexus –, and that Italy needs a policy that 
allows its public apparatus to differentiate the good migrants from bad ones. Ms. Adamo 
(PD), for instance, contends that: 
 
This [repressive norm] repels the immigration of quality, which is the 
problem of our country, and attracts low-skilled immigration, which creates 
more problems for us and puts these people, who do not find a state capable 
of telling them what are their rights and of assuring these rights, in the hands 
of those who organize traffic and of those who are criminals, because these 
will be appear in some way, albeit illusory, as the only ones who can assure 
some protection to immigrants.
585
 
 
Observe that the Senator identifies highly-skilled third-country nationals as desirable 
migrants, while pointing out in the same sentence that unqualified movers are problem-
creators, who will surely fall into illegality in case they do not receive support from the 
state. This representation , in addition to undermining the pro-immigrant idea conveyed 
by the image of the irregular, yet well integrated house-worker, denotes a connection 
between irregularity of status and criminality – which is precisely the ideological 
linkage used by the parties of the majority to support the “security package”. Obviously, 
in this case, the sentence and the argumentation are structured so as to locate the guilt 
for migrants' illegality in the state (note the subordinate passage “who do not find a state 
capable of telling them what are their rights and of assuring these rights”). Yet, the 
linear structure of the argument, and the lack of linguistic hedges (for example, 
conditional verbal tenses or modal auxiliary verbs, as “may”) that could mitigate the 
causal connections, gives the message a tone of inevitability, as though criminality was 
the fate of undocumented migrants. In sum, despite all the pro-immigration rhetoric 
used by the center-left bloc, individual politicians still have a hard time formulating an 
alternative to the security-oriented legislation, that is to say, an alternative that does not 
link immigration to criminality, and that does not make a differentiation between those 
who are potentially good and bad migrants based on loose and ill-informed categories. 
4.3.2 Center-Right: more security, more duties 
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The present subsection analyzes the speeches delivered by the components of the 
center-right parliamentary group in the debate sessions that culminated in the approval 
of the Security Law no.94. The main parties of the rightist coalition are: Silvio 
Berlusconi's PdL, which encompasses the old Forza Italia, as well as Gianfranco Fini's 
post-fascist party, National Alliance (AN), the controversial Northern League (LNP), 
headed by Umberto Bossi, and the Southern party Movement for Autonomies (MpA)
586
, 
whose main representative is the President of Sicily, Raffaele Lombardo. As mentioned, 
the center-right coalition, albeit not claiming to oppose immigration per se, has  
advanced a strongly securitarized discourse on the phenomenon. However, in regard to 
the latest security provisions, emphasis must be given to the role played by the Northern 
League in that this party managed to translate its larger parliamentary representation 
into more power of influence over policy-making in the field of immigration. As 
Senator Valli (LNP) stressed, the repressive Security Bill is the “[...] consummation of 
the political battles that for long the Northern League has pursued in the fields of 
prevention and contrast to the clandestine immigration, and of public security”. 587 
Indeed, a number of controversial measures repeatedly proposed by the Northern party 
and subsequently rejected by legislative vote, such as the crime of irregular immigration, 
finally managed to find their way through the parliamentary procedures in 2008/2009. 
This repressive evolution of immigration policy is a sign that the “battles” mentioned by 
Mr. Valli were won, and that the security narrative became at last the dominant 
discourse type on immigration. 
 In spite of this discourse's dominance, the plural composition of the Italian 
democratic government still allows for political disputes to take place in and over 
language, and this means that the securitized definition and treatment of the migratory 
phenomenon may be not only questioned, but  eventually transformed. In fact, during 
the parliamentary debates concerning the Security Bill, the majority group was 
recurrently challenged by the pro-immigration minority, which made bids for power 
using several linguistic and non-linguistic instruments – in this respect, see the previous 
subsection. Likewise, the rightist group attempted to take advantage of such resources 
in order to maintain and to reinforce its power, in particular after the Document of the 
101 had been released. Once again, the institutional and situational contexts in which 
discursive interactions were embedded proved to be strategic for political actors 
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tema di prevenzione e contrasto dell'immigrazione clandestina e di politica della sicurezza”. Mandell 
Valli, Northern League, Session no.95, Senate of the Republic, 19/11/2008. 
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engaged in the security battle: in addition to creating interactional constraints in terms 
of content, relations, and roles, the institutional configuration of the Parliamentary 
houses provided rightist politicians with opportunities to take advantage of certain 
conventions and norms of conduct in order to promote their own agendas. 
 Before explaining how this was done, it is important to note that although the 
center-right alliance was threatened by some of its own moderate members, the power 
position occupied by the group in the Senate and in the Chamber of Deputies was still 
quite strong: not only did the group have a large majority, but also its components filled 
the main positions of power in the parliamentary institutions. The Presidents of both 
Chambers, the main relatori (proposers) of draft laws, the Presidents of the 
commissions, as well as the representatives of the executive were all members of the 
leading coalition, that is, politicians of PdL and LNP. Even though these different 
positions are more organizational than properly hierarchical, they still assure more 
control over parliamentary procedures, and thus, over several dimensions of discourse. 
All in all, the supremacy of the right-wing meant that parliamentarians of the bloc did 
not have to be as worried about exposing and defending their proposals and arguments 
as the ones of the center-left coalition. The text of the law had been, after all, devised by 
their own representatives, and given the favorable context in which it was being 
discussed, their main scope was to get it approved as fast as possible. 
 The comfortable political situation in which the center-right coalition found 
itself appears to have influenced the unfolding of the debates. In fact, majority Deputies 
and Senators were not very keen to participate. It is noteworthy, for example, that these 
politicians took part in the discussions relatively few times (approximately 60 speeches 
were delivered, counting with the inputs of the relatori and of the representatives of the 
government), and in average, they spoke much less in each intervention than the 
members of the opposition did. Moreover, during parts of some sessions at the lower 
Chamber, Deputies of the majority were completely absent. As for the content of their 
discursive contributions, most of the center-right parliamentarians did not bother to 
respond directly to questions raised by their political counterparts (the relatori and the 
government's representatives, conversely, were obliged to do so). In some cases, this 
attitude gives the impression that some questions are just considered inappropriate and 
unworthy of an answer. Even in the cases in which they use their turns to refute 
critiques, these Deputies and Senators seem to be more concerned with advancing their 
own agenda. In sum, the center-right group was well-aware of its power, and this was 
clear throughout the debates. See, for instance, the following quotation: 
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The government has presented a draft law, not a decree: I believe this is a sign 
of good will, of dialogue, and of opening also in relation to the opposition. 
Let's not confuse this decision with an authorization to prolong the time with 
a thousand amendments.
588
 
 
 The passage, taken from Ombretta Colli's (PdL) speech, is an interesting 
illustration of the argument developed here: the pretentious tone used by the Senator, 
which is particularly pronounced in the imperative sentence “Let's not […]”, reclaims to 
the center-right government a paramount position of authority over both the 
oppositional force and over the Parliament as a whole. Note that her argument alludes to 
two perverted notions of democratic rule (presuppositions): firstly, it seems to rely on 
the idea of “tyranny of the majority”589, according to which the numerical supremacy of 
a majority political group should assure to it absolute power over policy-making. 
Thereby, this group would be allowed to pursue the interests of its subsections of the 
electorate, and of its subsections only. In this regard, observe, for instance, the relational 
value of the word “also” (in Italics): the adverb is deliberately used to include the 
oppositional force in the political game, as though it would not be a participant unless 
the majority and the government allowed. Secondly, Ms. Colli's argument appears to be 
founded upon a twisted version of the “theory of the presidential mandate”590, according 
to which the president – in this case, the Council of Ministers – is superior to the 
Congress, and not one independent and equal power. In this respect, the usage of the 
term “authorization” is noteworthy in that it conveys the impression that the executive 
power had the competence to delegate functions and powers to the Parliament. What's 
more, the latter understanding is supported by the argument that Law decrees are regular 
legislative procedures, whereas draft laws are to be used in exceptional circumstances, 
that is to say, when the executive power deems the contribution of minority groups 
particularly valuable. As a result of this view, Berlusconi, Maroni and Alfano are 
presented as benevolent leaders, whose patience should not, however, be strained. All in 
all, this short passage summarizes how several members of the PdL-LNP coalition 
understood the relationships between majority and minority political forces, and 
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between the executive and the legislative powers. 
 Although these were certainly not accurate representations of the democratic 
process – to say the least –, the asymmetry of power between the parliamentary groups 
did give the components of the majority a wider margin of discretion to use institutional 
procedures to their advantage. As the decision to ask for votes of confidence over the 
text of the Security Bill demonstrates, the center-right exploited such opportunities to 
advance its own agenda, as well as to control the discursive contributions of the center-
left coalition. Since the interactional consequences of the vote of confidence were 
mentioned above, they will not be analyzed here. However, besides the vote of 
confidence, the components of the center-right coalition resorted to other institutional 
conventions to constrain the discursive contributions of their counterparts. To begin 
with, the proposers of the Bill and the representatives of the government tended to use 
their positions of power to dismiss the attempts of the minority to change their version 
of the draft law. For example, during the first appraisal of the Bill in the Senate, when 
no vote of confidence was announced, the center-left group proposed and illustrated a 
large number of amendments, most of which received unfavorable opinions from the 
relatori Vizzini (PdL) and Berselli (PdL) and from the Undersecretary of the State for 
the Interior Mantovano (PdL). These negative opinions are particularly interesting here 
because they were often motivated by institutional limits (the expert discourse, as Bloor 
and Bloor
591
 name it), rather than by the merit of the propositions. In other words, 
instead of dismissing amendments on account of their irrelevance or unconstitutional 
character, these politicians often justified their opinions by resorting to institutional 
constraints of the following type: the Financial Commission estimates that the state will 
not be able to bare the burden of the suggested measure; there is another draft law 
dealing with the same matter being assessed in the other branch of the legislative power; 
and even, this question is so relevant that it must be regulated separately. Meanwhile, 
critiques of the same sort directed to the measures of the Security Bill were simply 
ignored (the financial coverage of the “crime of irregular entry and sojourn” being a 
case to note here). Therefore, the proposers of the Bill and the representative of the 
government often pretended to acknowledge the efforts of the center-left group, while 
using their institutional and expert powers to dismiss its ideas and to silence its voice. 
 Vizzini (PdL), Berselli (PdL) and Mantovano (PdL) were not the only ones to 
adopt this strategy: the Senators and Deputies of the majority parties have also tried to 
instrumentally use the constraints imposed by the institutional configuration to 
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challenge and to depreciate the discursive contributions of the components of the center-
left grouping. Senator Pastori (PdL), for example, stated the following about the several 
preliminary issues raised by the members of the opposition after the Security Bill had 
been presented: 
  
I believe that all the objections that we have listened to are questions of merit, 
not of constitutionality, and the objections of merit can also be heard, 
acknowledged, deepened, but they surely cannot constitute objects of 
preliminary [issues] as the ones presented by the colleges.
592
 
 
This passage was extracted from the first paragraph of the speech delivered by Mr. 
Pastori (PdL), who, (allegedly) based on the activity type of the parliamentary session 
underway, censured the speakers that preceded him by contending that they 
misinterpreted the content of their own messages and therefore, misused the time slot 
devoted to the presentation of preliminary issues (Fairclough
593
 describes this sort of 
practices as attempts to control the topic of the interaction). It is interesting to notice 
that the Senator chose to start up his reply by highlighting the institutional impropriety 
of the interventions made by the members of PD and IdV, instead of using the 
opportunity to react to the very serious accusations brought up against the Bill. The 
decision was not, however, innocent: this opening message has the capacity to 
disqualify all the statements made by the center-left group, in addition to giving text 
interpreters the impression that the critiques previously raised were not even worth 
answering. Note: they may be “heard”, “acknowledged” and “deepened”, not answered, 
not voted – as preliminary issues should be. What's more, the way in which the critique 
was articulated by the Senator, as a combination of  reprehension and tolerance (observe 
the expressive value of the modal verbs “cannot” and “can”), resembles more the type 
of discourses used in educational facilities, whereby teachers/parents try to patiently 
explain to their students/children what is correct and what is not, than the face-
threatening discourse conventionally used in politics. This is not to say that the Senator 
is treating his peers as children; rather, what is being contended here is that, by 
admonishing them in such a comprehensive manner, Mr.Pastore (PdL) presents himself 
as a balanced, wise man, while indirectly imputing immaturity to his political 
counterparts, who are then seen as inexperienced politicians, that albeit meaning well, 
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are unprepared to deal with reality. 
 Interestingly enough, this image of left-wing politicians pervades most of the 
discursive contributions of the center-right group. Furthermore, the representation fits 
well into the conception of “buonismo” mentioned above. Based on a combination of 
these negative assessments, the opposition is discursively depicted as an irresponsible 
political group, as a group detached from the country's reality, and as a force that 
“below a blanket of hypocritical tolerance”594, leaves the citizenry to its own fate. Terms 
commonly used to refer to these politicians provide support to this view: these actors 
are indirectly mentioned as, and blamed for the “past” (passato), an epoch during which 
much was “said”, “chattered”, but nothing was done. Political leaders of the past – i.e. 
of the left, since the representation obviously does not take into account that before the 
2006 Prodi's government, the center-right had been in charge for a very long period – 
are said to have “closed their eyes” to the reality of the country, as well as to Italians. In 
contrast, the center-right presents itself not as an exponent of “cattivismo” (badness), 
but as a doer, as an actor that listens to the real complaints and frights of its people, and 
does not hesitate to put in place concrete measures to redress these societal problems. 
Therefore, unlike the center-left group, which is said to have wasted time making 
delusional promises, they take immediate action; in short, they are pragmatic, not 
ideological politicians. Based on this self-conception, a new era of politics is announced: 
the era of facts. It is having in mind the importance of “action” – as opposed to the 
“inaction” characteristic of the “do-gooder center-left” – that these politicians often brag 
about how much they have done in one year of government – mostly through 
emergency legislation –, and about how close they are to the citizens and to their real 
needs. As it is demonstrated below, the foregoing discussion brings us directly to the 
alleged “national security emergency”, since the widespread fear and insecurity 
allegedly felt by the population motivated the government to undertake the duty to 
provide a concrete response – the “security package” – to this pressing societal problem. 
 In nearly all the speeches delivered by the members of the majority, their 
closeness to the people, as well as their better understanding of popular needs are said to 
explain to the 2008 electoral results. This ballot is approached as the supreme proof of 
their pragmatic capabilities and knowledge of the reality. In fact, the favorable outcome 
of this popular consultation is frequently understood as an authorization to resort to 
political instruments (Law Decrees and votes of confidence) that dispense with 
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parliamentary debates and deliberation – observe that this view is in tune with the 
above-quoted speech of Senator Colli (PdL). The extract below, for instance, illustrates 
this alleged connection between the elections, the people and the role of the majority, as 
well as the aforesaid self-representation of the center-right coalition: 
  
[…] we may say, […], that in the months that preceded the electoral 
campaign and in the days that immediately followed it, a unique, 
unambiguous scream of pain arose from all over the country, a strong and 
significant appeal, so that the conditions of legality and security, already 
excessively compromised and [that were] such as to have produced an 
intolerable situation, were restored. We could not, we should not remain 
indifferent in respect to this scream of pain that transversely came from all 
the components of the civil society and, as far as we are concerned, to speak 
about security means, in our parliamentary role, to adopt that complex of 
norms that can assure the most regular, ordered, and pacific development of  
everyday life of a community […], we could not, we should not and we did 
not remain apathetic. We did it being conscious that we had to provide a 
response that was simultaneously concrete, clear, efficient, and above all, 
based on a dose of sane and robust realism […].595 
 
In this passage, the majority coalition is introduced as an attentive listener, whilst the 
citizenry is presented as a desperate utterer, one who does not simply speak, but yells, 
cries out loud craving for the guidance and protection of the authorities. In this context, 
the figure of speech “the country screams” seems to hold at least a couple of important 
messages: first, alongside other textual features, it appears to express a situational 
critique to the opposition; second, it alludes to a crucial component of the overall 
societal context in which political discursive practices were taking place in 2007/2008. 
In more detail, concerning the situational critique, the screaming-country metaphor is 
important because the speaker, Senator Mugnai (PdL), albeit mentioning only two 
interlocutors, uses the figurative speech to send a critical message to a third discourse 
participant, namely: the center-left coalition, whose members are actual listeners of the 
intervention. The content of this message may be “heard” every time a “not” is 
verbalized. The usage of negation, instead of affirmative sentences, serves to emphasize 
that the unambiguous and pervasive popular outcry could not not have been heard by 
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Session no.89, Senate of the Republic, 12/11/2008. 
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the previous government (note that he specifies that the scream was already being 
uttered in the months that preceded the elections). Thereby, Prodi's administration is 
indirectly accused of neglecting the desperate requests of the citizenry, and this means 
that the politicians of the center-left are portrayed as being either irresponsible or 
incapable. In any way, the novel government is deemed to be the extreme opposite of 
both negative images. In fact, they “could not”, “should not”, and “did not” disregard 
the pressing security needs of the country. The sequence of adjectives used to 
characterize the reaction of the center-right government to these needs – “concrete, clear, 
efficient” – reinforces this point, in addition to underscoring the pragmatic approach of 
the right-wing coalition. 
 As for the second point, it is related to the message conveyed by the term 
“scream”, and to the ways in which the usage of this particular representation reflects 
and informs the overall societal context in which both the institutional and situational 
contexts are embedded. One screams in despair, when rationality is abandoned and 
emotions, as pain or fear, are all that is left. A scream is not a word, it is a subjective 
expression of feeling, one that responds to an unbearable emotional situation, which in 
turn needs to be redressed by any means as soon as possible. In light of this 
understanding, it is reasonable to content that when Mr. Mugnai (PdL) compared the 
demand for security to a scream, he was indicating that security was not just another 
regular political request; rather, it was an urgent, desperate, exceptional need that should 
be addressed immediately, regardless of what it took. More than that, the Senator 
unveiled a crucial component of the Italian social context, that is: the overspread feeling 
of insecurity. As explained previously in this study, insecurity, fear and unease have 
become pervasive in the Western world, and Italy is no exception to this pattern. In spite 
of not being necessarily founded upon real threats (they are, like the scream, triggered 
by emotions), these feelings often inform political discourses and policy-making in Italy 
and elsewhere. Moreover, as seen, when politicians replicate societal fears, either 
discursively or by other means, they collaborate to the reinforcement of these fears, 
even when they are unreal. 
 The speeches delivered by the center-right coalition certainly go in the direction 
of reproducing this overspread component of the societal context, as Senator Mugnai's 
intervention illustrates: although he contends that the majority bases its actions on a 
dose of realism, he accepts the validity of popular appeals without really substantiating 
them, and thereby, this Senator – an actor holding a power position (facilitating 
condition of securitization) – contributes to strengthen the feeling of insecurity. What's 
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more, this happens even though threatening elements are not clearly defined – plus, as 
said, they might not even be real. This situation resembles the one described in the 
analysis made by Saleri
596
 of the speech delivered by the President of the Council, 
Silvio Berlusconi, in the press conference where the “security package” was launched. 
The author points out a paradox in the Premier's discourse: even though he had 
announced a national emergency, presented the government as the actor responsible for 
redressing the situation, and introduced concrete measures to fight insecurity, the 
precise sources of fear, that is to say, the enemies/threats that so much fear raised in the 
citizenry were not identified. The superficial treatment of the security question was not, 
however, limited to Senator Mugnai's and to Berlusconi's interventions; on the contrary, 
it may be identified throughout the whole debate over the Law no.94. Although 
members of the center-right coalition repeatedly stated that the Security Bill was a 
concrete answer to the security demands of the electorate, they hardly ever determined 
what conception of security they were using, and the sources of insecurity they were 
referring to. Once again, Mugnai's contribution may be taken as a reference to illustrate 
this point: the Senator delineates a situation of insecurity that must be tackled by the 
governmental actors in order to re-establish the country's conditions of legality and 
security, as well as the development of an ordered, regular quotidian life. However, if a 
listener uses the traditional security framework to grasp the context depicted, he/she will 
probably come to the conclusion that something, a piece of the argument is missing. Put 
differently: what does the statement actually tell text interpreters about the conception 
of security that informs governmental actions? And what sources of insecurity that must 
be mitigated? The only information he provides to his interlocutors is that there is fear, 
and people would like to be freed from it. 
 The multifarious and somewhat confusing character of the Security Bill, which 
includes provisions ranging from terrorism to traffic rules, may be partly ascribed to the 
ill definition of (in)security and of the sources of fear. However, this lack of precision 
did not necessarily pose a challenge to the center-right group. Quite the contrary: as 
mentioned in the second chapter, the vagueness with which the terms security and 
insecurity were dealt appears to have been intentionally exploited, after all, it allowed 
these politicians to include a wide range of issues in the provision – including 
immigration policies. In other words, the security approach could, thereby, be used to 
manage whatever topic the center-right considered “dangerous” and, needless to say, the 
competence of assessing the level of dangerousness of social phenomena may easily be 
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influenced by self-interest (rather than used to identify actual threats). On the 
advantages of securitizing an issue, one has for example, the possibility of treating a 
matter with urgency, and of skipping lengthy processes of political deliberation. The 
2008-2009 Law Decrees and votes of confidence exemplify well this point. However, 
whereas the center-left criticized the Bill for being a malformed mixture of norms (a 
zibaldone) – some of which had nothing to do with security –, their political 
counterparts defended that its multiplicity reflected the complexity of the security theme, 
as well as the government's commitment to solve the national security emergency. In 
fact, that is how the relatori described the Bill, even though they themselves showed 
some difficulty in making sense out of the overall textual body of the legislative piece. 
 
[…] the draft law under examination in this Assembly constitutes an 
articulated series of answers to the complex demand of security largely heard 
in Italy. The theme is unfolded in various aspects, which range from the so-
called urban security to the organized criminality, to a few aspects of the 
management of the migratory phenomenon. The main objective of the draft 
law is to reinforce the protection of all of those who live and work legally in 
Italy. [Since] the factors that affect the perception of security are manifold, 
also the responses are articulated at diverse levels.
597
 
 
In the passage above, it is possible to observe that the complexity of the legislative 
piece is presented as a manifestation of the complexity of the security question. From 
this viewpoint, the multifarious character of the Bill seems to constitute an appropriate 
answer to the social demand of security. However, observe how the speaker logically 
relates all of these complex matters by using nominalizations (processes converted into 
nouns, as “the draft law under examination”, “the complex demand of security largely 
heard”). This grammatical instrument allows for processes to be taken for granted – the 
categorical presentation dispenses with further explanations –, and thus, it is widely 
used when it comes to referring to, for example, the “the diffusion of a sense of public 
insecurity”, or “the growing problem of public security”.  The definite article “the” 
contributes to impose naturalness to these supposed processes, in that it restricts and 
particularizes them as though they were actually defined, existing nouns. Yet, despite 
the apparent existence of these processes, it is difficult to find in what exactly insecurity 
consists, and what is inside the calls for security and protection. If the security of those 
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living in Italy may be guaranteed through the implementation of environmental and 
economic measures – to name a couple of pressing social issues –, why does this 
package include exclusively immigration rules and traffic norms? 
 Therefore, in spite of all the rightist attempts to introduce the legislative piece as 
a concrete, efficient response to the pressing security problems of Italy, and to the 
insecurity felt by the Italian citizenry, a deeper, more attentive look at the speeches 
delivered by the components of this group demonstrates that they themselves are not too 
sure about what are the security needs of Italy – and if they are, they do not discursively 
show it. Nevertheless, as Saleri
598
 argued, the legislative provisions devised to fight 
insecurity serve as an indication as to which societal phenomena are included in the 
center-right's security narrative. In the above-quoted passage, for example, the law 
proposer, Ms. Santelli (PdL), lists some of the societal processes that, according to the 
center-right group, ought to be treated under the banner of security: organized 
criminality and immigration. However, these are not the only ones; the provision also 
aims at contrasting terrorism, mafia, micro-criminality, smuggling, money laundering, 
among a number of other illegal activities. Of interest to the present paper is the 
treatment of immigration as a security matter, thus, as mentioned in the introduction of 
the present section, the remaining of this subsection deals specifically with the 
discourses that concern immigration, immigration policy, the rights of immigrants, and 
the articulation of the “rights-based” discourse within the dominant security narrative. 
 As the dedication of a whole part of the Security Law to immigration policy 
indicates, the security-migration nexus has significantly informed the legislative 
provision studied here. The inclusion of measures that regulate immigration and the 
legal condition of foreign residents in a piece of legislation that was also concerned with 
organized crime, terrorism, micro-criminality, etc, unavoidably reinforces the 
securitization of the topic, in addition to indirectly transmitting the message that cross-
border movements of people are as much of a security problem for the state as 
organized crime and other serious societal problems. Notwithstanding the importance of 
the securitization mechanisms enacted by the draft law itself, of particular interest here 
are the ways in which parliamentarians of the center-right group discursively articulated 
this process, represented immigration, and related these speeches to immigrants' rights 
and freedoms – which, as repeatedly mentioned above, could not be ignored in a liberal 
democracy. It was demonstrated in the previous subsection, that the center-left, albeit 
not completely refuting the security-migration nexus, questioned and challenged not 
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only the inclusion of immigration policy in the Bill, but also the repressive turn this 
policy was taking as a result of the novel provision. Most of these attacks were based on 
a discourse type that relied on the principles and values that define Italy as a civil and 
liberal democratic state (especially individual freedoms and human rights); thereby, they 
contrasted the prohibitionist and oftentimes discriminatory and oppressive way in which 
the novel regulation approached human mobility. The center-right, on the other hand, 
claimed to be adopting a more down-to-earth view of the phenomenon and of its 
relation to security problems in Italy. 
 In more details, in the discourses of the members of the majority, immigration 
was both directly and indirectly pointed out as a source of insecurity to the country. See, 
for example: 
 
[…] the re-establishment of the conditions of legality in our country could not 
leave one equation aside: that for which the reduction of the conditions of 
legality was strongly connected to another phenomenon that we had to face. 
[…] I am referring to the uncontrolled, savage, and clandestine phenomenon 
of immigration, which sadly in our country has reached levels that can no 
longer be tolerated without serious consequences, [which] damage also those 
that came to Italy and found regular life conditions.
599
 
 
This passage is the followup of the above-quoted speech of Senator Mugnai (PdL), in 
which he contended that the Security Bill is a concrete answer to the popular outcry for 
security. It is interesting to notice how he chose to connect this desperate demand to the 
migratory phenomenon: although the security question had been superficially defined in 
the first part of his speech, he did not hesitate to attribute a part of the blame for the 
“reduction of legality” to the inward movement of people. Therefore, based on his 
speech, it may be stated that he was one of the politicians who discursively formulated a 
clear linkage between immigration and insecurity, and thereby, securitized immigration 
(not all of them link the two phenomena as directly as Mr. Mugnai). 
 Moreover, it is noteworthy that even though the Senator used negative adjectives 
to describe the migratory phenomenon as a whole (“uncontrolled”, “savage”, 
“clandestine”), in the end of the textual extract, he states that the “serious consequences” 
(note the vagueness) brought about by immigration are likely to be detrimental also to 
foreigners living regularly in Italy. The inconsistency of this formulation (he is afraid of 
                                                 
599 Original in Italian: “[…] il ripristino delle condizioni di legalità nel nostro Paese non poteva 
prescindere da un'equazione: quella per cui il venire meno delle condizioni di legalità era fortemente 
connesso ad un altro fenomeno che dovevamo affrontare. […] Mi riferisco al fenomeno 
dell'immigrazione incontrollata, selvaggia e clandestina, che purtroppo nel nostro Paese ha raggiunto 
livelli tali da non poter essere più sopportata senza gravi conseguenze, anche a danno di coloro che 
sono venuti in Italia e hanno trovato regolari condizioni di vita”. Franco Mugnai, People of Freedom, 
Session no.89, Senate of the Republic, 12/11/2008. 
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immigration, but concerned for the outsiders) may sound strange, as if the speaker had 
made a mistake, but surprisingly, the same confusing message is found in other 
speeches of the majority. This ambiguous posture in respect to the migratory 
phenomenon is a pervasive characteristic of the Bill (it simultaneously promotes the 
criminalization of immigrants, the integration of foreigners, and the entry of highly-
skilled workers), and it is frequently replicated in the discursive contributions of the 
parliamentarians of the center-right group. However, this posture makes sense if we 
remember that, even though politicians of the center-right have a hard time recognizing 
it, immigration is a multifarious phenomenon that factually entails challenges and 
benefits both to countries of origin and of destination. On the top of that, as seen in the 
third chapter, Italy cannot do without immigrants, and this means that the political 
authorities of the country must somehow find a way to fulfill economic and 
demographic needs, without however, adopting a lax, undisciplined regulatory 
framework. It is here that the state's rules of belonging and membership seem to play an 
important role in qualifying the security narrative – even when such narratives are 
articulated by the most radical politicians. The center-right, in order to conciliate these 
contrasting positions, operates with a very clear classificatory scheme of migrants: if 
one is not regular, one is illegal, clandestine, and thus, dangerous. The statement below 
expresses this division: 
 
After that, we are a welcoming nation [Nazione di grande accoglienza]; 
thousands of foreigners live in our country, contribute to the lives of our 
families, of our industries, are in the schools next to our children and we 
consider them people who live with plenitude of their rights in our country.  It 
is against illegality, against clandestinity, against the traffic of slaves that this 
Law clearly positions itself […].600 
 
Senator Gasparri (PdL) presents the classificatory scheme quite clearly: on the one hand, 
there is a class of foreigners in Italy that deserves to enjoy the rights of the state for its 
members live normal lives and contribute to the development of the society; on the 
other hand, there is a class of illegal, clandestine individuals, who are involved in 
criminal and deplorable activities, as the traffic of slaves. In this regard, it is noteworthy 
that the legislative measures that criminalize irregular immigration work within the 
boundaries of this scheme. For one, the “crime of irregular entry and stay” in the 
                                                 
600Original in Italian: “Dopo di che noi siamo una Nazione di grande accoglienza; milioni di stranieri 
vivono nel nostro Paese, contribuiscono alla vita delle nostre famiglie, delle nostre industrie, sono 
nelle scuole accanto ai nostri figli e noi li consideriamo persone che vivono in pienezza di diritti nel 
nostro Paese. È contro la illegalità, è contro la clandestinità, è contro il traffico di schiavi che questa 
legge si posiziona in maniera molto chiara […]”. Maurizio Gasparri, People of Freedoms, Session 
no.143, Senate of the Republic, 05/02/2009. 
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country – one of the most debated topics of the sessions concerning the Security Bill – 
is always explained along these lines. For example: “Who, in fact, comes into our 
territory without possessing a regular permit or a visa (thus, all the instruments that 
provide for a legal entry) places himself beyond law”.601 The rights narrative seems to 
respect these lines as well, but its conciliation with the security discourse goes beyond 
this scheme, and therefore, its relations to legal statuses and to the security narrative are 
going to be further explained later on. 
 In practice, the differentiation promoted by the aforesaid categorization of 
immigrants advances the notion that irregular foreigners are, or will eventually become 
criminals, terrorists, drug dealers, and – at best – deviants, as prostitutes. The words 
used by the majority to designate these individuals corroborate this view: they are 
mostly referred to as “clandestine”, a harmful term that is occasionally replaced by other 
negatively charged terms, as “extracommunitarian” or “illegal”. Intertextual references 
to external texts and reports help to support this view, and also help to give authority to 
the security discourse. For example, a number of Senators and Deputies use criminal 
statistics to validate their ideas (especially the ones concerning the inmate population). 
What's more, several discourses establish direct connections between human mobility 
and this set of problematic phenomena. A couple examples are: 
 
What perspective will the clandestine have of surviving (because everyone 
needs to survive)?  Either he is going to to steal, or to push [drugs], or maybe 
there will be more women who need to prostitute themselves, or there will be 
even more rapes.
602
 
 
An authentic and complete parallel banking system. The money transfer 
agencies, used above all by immigrants to send their remittances home, are 
already widely spread and in all shapes, particularly in the big cities, and this 
[fact] further corroborates that such a complex network of agencies 
specialized in the transfer of money does not fulfill exclusively the demands 
of immigrants, but functions rather as a privileged means not only to money-
laundering activities, but also and above all to finance international 
terrorism.
603
 
                                                 
601Original in Italian: “Chi, infatti, viene oggi sul nostro territorio senza avere un regolare permesso o un 
visto (quindi tutti gli strumenti che consentono un ingresso legale) si pone al di là della legalità”. Jole 
Santelli, People of Freedom, Session no.169, Chamber of Deputies, 11/11/2008. 
602Original in Italian: “Quale futuro avrà il clandestino per poter campare (perché tutti devono campare)? 
O andrà a rubare, o a spacciare, o magari ci saranno ulteriori donne che si dovranno prostituire o ci 
saranno ancora più stupri”.Gianluca Buonanno, Northern League, Session no.169,  Chamber of 
Deputies, 11/11/2008. 
603Original in Italian: “Un vero e proprio sistema bancario parallelo. Le agenzie di money transfer, 
utilizzate soprattutto dagli immigrati per le loro rimesse in patria, sono ormai diffuse capillarmente e 
in tutte le loro forme, soprattutto nelle grandi città, e ciò fa ulteriormente ritenere che una rete così 
complessa di agenzie specializzate nel trasferimento di denaro non risponda soltanto alla esigenze 
degli immigrati, ma piuttosto che funzioni come canale privilegiato oltre che del riciclaggio di danaro 
sporco anche e soprattutto per il finanziamento del terrorismo internazionale”. Piergiorgio Stiffoni, 
Northern League, Session no.142, Senate of the Republic, 04/02/2009. 
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Both citations link immigration more or less directly to criminal activities. From a 
textual viewpoint, what is particularly interesting to observe in these extracts is the 
modality of the sentences that connect immigrants to criminal and deviant actions: 
instead of using verb tenses that express conditionality – which would be the obvious 
choice, given that both speakers are talking about events that might take place –, these 
politicians prefer to rely on the simple future and simple present tenses, which are 
normally used to narrate/describe a process/action that is to happen, and an undergoing 
process/action. Hence, unlike the center-left coalition, whose members chose to depict a 
possible future when exposing the potential consequences of the Security Bill 
(remember: they often used conditional verb tenses in their discourses), components of 
the majority claim the authenticity of their assertions (apart, of course, from the second 
part of the first text, which includes a modifier, “maybe”). From an ideological 
viewpoint, the expressive value of these sentences' modality is relevant because it 
supports a straightforward, transparent view of the world, as if the “clandestini” were 
unavoidably going to follow one of the ways enumerated in the first speech, and as if 
money transfer agencies could only exist and succeed in case they had links with 
terrorist groups and criminal organizations. Put differently, Deputy Buonanno (LNP) 
and Senator Stiffoni (LNP) are not suggesting that these scenarios might be or become 
reality, they are asserting that if they are not yet real, they ought to be eventually. Given 
these prospects, it is not at all surprising that immigrants are considered security threats 
in Italy. 
 This securitized understanding of immigration is closely related to the main 
frames used by the majority group to approach the migratory phenomenon and the 
presence of foreign-born residents in Italy. Concerning the dominant image of 
immigrants, for example, the negative perspectives presented by Mr. Buonanno (LNP) 
above (criminality, drug traffic, prostitution) only make sense if text interpreters assume 
that the so-called clandestini are the poor and destitute of the world. Therefore, once 
again, the “vision of pauperism” may be identified as one of the dominant ways to 
describe the migrant, especially undocumented ones. What's more, illegal entry through 
Italy's sea borders seems to be a part of this frame, with other types of irregular 
immigration rarely being mentioned. Another crucial representation of immigration has 
also been partly introduced before, namely: the idea that immigration is an uncontrolled, 
164 
savage “invasion”, as described by Senator Vallardi (LNP)604 and a few others. Senator 
Rizzi (LNP), for instance, states that: 
 
I believe that the epoch to think about an immigration controlled and 
controllable is over […] an immigration that is really bringing us to our knees, 
particularly from the security standpoint, because the uncontrolled and 
uncontrollable immigration, at last, is translated into the impossibility of 
these extracommunitarian citizens to come to our country to create in it a 
future and, thus, into being absolutely and progressively pushed to enter the 
criminality circle.
605
 
 
In this passage, immigration – this epochal and global problem, as some 
parliamentarians describe it – is presented as a phenomenon that can no longer be 
contained, that is to say, as a harmful invasion, a modern-days colonization (the latter 
terms are not used by the text producer, but by his colleges). Interestingly, when 
describing this process (first part of the quotation), Senator Rizzi does not differentiate 
between regular and irregular forms of entry in the country. This is because, even 
though Italy is considered a “great welcoming nation”, the “savage”, “uncontrolled”, 
“indiscriminate” and “unmanageable” “forced globalization of peoples”606 has already 
become a force beyond the control of any state, and thus, a danger to Italians and to 
foreign-born nationals  residing in the country. It is interesting to note that underlying 
this line of argumentation is the traditional conception of the nation-state, according to 
which this political unit has three constitutive parts, the government, the people and the 
territory. In fact, the notion of invasion only makes complete sense if supported by this 
framework in that only a bounded unit, isolated from the outside world, may be intruded 
upon. 
 In light of this framework, indiscriminate cross-border movements of people are 
said to pose three serious challenges to the Italian state. First, immigration “undermines 
the foundations of this state […] because its limits and its borders are no longer 
consistent, and its territorial sovereignty disappears, and the state itself starts to 
lapse”. 607  Second, immigration allegedly threatens the government itself because 
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Gianpaolo Vallardi, Northern League, Session no.90, 12/11/2008. 
605 Original in Italian: “Credo che sia finita l'epoca di pensare ad una immigrazione controllata e 
controllabile e che non vi sia davvero un'emergenza legata all'immigrazione clandestina […] una 
immigrazione che ci sta veramente mettendo in ginocchio, soprattutto dal punto di vista della 
sicurezza, perché l'immigrazione incontrollata ed incontrollabile, alla fine, si traduce in una 
impossibilità da parte di questi cittadini extracommunitari di venire in nostro Paese a crearsi in esso un 
futuro e quindi nell'essere assolutamente spinti progressivamente ad entrare nel giro della 
delinquenza”. Fabio Rizzi, Northern League, Session no.94, Senate of the Republic, 18/11/2008. 
606Original in Italian: “forzada globalizzazione dei popoli”. Gianpaolo Vallardi, Northern League, Session 
no.90, 12/11/2008. 
607Original in Italian: “[...] mina le fondamenta di questo stato […] perché i suoi confini e le sue frontiere 
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foreigners, especially irregular ones, disregard the rule of the law, and because, 
according to radical components of the center-right coalition, aliens are engaged in an 
attempt to become numerical majority in the country in order to take over the 
government. Third, several traditions and customs brought to Italy by these individuals 
are considered to be incompatible with the national culture (some examples mentioned 
throughout the debates are the usage of headscarfs, different wedding ceremonies, and 
polygamous marriages). Due to these inconsistencies, the practice of alien customs is 
said to be dangerous, after all, they may undermine the traditional principles and values 
upon which Italy is founded. In this respect, marriage is a case to note: since Italy is 
known to be a family-centered society, different ways to celebrate these unions, and 
diverse family models are deemed to be unacceptable, for they directly challenge one of 
the most basic pillars of the Italian culture, the family institute. What is particularly 
interesting about the last couple of challenges mentioned is that they are not necessarily 
related to the presence of irregular individuals in Italy, but to the presence of immigrants 
as such – a point that is going to be returned to later on. 
 In light of these multifaceted challenges to the Italian state, it is the government's 
obligation to take action (remember Senator Mugnai's intervention: “we could not, we 
should not and we did not remain apathetic”) in order to make sure that the citizenry and 
their rights are safeguarded. Needless to say, the immigrant-oriented “security package” 
aims at fulfilling precisely this duty, which is moreover, said to be the ultimate 
responsibility of every advanced and civil state. Regarding the latter statement, it is 
noteworthy that, similarly to the center-left group, members of the majority base their 
discourses on a sort of developmental hierarchy of countries and societies, according to 
which Italy stands side by side with France, Germany, the United Kingdom, amongst 
other “advanced and civil” societies. This classification is important here because, as 
indicated by Senator Saltamartini (PdL) in two different occasions, in the constitutional 
system of such advanced states, “the idea and the principle of liberty and democracy are 
always connected, as hendiadys, to the principle of the right of citizens to security”608. 
Based on this understanding, it is clear that liberal democratic states must introduce 
security measures whenever necessary to assure the safety of their People. In another 
parliamentary session, he further explores this relationship between liberty, democracy 
and security by saying the following: 
                                                                                                                                               
non hanno più alcuna consistenza, e la sua sovranità territoriale scomparse, viene meno lo stato 
stesso”. Sandro Mazzatorta, Northern League, Session no.230, 01/07/2009. 
608Original in Italian: “l'idea e il principio di libertà e di democrazia siano sempre legati, in termini di 
endiadi, al principio del diritto alla sicurezza dei cittadini”. Filippo Saltamartini, People of Liberties, 
Session no.230, Senate of the Republic, 01/07/2009. 
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To begin with a forerunner, that is with Thomas Hobbes, author of Leviathan, 
we may say that the state is born to defend the citizens and the transfer of 
sovereignty and of natural liberties occurs – exactly – in the moment in which 
the modern state is formed.
609
 
 
 In this passage, the intertextual reference to Thomas Hobbes is suggestive of the 
center-right's actual approach to immigration for it indirectly (and perhaps, involuntarily) 
suggests that the prevalent element in the aforesaid liberty-security dyad is the latter one, 
and therefore, that it is acceptable to sacrifice the first in the name of second. In more 
detail: although Hobbes is the first theoretician to point out that the State is an artificial, 
human creation, in his conception of the political world, the state is an entity endowed 
with absolute power that, albeit assuring the maintenance of a civil society, charges a 
high price for it, namely: the liberty of the citizenry. It is only with John Locke that the 
People becomes the prevailing political actor in the post-contractual world, and the 
Stato di Diritto (rule of law) finally comes into being.
610
 In sum, what is being argued 
here is that Senator Saltamartini (PdL) could be suggesting that a certain degree of 
sacrifice, in terms of freedoms and rights, is acceptable in the face of modern security 
challenges, such as immigration. From this viewpoint, the restrictive and repressive turn 
taken by immigration policy is fair, after all, as mentioned in the second chapter of this 
study, “security is the first freedom”. Indeed, it is interesting to notice that this position 
corresponds perfectly to the scenario delineated in the theoretical part of this work: the 
Italian state, threatened by a phenomenon that it can no longer control, insists on relying 
on the out-dated national apparatus in order to safeguard its population and territory. In 
this context, freedoms and rights are progressively sacrificed in the name of security. 
Despite this correspondence, generally speaking, politicians of the center-right coalition 
do not openly recognize that rights are being sacrificed in the name of security, and this 
means that the research question of this study remains unanswered. 
 Yet, some elements conducive to an answer were provided along this subsection. 
To start with, it was demonstrated that the Bill's repressive approach to immigration was 
considered absolutely necessary in light of this phenomenon's threatening character. If 
irregular immigrants are directly and indirectly connected to criminal activities, and if 
immigration is an uncontrollable, invasive phenomenon, Italy cannot allow everyone to 
                                                 
609Original in Italian: “Partendo da un antesignano, cioè da Thomas Hobbes, autore del "Leviatano", 
possiamo affermare che lo Stato nasce proprio per difendere i cittadini e la cessione di sovranità e 
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come in; it must do its best to strengthen its border controls, and to improve its capacity 
to sort out between good and bad migrants. Besides that, given the state's economic and 
demographic needs, it must be able to effectively welcome the outsiders who are 
accepted into its society, while making sure that they do not become either a burden or a 
threat. In sum, the main message of the discourses of center-right coalition seems to be 
the following: the compulsion to accept immigration cannot mean to succumb to 
criminality and to the “other”, as it has happened hitherto. A good summary of these 
arguments is provided by Ms. Sbai (PdL): 
 
Being an Italian woman with Moroccan origins, I would say that the time has 
come to those who aspire to a better life here to arrive legally in Italy, to 
contribute to its economic, social, and institutional development without 
falling victim to organized criminality. It is dangerous to let in clandestine 
individuals who augment the pockets of social marginality, in a context of 
crisis as the one we are living. It is even more dangerous that do-gooder 
multiculturalism that, secure to act in the name of the respect for differences 
and of habits and customs, is ready to understand and justify anything. […] 
Those who live in Italy cannot live following traditions that are incompatible 
with the Italian regulatory framework: they must know and respect the laws 
of this country, studying the language and the Italian Constitution. 
611
 
 
In this passage, Ms. Sbai (PdL) seems to be doing more than simply justifying the novel 
repressive immigration and immigrant provisions contained in the Security Bill; the 
Deputy is also delineating the picture of the good/ideal immigrant: he/she should enter 
and stay in the country legally, he/she should contribute to the society, he/she should 
adapt herself to local habits and customs, he/she should abandon traditions that are not 
in conformity with Italian values, he/she should learn Italian, and he/she should know 
and respect the Constitution. In this respect, it is interesting to remark that Ms. Sbai 
(PdL) introduces herself as an “Italian woman with Moroccan origins”, reminding her 
fellow Deputies of her past as an immigrant in the country where now she is a 
representative of the people. On the significance of this personal memory, one may say 
that she speaks about immigration from a unique position of authority: she is not only a 
representative of both worlds, but also the embodiment of the ideal immigrant she 
describes. She is the living proof that the message put forth by the center-right is correct: 
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Original in Italian: “Da donna italiana di origine marocchina, mi sento di dire che è giunta l'ora che chi 
aspira ad una vita migliore qui da noi debba giungere legalmente in Italia, per concorrere al suo 
sviluppo economico, sociale e istituzionale senza cadere vittima della criminalità organizzata. È 
pericoloso far entrare clandestini che vanno ad ingrossare le sacche di marginalità sociale, in un 
contesto di crisi come quello che stiamo vivendo. È ancor più pericoloso quel multiculturalismo di 
stampo buonista che, convinto di agire nel nome del rispetto delle differenze e di usi e costumi, è 
pronto a comprendere e a giustificare qualsiasi cosa. […] Chi vive in Italia non può vivere seguendo 
tradizioni incompatibili con l'ordinamento italiano: deve conoscere e rispettare le leggi di questo Paese, 
studiando la lingua e la Costituzione italiana”. Souad Sbai, People of Freedoms, Session no.176, 
Chamber of Deputies, 13/05/2009. 
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she is not dangerous for she is, she became Italian – and not only on paper. This latter 
consideration also alludes to what the center-right bloc considered one of the main 
problems of Italy when it came to immigration, that is: because most foreigners had 
been allowed to live in the country according to their own rules and customs, and thus, 
allegedly disregarding those of the Italian state (as if Italy was a “no man's land”), a 
basic right of the native population had been compromised, the right to be free from fear. 
 It is in this pressing context that Ms. Sbai (PdL) states that the time has come for 
the Italian state to take control of the situation and to set the record straight; otherwise, 
Italy will succumb to immigration – at least according to the catastrophic scenario 
depicted by the center-right. Thus, the government must not only fight the 
irregular/illegal/clandestine immigration that threatens its borders and sovereignty, but 
also re-establish the equilibrium between the rights and the duties of foreign residents in 
order to guarantee a proper integration of these individuals into the society. In this sense, 
the Security Bill and its repressive provisions, including those that apparently have 
nothing to do with security, are justifiable. More specifically, according to this discourse, 
the logic underlying the Bill is the following: 
 
Irregulars: it seems to me that in this Parliament, at least for a part of it, only 
irregulars should have rights in this country and the Italian citizens, instead, 
should not have them.
612
 
 
We are trying to modify some norms respecting the famous equilibrium that 
must exist between rights and duties that we ask both from our citizens […] 
and from those who enter the territory of our country, legally or illegally.
613
 
 
Other than racism, this is justice!
614
 
 
Alongside the previous one, these quotations summarize most of the arguments raised 
by the components of the center-right coalition to support the exclusionary and 
oppressive measures of the Security Law, as well as to refute the innumerable 
accusations of racism, discrimination and violation of freedoms and rights made against 
them by the center-left group. Looking at the content of these excerpts, it is surprising to 
find out that terms like “rights”, “rights and duties” and “justice” are so comfortably 
                                                 
612Original in Italian: “Irregolari: mi sembra che in questo Parlamento, per lo meno per una parte, i diritti 
in questo Paese dovrebbero averli solo gli irregolari e non dovrebbero invece averli i cittadini italiani”. 
Manuela Dal Lago, Northern League, Session no. 176, Chamber of Deputies, 13/05/2009. 
613Original in Italian: “Cerchiamo di modificare alcune norme rispettando il famoso equilibrio che deve 
esserci tra i diritti e i doveri che chiediamo sia ai nostri cittadini […] sia a chi entra nel nostro Paese, 
che lo faccia legalmente o illegalmente”. Luciano Dussin, Northern League, Session no. 176, 
Chamber of Deputies, 13/05/2009. 
614Original in Italian: “Altro che razzismo, questa è giustizia!”. Roberto Cota, Northern League, Session 
no. 177, Chamber of Deputies, 14/05/2009. 
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(and frequently, we may add) used to defend the center-right's repressive legislative 
piece. What's more, as seen in the speech delivered by Senator Sbai (PdL), the idea of 
legal residence status and the image of a regularized and perfectly integrated foreigner 
are oftentimes drawn upon for the same purpose. The usage of these terms/image is 
puzzling because first, the Bill is clearly a securitized and repressive legislative piece 
that does not promote any of these goals, and second, because not only moderates, but 
also radical politicians and members of parties founded upon regional identities strongly 
rely on this vocabulary in their interventions. As seen in the previous subsection, it is 
normal to hear parliamentarians from the center-left advancing such inclusive ideas 
(remember: they fight the security discourse with a discourse based on rights), but it is 
not as common to have the center-right advocating for regular inflows of migration, for 
the establishment of rights and duties to immigrants and for equality between these 
individuals and citizens (especially given that their opponents rely on the same 
discourse to undermine the Security Bill). Another surprising, yet common example of 
these arguments may be found below: 
 
The guests must be respected, but the same must be expected from them. 
From now on, there will no longer be place in this country for the immigrants 
that do not want to be integrated, that violate our laws, and that live on 
criminality, as those who do not respect our history, our culture, and our 
traditions will not be welcome. Integration does not mean to renounce one's 
own identity and roots, as the center-left would have wanted it. Integration , 
as far as we are concerned, means that those who come to our house (because 
this is our house) must respect our laws and must adequate themselves to our 
ways of living. This is integration as we understand it.
615
 
 
In this passage, as in the previous ones, it is stunning to observe that a parliamentarian 
from the anti-immigration Northern League is drawing on the notion of immigrant 
integration to support his contentions. Again, regardless of how surprising this may 
sound, this discourse has been, alongside the discourses on legality, rights and duties, 
extensively used by the majority to justify the Security Bill. But, aren't these discourses 
in contrast with the securitarian one? How can these politicians criminalize irregular 
immigrants and treat foreign residents as suspects, for instance, and at the same time use 
a rights-based narrative to justify such practices? 
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Northern League, Session no.232, Senate of the Republic, 02/07/2009. 
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 The previous chapter of this work, as well as the beginning of the present 
chapter have attempted to demonstrate the extent to which immigration has been 
securitized in Italy, as well as how the legislative piece no.94 has managed to take the 
security-oriented view of the migratory phenomenon to an extreme. What's more, the 
conceptual part (second chapter) presented securitization as a process that sets in motion 
an exclusionary and oppressive logic, one that, in order to safeguard referent objects, 
endeavors either to annihilate or to push the threatening entity – in this case the 
migrant/the Other – away. In light of these factual and theoretical inputs, how could a 
discourse based on rights, duties, equality, integration, in sum, a discourse that is 
ultimately based on the notion of inclusion, be used to justify the Security Bill? It is 
precisely in this apparent contradiction that the answer to the research question of this 
study seems to lie. The speeches delivered by the center-right coalition in the Italian 
Parliament – site of political struggle wherein the exclusionary security discourse was 
directly contested by the inclusive “rights-based” – indicate that the components of this 
group could defend a Bill that treats migrants as security threats, without (apparently) 
violating the liberal and democratic character of the Italian Republic because they relied: 
first, on the legal categorization of immigrants that results from the country's rules of 
membership and belonging; second, and more importantly, on a distorted speech on 
inclusion, which allowed them to incorporate into their vocabulary notions that 
traditionally belong to a pro-immigrant discourse type, such as rights, equality, and 
integration. Obviously, this strategy is dependent upon the ways in which these 
parliamentarians approached  the migratory phenomenon and the security emergency. In 
what follows, these statements are further explained. 
 In the passages quoted above, it is noticeable that immigration is not represented 
in its multiplicity; rather, one unique view stands out: that of immigration as an 
uncontrolled and uncontrollable modern phenomenon triggered mainly by the 
developmental disparities between the Northern and the Southern hemispheres. In this 
context, Italy is introduced as a great welcoming, humanitarian nation, but one that 
cannot possibly receive everyone. Note that, from this viewpoint, the origin of the 
problem of “clandestinity” is transferred from the state to the globe, that is to say, 
irregular migration is presented as neither a result of the nonavailability of legal doors 
into the country nor of the difficulties foreigners face in maintaining their legal statuses; 
rather, it is the numerical disequilibrium between the amount of desperate and/or poor 
people in the world and Italy's capacity of receiving these people that generates 
“illegality” and therefore, criminality. As for legal migrants, they contend that, since the 
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previous governments were incapable to regulate their presence, many of them could 
simply take advantage of the Italian state and economy, while living a life of non-
integration, often of marginality, and thereby, creating situations that endanger the 
cohesion of the society, as well as its foundations. All of this means that while certain 
types of immigration may be praised, owing to the lack of stricter and down-to-earth 
regulations, immigrants are practically “above the law”. Needless to say, this situation 
has supposedly originated a number of threats to the security of the state and society. In 
sum, according to this view, foreigners come into Italy, legally and illegally, benefit 
from the rights guaranteed to them by the Italian liberal and democratic state, but, unlike 
citizens, do not have to fulfill any duties. They are disrespectful guests. 
 This argumentative structure succeeds in turning around all the arguments 
advanced by the center-left government against the Security Bill: from the rightist 
standpoint, there is indeed discrimination and racism in Italy, but not against immigrants. 
On the contrary, these individuals are portrayed as privileged guests, who proceed as 
they will, whereas the right to security of native citizens is relegated to a second plane. 
Hence, Italians are the ones being discriminated against: since the center-left 
government, in its do-gooder position, did not regulate immigration, the native 
population is now suffering the consequences of having a class of residents that is 
beyond the rule of law. It is from this perspective that foreign citizens must be included; 
their statuses must be equated to the one the Italian citizens, they must be given duties, 
and they must behave as respectful guests. However, since there is an imbalance 
between the number of those looking for a better life in Italy, and the state's capacity to 
absorb these people, not everyone is welcome: if they want in, immigrants have to 
prove that they are worth the effort made by the Italian state and society, that is to say, 
they must attempt to conform to the image of the ideal migrant presented above. 
Irregular migrants, on the other hand, are to be treated according to their choices, that is, 
as criminals. So it seems that if the Italian state wants to guarantee the security of its 
residents, it must measure the worthiness and the dangerousness of the potential mover, 
and the repressive measures of the Security Law go precisely in this direction. 
 The parliamentary speeches, too, reflect this view: if one is in Italy irregularly, 
he/she is dangerous; if one uses a burqa or a headscarf, she is dangerous; if one did not 
learn Italian,  he/she is not worth; if one has taken a PhD in the country, he/she is 
welcome, and so on.  Note, however, that the notions of inclusion and integration with 
which the center-right group works are twisted versions of their original conceptions. 
Senator Bricolo (LNP), for example, puts forth an idea of integration as a one-way 
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process, according to which the foreigner has to adapt himself if he wants to be an 
accepted part of the society. Besides this, in the Security Bill itself, the measures 
allegedly aimed at equating migrants to nationals and at promoting their integration do 
nothing to assure the fulfillment of these goals, apart from imposing burdens on 
migrants, and worsening their legal condition in the country. This twisted discourse on 
immigrant integration resembles the arguments advanced by Doty
616
 and mentioned in 
the second chapter of this study, that is: securitization does not need to be directly 
exclusionary; it may take the form of identity politics, and if this case, policies designed 
to assimilate the “other” may be used as an alternative way to control the threat (even 
though they incorporate a logic that is different from the one conventionally resorted to 
by securitizing actors). All in all, it seems that the putative inclusion advanced by the 
center-right majority is actually aimed at promoting a spectrum of exclusion: the closer 
a foreigner gets to possessing some sort of “Italianess” – no longer representing a “non-
I” – , or to possessing skills and resources that are valuable to the country, the more 
included he/she is, and the more rights he/she gets. As for those who are not worth, they 
are automatically deemed to be dangerous, and should be kept outside of the national 
borders. In this spectrum, citizenship seems indeed to be the “ultimate status privilege”, 
as Marco Ferrero
617
 described it. What's more, this conclusion seems to be in tune with  
Alessandro Dal Lago's
618
 following argument: 
 
When nationalism is no longer in its formative phase, but is already 
consolidated, the hyperbolic forms of racism will be substituted by the 
procedural, democratic, legal and scientific forms of racism. These forms 
don't need to declare hatred against the other, but limit themselves to actually 
treating the other as an enemy.
619
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5 Conclusion 
 
In 2008, following the electoral triumph of the center-right coalition, immigration 
policy in Italy took a decisive turn for the worse: the inclusion of several migration-
related provisions into the so-called “security package” – whose alleged aim was to 
redress the country's pressing security troubles – resulted in more than tighter border 
controls; it actually criminalized thousands of irregular migrants, turned other thousands 
into permanent suspects, and worsened the legal condition of all foreign-born nationals 
residing legally in the country.
620
 More than that, the provisions of this package were 
accused of discriminating against, and of violating individual freedoms and human 
rights of immigrants and of vulnerable sections of the Italian population. 
 In light of the negative consequences of the new legislation over the rights of 
migrants, the main purpose of the present work was to investigate how the predominant 
securitarian discourse on immigration  managed to suppress and to silence the necessary 
presence of human rights considerations in immigration policy. This inquire was 
considered particularly interesting because, regardless of how threatening migration and 
immigrants are said to be, in liberal democratic states, the exclusionary and oppressive 
logic of security should find its limits in the individual freedoms and human rights of 
movers. This means that somehow, components of the center-right political force – the 
main proposers and defenders of the “security package” – were compelled to negotiate 
the contradictions of the exclusionary security narrative with the inclusive “rights-based” 
discourse in order to justify the adoption of migration-related policies that, according to 
many, did not comply with domestic and international human rights laws. Since 
securitization is a socially constructed process, and taking into consideration that 
contemporary political battles mostly take place in and over language, the methodology 
chosen to conduct the proposed investigation was discourse analysis. More specifically, 
the idea was to carry out a critical discourse analysis of the parliamentary debates that 
led to the approval of the main legislative piece of the “security package”, Law no.94. 
 As mentioned in the first chapters, the movement of people across national 
borders brings about both positive and negative consequences for the societies involved. 
Due to this uncertainty, most contemporary states adopt an ambivalent position in 
relation to the migratory phenomenon. Economically developed states, in particular, 
albeit needing the extra manpower provided by foreigners, are reluctant to open their 
borders for what is apparently an ever-increasing mass of international movers. On the 
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consequences of this ambivalence, we have a somewhat contradictory situation: 
whereas most people are free to leave the territories of their states, the majority of the 
states around the globe have put in place restrictive immigration policies, which not 
only regulate who is allowed into the country, but also under what conditions, for how 
long, for which purposes and so forth. As Joppke
621
 highlights, the current plurality of 
legal statuses reflects precisely these conflicting interests of states when it comes to the 
handling of immigration. Since states' norms and rules of membership and belonging 
determine a spectrum of inclusion and exclusion of outsiders according to the receiving 
state's needs, duties, international agreements, etc, the present paper advanced the 
hypothesis that in order to discursively conciliate an exclusionary security discourse 
with an inclusive “rights-based” one, parliamentarians of the center-right coalition 
would instrumentally use the Italian state's legal categorization of migrants. In more 
detail, the hypotheses put forth in the beginning of this study were the following: 
 
– The “rights-based” discourse on immigration is instrumentally appropriated by 
the actors advancing a security logic; 
– The antagonistic aspects of these discourses are brought together in the rules and 
procedures of membership and belonging of the country. Put differently, the articulation 
of a legal and institutional framework that transcends the notion of foreigners as a “non-
I”, as an“Other”, allows politicians to formulate a spectrum of inclusion and exclusion 
against which the worthiness and dangerousness of the immigrant may be gauged. 
– This framework provides the government with the power of discretion to: 
– translate security concerns into policies that target specific, “dangerous” groups; 
– maintain a “rights-based” facade to migration regulation; and 
– advance national economic interests related to the inflow of particular categories 
of foreign-born individuals (e.g. high-skilled and seasonal migrants). 
 
 The analysis of the speeches delivered by the components of the center-left and 
center-right parliamentary groups demonstrated that legal status does play an important 
role in qualifying the security narrative. The division of foreign-born nationals into 
regular and irregular is particularly relevant in this respect: it featured prominently in 
the discourses of both the rightist and leftist blocs, and it was identified as one of the 
most basic classificatory schemes upon which politicians rely to make sense of inward 
movements of people. In fact, he slash between regular/irregular is quite 
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straightforwardly drawn upon, especially by parliamentarians of the majority – even 
though these politicians often disregard that, in Italy, “status” mobility 622  is a 
widespread phenomenon. The reliance on this division shows that, although the security 
narrative is moved by a logic of exclusion (states wish to get rid of menaces, and thus, 
of migrants), this oppressive logic finds a limit in the legal separation between those 
who have the right to be in and those who should be kept out. 
 In spite of being a prominent classification in the speeches of both political 
groupings, the meaning attributed to the regular/irregular division by each is quite 
different. Needless to say, such differences help to explain why these groups to support 
different sets of immigration policies. To be sure: regardless of where a politician is 
placed on the political spectrum, irregular immigration is a phenomenon to be curbed, 
and regular migration one to be carefully controlled. However, while the center-left 
opposition defends the development of immigration policies that respect the humanity 
of unauthorized movers, and in some cases, supports their regularization, the majority 
coalition adopts a discourse guided by a security logic. According to this discourse, 
irregular movers are not “migrants” – a do-gooder word ascribed to the lax center-left 
approach to immigration –, they are “clandestine”, “illegal” individuals. Put differently, 
those who do not respect the entry regulations of the state and live irregularly in its 
territory are considered criminals, and, as such, represent security threats to the country. 
As shown, their threatening character is often related to the alleged challenges they 
impose to the territorial borders of the state, to its identity/culture and to the public order. 
Furthermore, immigrants have been included in the country's security spectrum as a 
menace that is closely related to other serious threats, both domestic, as drug traffic and 
micro-criminality, and external, as smuggling and terrorism. The relationship 
established between movers and these serious societal problems serves to exacerbate the 
securitization of immigration in the country. 
 Notwithstanding the differences between the speeches of the center-right and 
center-left, there are at least three commonalities between the former group's securitized 
understanding of irregularity and the latter group's approach to the same problem, 
namely: the main mental representation of migrants, the origin of their 
irregular/clandestine status, and the role Italy ought to play in this context. The “vision 
of pauperism”, as Colombo and Sciortino623 name it, is without a doubt the main frame 
used to describe immigrants throughout the debates, and this is as true for the center-left 
                                                 
622
See more about status mobility at: Liza Schuster. The Continuing Mobility of Migrants, 2005. 
623
Asher Colombo and Giuseppe Sciortino. Italian immigration, 2004. 
176 
as it is for the center-right coalition. Nevertheless, as seen, poverty and despair are 
conducive to diverse conditions in each case: on the one hand, the opposition states that 
while irregularity may indeed be connected to a few security problems, as human 
smuggling, the lack of documents is not a criminal-maker; on the other hand, the center-
right group contends that the combination of lack of financial resources and 
unauthorized entry and stay can only result in deviant and illegal behaviors on the part 
of irregular foreigners. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the latter group does not 
argue that foreigners are intrinsically bad, but rather that the nonexistence of 
opportunities for them in Italy, combined with the lack of support from the state – they 
are, after all, “invisible” residents –, allows criminal organizations and other malefactors 
to take advantage of their fragile situation. Therefore, the origin of illegality, according 
to the rightist force, is not on immigrants themselves, but on a state of affairs that 
unavoidably steers these people into criminality. The blame for this scenario, in turn, is 
directly attributed to the past center-left governments, which instead of taking a realistic 
and fierce stand against the phenomenon of irregular migration, have chosen to 
implement do-gooder and inefficient immigration policies. As for the center-left, 
according to its components, the origin of irregular immigration are the policies devised 
by the center-right government, in particular the 2002 Bossi-Fini Law, which virtually 
closed all the legal gateways into the country, with the consequence that migrants must 
resort to alternative means to access the state's territory. 
 What's more, both political groups relate the migratory phenomenon to the 
process of globalization and to the existing developmental gaps between the Western 
and Southern parts of the globe, a view that supports the representation of international 
movers as the world's poor and destitute. Yet, whereas the center-left coalition 
acknowledges that migration is a structural phenomenon, and that the presence of 
immigrants has already turned Italy into a multicultural society, the majority has a hard 
time conceiving immigrants as anything more than guests, and depicts the migratory 
phenomenon as an uncontrollable invasion. In both cases, the critical international 
juncture imposes a crucial role on Italy and on other developed and civil states: that of 
host nations. However, given the political groups' different understandings of 
immigration, this role is also approached differently. The PD-IdV-UDC alliance 
advocates that the state should establish legal entry points for those who would like to 
try their luck in Italy, and that it should create and improve international cooperation 
programs and agreements aimed at aiding and speeding up the developmental processes 
of countries of origin. Conversely, the rightist sections of the parliamentary houses, 
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relying on the understanding of immigration as an uncontrolled invasion, maintain that 
the welcoming capacity of the Italian state is practically exhausted, and that it is 
consequently, impossible for the country to meet the demand imposed on it by this 
savage phenomenon. In light of such difficulties, it is only reasonable to adopt tighter 
border controls, and to increase internal levels of surveillance, after all, those who come 
in irregularly are inevitably going to be added to the ranks of criminality and deviance. 
 From this standpoint, the criminalization of irregular entry and stay in the 
territory, the maintenance of unidentified individuals in CEIs, the obligation of civil 
servants to denounce unauthorized residents, amongst other measures of the Security 
Bill, are apparently justifiable: the state is simply fulfilling its role by attempting to 
safeguard its residents – citizens and migrants alike – from potential criminals, terrorists, 
drug dealers, etc. This also means that, according to this view, there is no discriminatory 
intention in the novel security provisions; on the contrary, they are aimed at bringing 
into law a section of the population which does not comply with the rules of the state. In 
this sense, center-right politicians contend that they are promoting a process of 
equalization rather than one of discrimination. Put differently, they argue that the 
migrant-related provisions of the draft law do not create a special right to unauthorized 
migrants; on the contrary, the new measures intent to make sure that everyone in the 
country is compliant with the rule of law, and that nobody is above it. In respect to this 
argument, it is interesting to highlight that the center-right bloc manages to 
instrumentally use the notion of equality – a central concept of the “rights-based” 
discourse – in order to advance it own securitized agenda and policies. As it is going to 
be explained ahead, the instrumental appropriation of parts of the “rights-based” 
discourse to advance an exclusionary, securitized logic is not limited to this argument. 
 In fact, although the legal categorization of foreigners does not provide for the 
securitization of regular movers, the instrumental usage of the democratic discourse on 
rights and duties and the adoption of a perverted notion of immigrant integration seem 
to fill this gap, thereby allowing for a restrictive treatment of documented migrants as 
well. In more detail, as mentioned throughout this study, the principles that traditionally 
define nation-states, namely sovereignty, authority, nationality, citizenship, and territory 
are said to be challenged by the migratory phenomenon as such (i.e. by all types of 
human mobility), and this means that regular migration, too, might be considered, if not 
a threat, at least a factor responsible for destabilizing the foundations of the Italian state. 
It is contended, for instance, that the diverse traditions, religions, and “ways of living” 
that migrants unavoidably carry with them may endanger the native culture of the 
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society of settlement, especially if they are incompatible with local customs. The 
politicians of center-right coalition strongly rely on these traditional arguments to justify 
the repressive character of the immigration policies contained in the Security Bill. 
 Based on this nationalistic framework, rightist exponents argue that migrants in 
Italy are no more than guests, and that, as such, they should behave respectfully towards 
the norms, customs and traditions of the country, trying to adapt their conventional 
“ways of living” to the ones of the society that welcomes them. Not to do so is not only 
considered disrespectful, but also potentially threatening in that, as said, some practices 
may endanger the social cohesion and public order of the country. Unfortunately – 
according to them –, the “do-gooder” governments of the past were unwilling to 
regulate these matters, and thus, have allowed foreigners to take advantage of a number 
of rights and opportunities, without asking anything in return. As a result of this 
governmental inaction, foreigners living in Italy are said to be privileged: they can enjoy 
all that the Italian state has to offer, but they are required neither to respect nor to 
contribute to the society. The “threatening privileges” supposedly held by foreigners 
living regularly in the country justify the adoption of restrictive security measures 
which touch upon their legal condition. Note, however, that unlike irregular immigrants, 
regular foreign-born residents are not directly presented as security treats to Italy. 
 In order to substantiate this view, center-right politicians put forth their 
contentions drawing upon the democratic notion of rights and duties, as though 
immigrants had been given the same rights of Italian citizens, but unlike them, did not 
have to fulfill any duties. All in all, this is said to have generated an unbalanced 
situation, one according to which migrants are favored, whereas native citizens are left 
in great disadvantage: they not only suffer from a pervasive feeling of unease brought 
about by the immigrant invasion, but are also asked to cover all the expenses associated 
to hosting outsiders, and to put up with diverse cultures and customs. In this apparently 
unfair context, the exclusionary and somewhat repressive handling of regular 
immigration is presented as an inclusive strategy: according to the exponents of the 
majority, it is in the name of equality and integration that restrictive measures, as the 
creation of a financial contribution for the issuance and renewal of the residence permit, 
and the establishment of an integration agreement for newcomers, were devised and 
implemented. In other words, the center-right discursively justified these laws by 
claiming that they would help to equate foreigners to native citizens, in that not only 
rights, but also duties would be assigned to them. From that moment onwards, they 
would be required to pay for their stay, to contribute to the society, and to learn the 
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Italian “ways of being”. Thereby, according to these politicians, these new measures 
would first, reestablish the balance between immigrants' rights and duties, and second, 
stimulate their integration into the Italian society. The final result would be the 
establishment of a society that is safer and more just to all, both migrants and Italians. 
 This narrative demonstrates once again that notions pertaining to the “rights-
based” discourse were instrumentally appropriated by center-right actors in order to 
defend policies that violate movers' freedoms and rights. In fact, if an informed text 
interpreter compares the center-right's understanding of immigrant integration to the 
original conception of this term, it becomes clear that its usage is not appropriate. 
Historically, the notion of integration emerged during the 1970s and 1980s as a result of 
the combination of postwar liberal values and the human rights discourse – both of 
which opposed strategies of cultural assimilation.
624
 However, the notion of integration 
advanced by the center-right group resembles more old assimilation paradigms, than the 
two-way process of becoming an accepted part of the society.
625
 What's more, the 
measures allegedly aimed at promoting the integration of immigrants not only fail to 
engage the state in the process (no integration programs are provided for), but also help 
to worsen the legal condition of regularized foreign-born residents in the country (even 
though a secure legal status is a precondition for a successful process of integration
626
). 
The usage of the notion of rights and duties is also surprising for a number of reasons: 
firstly, because rightist parliamentarians do not take into consideration that most of the 
rights guaranteed to migrants in Italy are fundamental rights of human beings; secondly, 
because they deliberately ignore that foreigners do contribute to the Italian society and 
economy; and third, because these politicians seem to fall in contradiction when using a 
vocabulary derived from the traditional conception of citizenship to approach a group of 
individuals that they themselves define as guests. A last noteworthy aspect of the 
discourse on integration and duties is that, although it is based on a framework that 
problematizes immigration as such, it appears to apply only to certain categories of 
immigrants, notably to those who approach the image of poor and desperate. Highly-
skilled workers and EU citizens, for instance, are not subjected to the same rules. 
 All in all, these inconsistencies and shortcomings unveil a powerful discursive 
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strategy. The majority coalition puts forth a creative and tactical narrative that 
instrumentally appropriates terms from the opposing “rights-based” discourse in order 
to justify the exclusionary and oppressive migration-related provisions of the Security 
Bill. This strategic usage of parts of the opposing, subaltern discourse on immigration 
allows these politicians to apparently conciliate the oppressive security narrative and the 
inclusive logic of human rights and freedoms. Nevertheless, in practice, the new 
regulations most certainly do not promote the inclusion and integration of migrants; on 
the contrary, they seem to create another spectrum of inclusion and exclusion, one 
according to which the most “normalized” foreign-born individuals – i.e. the ones that 
turn out to be more similar to Italians or instrumental for the country – are accepted in, 
whereas the others are to be either left out or expelled. In this regard, it is noteworthy 
that the novel regulations do not apply to all categories of migrants (only to those that 
are considered superfluous to the country's economy), and that, in order to be accepted 
in, these outsiders are asked to proof that they are willing to integrate and contribute to 
the society. Only then, i.e. once the immigrant has proved his/her worthiness, he/she 
may be accepted as a harmless guest into Italy. 
 Based on these considerations, the aforementioned speeches on equality, on 
rights and duties and on integration really stand out as a facade, as a means to cover the 
exclusionary, restrictive and repressive handling of immigration. It is based on this 
facade that the center-right parliamentary group could enact a set of security measures 
that, albeit violating human rights in practice, could be legitimately supported by 
political actors in a liberal and democratic state. Thus, all in all, the rationale behind the 
novel restrictive regulations does not appear to be the integration of immigrants into the 
host society, nor the restoration of a balance between rights and duties, but rather the 
expansion of the state's power of discretion to determine which foreigners are desirable, 
which are worth to welcome, and which are dangerous or burdensome. 
 These conclusions should, however, be partly qualified. To begin with 
reservations mentioned in the methodological note, discourse analysis is an 
interpretative way of analyzing linguistic interactions, and this means that researchers 
may reach different conclusions, even when they work with the same primary sources. 
This is because discourse analysts may, for instance, observe diverse sets of formal 
properties in the textual material, or interpret differently the same aspects of texts. 
What's more, the critical character of the type of discourse analysis used here adds to 
this deficiency in scientific objectivity, in that it requires the researcher to take a 
positive commitment against linguistic forms of oppression and power. From this 
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viewpoint, it is relevant to highlight a fact that should be clear by now: the author of this 
contribution is opposes the securitized understanding of the migratory phenomenon. 
This political position certainly influenced the investigation. Another qualification to the 
findings of this study has to do with the loose application of the methods described. 
Since the amount of discourses analyzed was very large (see Annex 2), it was neither 
possible to make a through examination of the material, nor to clearly divide between 
the three stages of analysis proposed by Fairclough
627
. Despite these shortcomings, an 
attempt was made to observe and to analyze the most general linguistic patterns found 
in the debate sessions, as well as to use a wide range of secondary literature to support 
the analysis. The strategies were expected to enrich the quality of the analysis delivered, 
and to downgrade the problems listed above. 
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Annex 1: Timeline of the Italian “Security Package” (2008-2009) 
 
2008 
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(1) 28.02.2008: Legislative Decree no.32, on the freedom of movement of 
Communitarian citizens (Directive 2004/38/EC), which was later on withdrawn. 
(2) 23.05.2008: Law Decree no.92, concerning “Urgent Measures in the 
Field of Public Security”, later on amended and converted into law by the Law 
no.125. 
(3) 24.07.2008: Law no.125, concerning the conversion of the Decree no.92 
into Law. 
(4) 05.08.2008: Decree of the Interior Ministry, concerning “Public Safety 
and Urban Security: Interventions of Mayors” (GU no.186, 09.08.2008). 
(5) 02.10.2008: Decree Law no.151, on the usage of the Armed Forces in the 
fight against criminality and irregular migration, later on converted into law by 
the Law no.186. 
(6) 03.10.2008: Legislative Decree no.159, on the procedures to recognize 
and revoke the refugee status (Directive 2005/85/CE) 
(7) 03.10.2008: Legislative Decree no.160, on the right to family 
reunification (Directive 2003/86/CE); 
(8) 28.11.2008: Law n.186, concerning the conversion of the Decree no.151 
into Law. 
 
2009 
 
(9) 30.06.2009: Law no.85, with which Italy becomes a party in the Treaty of 
Prüm. 
(10) 15.07.2009: Law no.94, concerning “Provisions in the Field of Public 
Security” (Senate Act no.733 and Chamber Act no.2180). 
(11) 08.08.2009: Decree of the Interior Ministry no.183 (known as “Decreto 
Ronde”), on the citizens' patrolling groups. 
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Annex 2: List of the Parliamentary Sessions devoted to the Discussion 
of the Security Bill
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Senate of the Republic (Draft Law S 733) 
 
Discussion in the Commission: from the 19
th
 June 2008 to the 5
th
 of November 2008 
 
Discussion in the Assembly 
 
Number of the Parliamentary session and date: 
 
1) Session n.088, 11/11/2008 
2) Session n.089, 12/11/2008 
3) Session n.090, 12/11/2008 
4) Session n.093, 18/11/2008 
5) Session n.094, 18/11/2008 
6) Session n.095, 19/11/2008 
7) Session n.115, 16/12/2008 
8) Session n.122, 13/01/2009 
9) Session n.123, 14/01/2009 
10) Session n.124, 14/01/2009 
11) Session n.125, 15/01/2009 
12) Session n.141, 04/02/2009 
13) Session n.142, 04/02/2009 
14) Session n.143, 05/02/2009 
 
Source: Senato della Repubblica. Atto Senato n. 733. XVI Legislatura. All the 
discursive interventions of the Senators are available at: 
<<http://www.senato.it/leg/16/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/aula/31554_aula.htm>>. 
 
 
Chamber of Deputies (Draft Law AC 2180) 
 
Discussion in Commission: from the 10
th
 of March 2009 to the 12
th
 of May 2009 
 
Discussion in the Assembly 
 
Number of the Parliamentary session and date: 
 
1) Session n.169, 30/04/2009 
2) Session n. 171, 04/05/2009 
3) Session n. 175, 12/05/2009 
4) Session n. 176, 13/05/2009 
5) Session n. 177, 14/05/2009 
 
 
Source: Camera dei Deputati. Atto Camera: 2180. All the discursive interventions of the 
Deputies are available at: <<http://www.camera.it/126?PDL=2180&leg=16&tab=5>>. 
 
                                                 
629
As mentioned previously, the Security Bill became the Law no.94, published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale 
on the 15
th
 of July of 2009 (GU n.170 of July 24
th 
2009). 
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Senate of the Republic (Draft Law S 733-B) 
 
Discussion in the Assembly 
 
Number of the Parliamentary session and date: 
 
1) Session n.218, 09/06/2009 
2) Session n.221, 16/06/2009 
3) Session n.224, 23/06/2009 
4) Session n.229, 30/06/2009 
5) Session n.230, 01/07/2009 
6) Session n.231, 01/07/2009 
7) Session n.232, 02/07/2009 
 
Source: Senato della Repubblica. Atto Senato n. 733. XVI Legislatura. All the 
discursive interventions of the Senators are available at: 
<<http://www.senato.it/leg/16/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/aula/31554_aula.htm>>. 
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